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Thesis Abstract
“From Bad Weapons to Bad States: The Evolution of U.S. Counterproliferation Policy”
One of the key features of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy was an
abrupt shift from the traditional U.S. approach to proliferation threats that prioritized
deterrence and promotion of nondiscriminatory nonproliferation norms, to an approach
called counterproliferation that emphasized military preemption and direct challenges to
adversarial state identity. This thesis asks the question, what caused counterproliferation
to largely replace deterrence and nonproliferation as the central national security policies
of the U.S. concerning unconventional weapons? The thesis argues that to understand this
policy change requires not merely an appreciation of changes in the post-Cold War
international security environment, but also an examination of how culturally shaped
threat conceptions among American policymakers interacted with capabilities
development and policy institutionalization within the U.S. military. As no current theory
adequately addresses those dynamics, complimentary strategic culture and organizational
theory models are presented as the framework for analysis. This thesis will contend that
policy shift from NP to CP resulted from the merging of strategic cultural efforts aimed at
legitimizing conceptions of proliferation threats as originating from state identity, with a
military organizational drive to avoid uncertainty through the development of
counterproliferation capabilities. Together these strategic cultural and organizational
responses to shifting proliferation threats altered the menu of choice for policymakers by
institutionalizing and legitimizing a policy response that directly challenged existing
nonproliferation norms and practices. This thesis relies on a detailed case study of the
evolution of counterproliferation policy from 1993 to 2002, with particular focus on the
analysis of public discourse, declassified policy planning and Department of Defense
documents, and participant interviews.
Introduction
Ideas have consequences.1 One of the consequences, for better or for worse, is that as
ideas become the stories we tell to make sense of the world around us, they also
significantly condition our actions and challenge our ability to understand others. Stories
are essentially simplifications that take the rich diversity of human experience and shape
it into recognizable, transmittable forms, providing the basis for our cultures, our
associations, as well as the justifications for our actions. Such stories can obscure just as
easily as illuminate, or sow suspicion rather than foster mutual understanding.
In broad terms, this thesis is an examination of how we create and transmit ideas in the
political world, as told through the lens of American foreign policy at the end of the Cold
War. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the genesis and evolution of policy ideas about
the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their associated means of
delivery. 2 Far from being an unambiguous conceptual issue with a single ‘rational’ policy
response, responding to unconventional weapons proliferation required U.S.
policymakers to first conceptualize the threat, create adequate policy responses to meet
identified threats, and then justify both threat conceptions and policy choices to others.
Each stage entailed subjective interpretations of reality that significantly affected the
ultimate direction of U.S. foreign policy. As no clear consensus on proliferation threats or
responses had emerged from the Cold War, competing ideas clashed within the halls of
power and on the public stage over many years. The ultimate victors in this process
claimed the argumentative ground of ‘common sense’, and their ideas have strongly
affected the direction of U.S. foreign policy on proliferation issues ever since.
                                                 
1 Though I owe a personal debt to conservative thinker Richard M. Weaver for this phrase, it is hardly an
original concept to which authorship can reasonably be attributed. See Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have
Consequences, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984)
2 This thesis follows the lead of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by eschewing the use of
the term “WMD” in favor of “unconventional weapons” as a blanket term for nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, and their associated delivery systems. As will be argued in this thesis, “WMD” is a
term with overt political connotations that will be a focus of analysis, and thus is inappropriate as a general
descriptive term for the relevant weapons categories. See Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam
Rajkumar (eds.), Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, Second Edition,
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005)
2However, for social scientists, political claims of ‘common sense’ lead to additional
questions, rather than the acceptance of given assumptions. In the case of the
proliferation of unconventional weapons, the issues that arise from questioning
supposedly common sense threat conceptions reveal many important issues about the
creation and evolution of U.S. foreign policy. These issues have important implications
concerning the potential for peaceful relations between the United States and various
non-democratic regimes and non-state actors, and especially the use of American military
force in attempting to prevent the proliferation of unconventional weapons.
At the time of this writing, more than 130,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Iraq as the
result of a conflict that has led to the deaths of more than 4,000 U.S. soldiers, an
estimated 150,000 Iraqis, and a cost to the United States of more than $750 billion.3
Though subject to a shifting rationale by the Bush Administration, the conflict was
ostensibly triggered by Iraq’s possession of unconventional weapons and its refusal to
fully comply with UN Security Council Resolutions calling for its complete
disarmament.4
Across the Iraqi border to the east, the United States and Israel are engaged in a
dangerous game of brinksmanship with Iran over the suspected Iranian nuclear weapons
program, with both the Israeli and American governments signaling their willingness to
use preventative military force if Iran is unresponsive to economic sanctions and political
pressure to abandon its weapons program.5 Political tensions and the potential for
                                                 
3 Although reliable figures on Iraqi fatalities as the result of conflict are difficult to determine, the most
widely respected recent study by the Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group (in collaboration with the
World Health Organization) estimates approximately 151,000 fatalities. See Iraq Family Health Survey
Study Group, ‘Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006’, The New England Journal of
Medicine, Vol. 358 (January 31, 2008), pp. 484-493; Estimates of financial costs of the Iraq War are drawn
from Amy Belasco, ‘The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since
9/11’, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, September 22, 2006.
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33110.pdf (accessed July 6, 2008)
4 For a listing of the relevant Security Council Resolutions, see U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet,
‘Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraq’ http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm (accessed
July 6, 2008)
5 Agence France-Presse, ‘Israel trains for possible strike on Iran: reports’, June 20, 2008,
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gG5oYXZ9oJBk4Ls5-nmW_7R7eGZA (accessed July 6, 2008)
3devastating military escalation also remain high on the Korean Peninsula, once again
focused on the North Korean nuclear weapons program and international efforts to press
for its disarmament.
From the late 1960’s until relatively recently, the United States addressed the
proliferation of unconventional weapons primarily through a combination of deterrence
and nonproliferation policy. With potential adversaries who possessed unconventional
weapons, the United States fashioned a military doctrine of deterrence that threatened
massive military retaliation against those who would use these weapons against the
United States, its forces abroad, or its allies. For states that did not yet possess these
weapons, the United States helped shape a regime consisting of multilateral,
nondiscriminatory diplomatic, legal and economic tools known as nonproliferation (NP)
policy, intended to dissuade states from acquiring or developing these weapons.6 More
than simply a set of foreign policy tools, NP policy encompasses a set of normative
beliefs that view these weapons as inherently destabilizing and advocates eventual global
disarmament. It is only since the end of the Cold War that the United States has
developed a controversial alternative policy to address proliferation called
counterproliferation (CP). CP policy entails the application of military force to defend
against or even rollback the spread and use of unconventional weapons, conceptualizing
the threat of proliferation as largely stemming from the possession of such weapons by
supposedly irrational “rogue regimes” and transnational terrorist organizations assumed
to be unresponsive to traditional deterrence strategies.7
Considering the centrality of debates over nonproliferation and counterproliferation
approaches to many of the vital security issues of the past two decades, there exists a
surprising degree of confusion over the history and nature of counterproliferation policy,
                                                 
6 Though most often referring directly to nuclear weapons, NP policy is a blanket term loosely covering
U.S. support for similar regimes intended to control chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic
missiles.
7 See particularly United States Government, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America’, (September 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed July 6, 2008); and United
States Government, ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’, (December 2002)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf  (accessed July 6, 2008)
4both within academic circles and even the U.S. government itself. A number of
academics have shown little concern for the distinction between counterproliferation and
nonproliferation, using the term as a general label for all policy responses to
proliferation.8 Confusion about the difference between the approaches exists on the
national level, with the Canadian Navy claiming participation in the U.S.-led
counterproliferation activity of militarily interdicting suspected proliferation-related
cargo on the high seas as a form of “nonproliferation assistance.”9 In another telling
example of enduring conceptual confusion, the United States National Defense
University recently changed the name of its Counterproliferation Center to the Center for
the Study of WMD, claiming that “many people, even in the military, aren’t exactly sure
what counterproliferation means.”10 As a clear understanding of CP policy is critical to
understanding the concepts and methods the United States applies in its response to
proliferation, it is vital to provide an explanation of what exactly is meant by
counterproliferation policy and how it evolved into its current form.
The central question asked by this thesis is: How did counterproliferation come to
largely replace deterrence and nonproliferation as the central national security policy of
the U.S. concerning unconventional weapons? This challenge was most clearly
articulated in the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of preemptive force as set forth in the 2002
National Security Strategy of the United States. In the course of answering this question,
both the central concepts and significant consequences of counterproliferation policy will
be examined.
                                                 
8 Caroline F. Ziemke, ‘The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation
Perspective’, in Victor A. Utgoff, (ed.) The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World
Order, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 87-122; see also Derek D. Smith, ‘Deterrence and
Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Security Studies, (June 2003), pp. 152-
197; and Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
9 This activity is classified under the Proliferation Security Initiative. For Canadian military perspectives on
this, see Vice Admiral Drew Robertson, ‘A Conversation with Vice Admiral Drew Robertson’, Canadian
Naval Review, Vol. 2, No. 4, (Winter, 2007), pp. 4-8
10 Interview with John P. Caves, Senior Research Professor, National Defense University WMD Center,
and former Deputy Director for Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 21,
2005
5Without an authoritative explanation of the evolution of CP, there is little common
ground for understanding what precisely CP policy is, much less the ability to adequately
discuss the implications of this policy for existing deterrence strategies or
nonproliferation norms and practices. How the United States frames the problem of
proliferation and appropriate policy responses carries important implications for the
international system. The reorientation of American policy responses to proliferation in a
more military, coercive direction hold the potential to alter or directly challenge
established global approaches to the use of force, the legitimacy of preventative or
preemptive use of force, the question of nuclear ordering, the future of deterrence as
viable military doctrine, and the future of the multilateral NP regime with its focus on
diplomatic and economic tools for influencing state behavior.
Understanding how CP evolved can help reveal the forces behind the transformation of
normative beliefs at the national level, shed light on the relationship between civilian
policymakers and military organizations in developing policy, and show how important
challenges to broadly legitimized and institutionalized practices and conceptions occur at
the national level. Additionally, without a clear understanding of the forces behind CP
policy evolution, analysts and policymakers risk failing to understand the longevity and
scope of the policy. Will the central conceptions and practices of CP persist beyond the
current presidential administration? Will the targets of CP action expand or reduce in
number? Will CP efforts be focused on reducing the physical threat posed by
unconventional weapons proliferation, or will CP methods be applied as part of broader
efforts to remove the adversaries themselves? Although a better understanding of the past
will not provide unambiguous answers to these questions, such an examination is
essential for understanding how current choices have been shaped by past actions and
conceptions.
Existing Literature on Counterproliferation
Despite the importance of CP policy to one of the central security issues of the post-Cold
War, as well as its challenge to deterrence and nonproliferation, it is surprising there is
6relatively little literature that deals directly with CP, with almost nothing of significance
written on the evolution of CP policy. Existing literature on CP policy is characterized by
a widespread confusion about the nature of the policy itself, and universally thin
examination and analysis of its evolution.
This conceptual confusion and lack of analytical depth perhaps stem from the tangled
history of counterproliferation, which saw the policy pass through several guiding hands
and public pronouncements.
Though having its roots in the immediate post-Cold War years, CP was publicly unveiled
with much fanfare by the Clinton Administration in December of 1993. The Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI) was introduced as the first major defense initiative
of the Clinton Administration and intended to bolster existing NP policy by giving the
Department of Defense a strengthened ability to protect U.S. forces from use of
unconventional weapons in future conflicts. It was greeted with strong resistance in three
major areas: first was a wave of external criticism that the initiative threatened to
undermine multilateral nonproliferation efforts; second was stiff bureaucratic opposition
from the State Department worried about its own NP policy turf; and third was internal
resistance from senior military members arguing the DCI would present little more than
an unnecessary budgetary burden for the DOD. Facing such a range of resistance,
counterproliferation disappeared from public prominence as quickly as it had appeared. It
was only with the publication of the National Security Strategy in 2002, and its
articulation of counterproliferation as central to a new doctrine of preemption, that CP
policy returned to public prominence.11
The contentious public path taken by CP over the years has led some analysts to conclude
there was never a single CP policy, but in fact several competing policies bearing the
                                                 
11 ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, preface
7name of CP, each coming to prominence when championed by a new Administration or
leading defense official, and in turn generating controversy and fading into obscurity.12
While acknowledging the competing interpretations of CP, the bulk of existing literature
is concerned with supporting or critiquing one of the three following general assumptions
about the nature and scope of CP policy.13
1) Counterproliferation means merely nonproliferation activities undertaken by the
Department of Defense
Interpretations of CP drawing from this assumption often reflect the conceptual confusion
resulting from the public “failure” of the policy following the announcement of the DCI
in 1993. Though examined in greater detail in following chapters, the strong controversy
that met the DCI announcement was resolved by a set of working definitions for NP and
CP formulated by the National Security Council (NSC). Under these definitions, CP was
supposedly limited to the activities of the DOD such as export control verification and
intelligence collection to support larger NP policy led by the State Department. Though
serving to mollify critics, this definition was hardly representative of conceptions of CP
held by the DOD, and far from an accurate assessment of the much more active policy
developed and institutionalized in subsequent years.
The literature that holds to this definition is often either wholly misguided as to the nature
and scope of CP policy, or simply mistakes the public resolution of controversy
                                                 
12 Important critical analyses that touch on the competing forms of CP policy include, Harald Müller and
Mitchell Reiss, ‘Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Weapons
Proliferation in the 1990’s, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 139-150; Thomas Mahnken, ‘A
Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, National Security Studies Quarterly,
(Summer 1999), pp. 91-102; Brad Roberts, ‘From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation’, International
Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173; Gilles Andréani, ‘The Disarray of U.S. Non-
Proliferation Policy’, Survival, (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 42-61; Leonard S. Spector, ‘Neo-
Nonproliferation’, Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85; and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, ‘The
Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, in Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin
and Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies,
1998), pp. 21-36
13 These three definitions are loosely drawn from a larger list detailed in the most comprehensive early
analysis of CP policy by Müller and Reiss, “Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles’
8surrounding the announcement of CP for the end of substantive evolution and
institutionalization of the policy. The first category includes analyses such as those by
Smith and Ziemke conflating NP and CP, and results from taking the NSC definitions at
face value.14 In these accounts, CP is used as a blanket term denoting all foreign policy
tools of the United States to address proliferation threats, with no distinction made
between the political and economic methods of traditional NP policy and the range of
military methods presented at different stages of CP policy evolution. Considering the
controversy surrounding CP methods from many quarters at the time of the
announcement of the DCI, it is surprising that these authors do not take a more critical
stance towards their analysis of both the clear normative and operational distinctions
between nonproliferation and counterproliferation.
A particular weakness in Smith’s approach to assessing U.S. policies is that in ignoring
the contentious history of counterproliferation, he uncritically adopts many of the most
politically charged terminology at the heart of the divide between CP and NP. Smith’s
use of terms such as WMD and “rogue regimes” would not be problematic in itself, were
he to display an appreciation of those terms as politically negotiated and representative of
one facet of the proliferation policy debate. As it stands, the terms and their embedded
concepts are accepted as representative of objective fact removed from the broader
process of threat perception and policy response, illustrating the problem of removing
issues like CP policy from their historical and political context.
2) Counterproliferation means preparing U.S. military forces to survive and
continue to fight in a battlefield featuring unconventional weapons usage
A larger body of literature proceeds from the assumption of CP policy as centrally
articulated in the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, and as defended by Clinton
Administration officials responding to criticism of CP as oriented towards preemptive
military strikes. In this conception, the focus of the policy is on CP capabilities such as
                                                 
14 Smith, Deterring America; Smith ‘Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass
Destruction’; and Ziemke, ‘The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation
Perspective’
9battlefield detection of chemical or biological weapons, force protection in the form of
protective clothing, vaccinations and mobile decontamination equipment, and active
defenses in the form of limited-range forward deployed missile defenses. As such, while
presenting new capabilities, CP in this form represents a modest investment in conflict
preparedness rather than any comprehensive alternative to existing nonproliferation
policy. While potentially exhibiting a lack of confidence in the ability of nonproliferation
norms or deterrence postures to prevent the spread and use of unconventional weapons,
CP in this form hardly constitutes a significant normative challenge to either NP or
deterrence, and instead is merely representative of prudent military preparedness.
While much of the literature in this category acknowledges the history of CP conceptions
and practices, this focus of analysis on the evolution of CP policy is secondary to the
larger goal of policy advocacy or critique in the literature. Important collections of such
policy assessment and prescription literature founded on this assumption are a number of
papers from two volumes on CP policy collected as part of government sponsored
colloquia in the mid-1990’s that drew former defense officials and scholars to answer
questions about the status of CP capabilities and the proper direction for CP policy.15
While this literature contains some important identification of potential forces driving CP
policy evolution, most of the writing represents attempts to assess the performance of CP
to date in addressing proliferation threats, and advocating changes to CP policy where
progress in reducing proliferation threats was limited.16 While relevant to policy makers,
                                                 
15 William H. Lewis and Stuart E. Johnson (eds.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on
Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995); and Peter L. Hays,
Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel (eds.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Companies, 1998)
16 See particularly, Mitchel B. Wallerstien, ‘Concepts to Capabilites: The First Year of
Counterproliferation’, in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction:
New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp.
27-38; Robert G. Joseph, ‘WMD: A Proliferation Overview’, ibid., pp. 3-15; Mitchel B. Wallerstein, ‘The
Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, in Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin
and Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies,
1998), pp. 21-36; Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, ‘NBC Military Planning: Lessons Learned from
Analysis and Wargaming’, ibid., pp. 171-192; Henry F. Cooper, ‘Active Defenses to Help Counter
Proliferation’, ibid., pp. 193-215; and Robert P. Kadlec and Randall J. Larsen, ‘Passive Defense’, ibid., pp.
217-237
10
such literature exhibits little concern for either explanation of the development of CP
policy, or assessment of the normative challenges to existing NP policy and deterrence.
Instead, these articles often depend loosely on a type of materialist theoretical assumption
in explaining the evolution of CP that attributes policy orientation in vague terms to the
relative distribution of power in the international system and potential challenges to the
status quo presented by proliferation.
One significant account by former defense official Henry Sokolski, which draws a similar
conclusion of CP as valuable but limited force protection measures, provides a well-
documented account of the complications and roadblocks that faced the adoption and
development of the counterproliferation initiative and acknowledges the large conceptual
differences that had originally placed CP as an alternative to NP policy.17 Unfortunately,
his conclusions about the evolution of counterproliferation end largely with what he
views as the accepted limitations on the scope of CP by the DOD following the
controversies of the early 1990’s. In doing so, Sokolski fails to fully acknowledge the
importance of subsequent re-conceptions of proliferation threats by political leaders, or
the transformative institutionalization of CP capabilities within the U.S. military. In
Sokolski’s account, the political pressures and internal resistance to counterproliferation
as a viable DOD mission represent the end of any meaningful challenge CP presents to
NP or deterrence, though this conclusion necessitates ignoring much of the later obvious
manifestations of CP policy as precisely such a challenge.18 Without a substantive
analysis of policy evolution that extends beyond the early controversies, or one that
investigates the continuing ramifications of the important normative challenges
embedded in CP concepts, Sokolski presents an analysis that examines only half of CP
policy evolution, and not necessarily the most significant half.
3) Counterproliferation means the offensive military actions to eliminate the
unconventional weapons capabilities and production facilities of proliferators
                                                 
17 Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s campaign against strategic weapons proliferation,
(Westport: Praeger, 2001), esp. Ch. 6
18 Oddly, in interviews and personal conversations, Sokolski first denied that military capabilities and
actions targeting unconventional weapons were significant, and later denied such actions and capabilities
even constituted counterproliferation.
11
during conflict, or preceding conflict in the form of preemptive or preventative
action.
The most divisive interpretation of CP policy, drawing in the most vocal critics and
supporters, is of an offensively oriented policy of preventing the use or development of
unconventional weapons by potential adversaries. It is this offensive military conception
of CP that involves the potential for preventative or preemptive use of military force prior
to the outbreak of hostilities. The instruments of such a policy would be counterforce
capabilities of the United States military, particularly deep precision strike capabilities
utilizing either standoff weapons or special operations forces. Unsurprisingly, this
conception of CP policy has drawn the fiercest critics, who point to the potential for such
a policy orientation to undermine both NP and deterrence norms, and perhaps lead to
military escalation with devastating results in highly militarized regions with existing
tensions such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. It is also an offensively
oriented CP policy that is feared to potentially delegitimize the entire multilateral NP
regime through the unilateral application of American military power to limit the spread
of unconventional weapons.
Unsurprisingly, opposing positions in the literature also hold rather different opinions on
the evolution of this particular interpretation of CP policy. Direct advocates generally
argue that a policy of counterproliferation should provide an effective set of capabilities
to counter threats to American interests posed by inherently irrational regimes, or
undeterrable terrorist organizations.19 Often this literature expresses a certain inevitability
or inherent logic of threat assessment in explaining how CP policy supposedly evolved.
Analysts with this perspective often fail to explain why such assessments are supposedly
                                                 
19 For prominent examples, see Jason D. Ellis, ‘The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National
Security’, The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 2003), pp. 115-133; Lewis A. Dunn, ‘Proliferation
Prevention: Beyond Traditionalism’, in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass
Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University
Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; William C. Martel and William T. Pendley, ‘Rethinking U.S. Proliferation Policy
for the Future’, ibid,, pp. 207-229; Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, (Lexington, KY:
The University Press of Kentucky, 1996); and Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military
Power and the Second Nuclear Age, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999)
12
common sense for the United States, but obviously controversial or even illegitimate in
the eyes of America’s allies and strategic partners.
What constitutes “common sense” in these accounts on the issue of threat perception and
the fashioning of appropriate policy response is often precisely what requires critical
examination if we are to come to an understanding of how the conceptions and practices
underpinning CP have evolved and what they mean for existing normative beliefs.
Narratives of strategic threat conception necessarily contain a number of basic
assumptions. Examining these basic, supposedly “common sense” assumptions, is
important to understanding the implications of threat conceptions.
Critics charge that a preemptive policy of counterproliferation destroys confidence in
stable deterrence relationships and threatens to lock out other states from the existing
nonproliferation decision-making process, thereby placing the United States in the role of
global judge, jury and executioner against unconventional weapons.20 Critics also view a
policy of counterproliferation as part of a larger trend of unilateralism and a dangerous
willingness on the part of the United States to abandon diplomatic and political
approaches to international security issues in favor of military or technical solutions.
In explaining the evolution of this form of CP policy, critics often identify powerful
individuals or groups of policymakers with shared biases about the nature of the
international security environment and the role of American power as the causal drivers
of change. It is these individuals or groups, such as the so-called neoconservatives of the
Bush Administration, that are assumed to have shaped CP policy by fiat, organizing the
                                                 
20 Some of the most astute and prescient criticism appeared in the following collected volume: Mitchell
Reiss and Harald Müller (eds.), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, 1995), especially David Fischer, ‘Forcible Counterproliferation:
Necessary? Feasible?’, pp. 11-24; Virgina S.I. Gamba, Counterproliferation: Harmony or Contradiction?’,
pp. 55-72; Benjamin Sanders, ‘Counterproliferation: How Does it Play on the International Stage?’, pp. 1-
10; and Avner Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate’, pp. 73-102.
See also, Thomas Mahnken, ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, National
Security Studies Quarterly, (Summer 1999), pp. 91-102; Brad Roberts, ‘From Nonproliferation to
Antiproliferation’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173; Gilles Andréani,
‘The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy’, Survival, (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 42-61; Walter B.
Slocombe, ‘Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy’, Survival, (Spring 2003), pp. 117-130; and Lawrence
Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York, Palgrave, 2003) Ch. 28
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CP capabilities of the DOD around personally identified threat conceptions and policy
responses. However, these accounts largely fail to account for earlier capabilities
development within the DOD and the evolution of similar organizing conceptions in
decisionmaking circles that established the legitimate “menu of choice” for later
policymakers. In ignoring or failing to explain earlier processes of political argument and
institutionalization of offensive CP capabilities, critics fail to offer an explanation of
policy evolution that integrates a wealth of evidence pointing to prior development of CP
conceptions, practices and capabilities seized upon by later policymakers responsible for
fashioning a CP policy heavily weighted towards preemption.
It is worth reiterating that the distinction between nonproliferation and
counterproliferation is not a superficial question of terminology, but rather representative
of substantively divergent interpretations of threat assessments and appropriate responses.
A traditional NP policy that assumes broadly rational potential proliferators that can be
dissuaded from unconventional weapons development through a framework of largely
economic and diplomatic incentives and disincentives, presents far different implications
for international order than a CP policy that assumes broadly irrational proliferators
whose weapons development activities (and indeed, political identities) must be
countered by coercive, often military means. Although leveraging these two approaches
in concert can be argued to provide a wider spectrum of policy response to proliferation
threats, the often contradictory strategic assumptions underpinning these two approaches
means they must be treated as distinctly alternative responses to the problem of
proliferation, and with very different implications for the international system.
Further Theoretical Limitations on the Existing Analysis of CP Evolution
In directly addressing the evolution of counterproliferation policy, explanations in the
literature are largely implicit from the theoretical assumptions that inform the studies, or
mentioned only briefly and tangentially, such as in the case of policy advocacy papers.
The theoretical assumptions of the existing literature dealing with the evolution of CP
policy generally fall into one of three categories:
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1) Literature based on assumptions similar to Rational Actor Models, which explain
the evolution of CP policy as a rational response by the United States to the
expansion of military capabilities by potential adversaries.21
2) Literature explaining CP policy evolution according to Bureaucratic Politics
models, with policy outcomes implicitly assumed to be the result of bureaucratic
bargaining.22
3) Literature considering CP policy evolution to be the result of individual biases
and policy preferences of powerful policymakers, keeping with assumptions
common to Cognitive theories of policymaking.23
An examination and critique of these theoretical assumptions as applied to the
explanation of CP policy evolution will be dealt with in greater detail in the following
chapter.
While the literature debating counterproliferation has explained in some depth the
external environment that framed the choices made by the actors within the system, it
leaves important gaps in our understanding of how those decisions have been made.
Significantly, there is not yet any literature that deals with an in-depth study of the
constituencies that supported or resisted the development of a policy of
counterproliferation, and most of the existing accounts rely largely on finalized speeches
or official policy positions announcing milestones in the development of a
counterproliferation policy. This has resulted in a simplified analysis that fails to
                                                 
21 For accounts of CP policy evolution dependent on RAM assumptions, see Ashton B. Carter and L.
Celeste Johnston, ‘Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative’, National Security Studies Quarterly,
Summer 1999, pp. 64-71; Wallerstien, ‘Concepts to Capabilites’; Wallerstein, ‘The Origins and Evolution
of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’; Dunn, ‘Proliferation Prevention: Beyond Traditionalism’;
and United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2001)
22 Important accounts of CP policy largely dependent on Bureaucratic Politics explanations include,
Sokolski, Best of Intentions; Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Ossirak’; Sanders, ‘Counterproliferation: How Does it
Play on the International Stage?’; and Slocombe, ‘Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy’
23 See particularly, Mahnken, ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’; Ellis and
Kiefer, Combating Proliferation; Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Ch. 28; and David J. Karl,
‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Winter
1996-1997), pp. 87-119
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adequately identify the relevant actors in the policymaking process, while glossing over
competing visions of U.S. foreign policy among the actors it does recognize.
A number of analyses touch promisingly on the concept of competing constituencies
supporting different approaches to CP policy. Müller and Reiss mention a number of
governmental and nongovernmental “enthusiastic supporters” of the competing
interpretations of CP policy, but fail to draw any conclusions as to the significance of
these divisions.24 David Karl attempts to make sense of the diverse views on CP policy by
dividing advocates into categories of proliferation “pessimists” and “optimists.” These
two categories represent either those who perceive an offensive CP policy to be a
necessary augmentation to a critically flawed NP regime incapable of reining in
proliferation pressures, or those expressing confidence in the NP regime and advocating a
largely secondary role for CP respectively.25 Leon Sloss attempts a similar line of
argument through more vague categories of “alphas” and “betas” in an attempt to avoid
the limiting preconceptions of Karl’s categories in dealing with divergent views on the
scope and application of CP.26 In one of the more interesting pieces of analysis in this
vein, Leonard Spector briefly raised the possibility of a more offensively oriented CP
policy if the Department of Defense, backed by conservative supporters in Congress, was
given free reign to develop CP policy as it saw fit.27
Why does the existing literature present important shortcomings to our understanding of
CP? Because without a clear understanding of how CP evolved, the organizational forces,
political constituencies and strategic assumptions driving CP policy remain hidden.
Without a detailed examination, critiques or support address the results of the policy,
rather than exploring its origins. By failing to adequately present the diversity of opinions
and significant policy influences and outcomes, these accounts offer little to further our
understanding of either the implications of counterproliferation policy or the broader
process of U.S. foreign policy making. Without such an examination, it is unclear
                                                 
24 Müller and Reiss, “Counterproliferation’, pp. 140, 141
25 Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’
26 Leon Sloss, The Current Nuclear Dialogue, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1999)
27 Spector, ‘Neo-Nonproliferation’
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precisely where a policy of counterproliferation has come from, what substantive impacts
it has had on the way the United States responds to proliferation threats, what this means
for the future of multilateral institutions charged with addressing proliferation at the
global level and founded on broadly shared normative beliefs, and whether the United
States intends to apply military force to address the problems of proliferation.
Answers Provided by the Thesis
The thesis argues that from a theoretical perspective, we must move beyond the
limitations of Rational Actor, Bureaucratic Politics and Cognitive models of
decisionmaking, in order to examine the cultural, ideational and institutional forces at the
heart of CP policy evolution. To understand how this range of alternatives evolved, close
examination must be made into how political entities legitimized new strategic
conceptions, how military organizations provided new options for the application of
military force, and how both of these forces interacted to challenge existing normative
beliefs and alter the choices available to future policymakers. In order to address the
cultural and normative issues at the heart of CP policy evolution, the thesis presents two
alternate models for analysis focused on the collectively held beliefs of civilian
policymakers and those of military organizations, that of strategic culture and
organizational theory respectively.
Counterproliferation policy is more than the military capabilities developed by the DOD
and the political decisions about when to use them. CP policy is also strongly grounded in
widely accepted conceptions about the nature of the proliferation threat and the normative
beliefs about appropriate means to respond to that threat. The policy shift from a limited
defensive conception of CP to one weighted more heavily towards preemptive military
action resulted from the merging of conservative strategic cultural efforts at legitimizing
conceptions of proliferation threats as originating from state identity, with an
organizational drive to avoid operational uncertainty through the development of
effective counterforce and active defense capabilities. Together these strategic cultural
and organizational forces incrementally altered the menu of choice for future
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policymakers by institutionalizing and legitimizing a policy response to proliferation
threats that directly challenged existing nonproliferation norms and practices.
Research Methodology and Sources
The arguments presented in this thesis are based on a detailed case study of the evolution
of counterproliferation policy from 1989 to 2002, with particular focus on the analysis of
public discourse, declassified national policy planning and Department of Defense
documents, and participant interviews.
Materials relevant to the public discourse on counterproliferation include speeches and
official policy documents produced by the United States Government from 1989 to 2002,
particularly Congressional materials such as testimony presented at unclassified hearings,
floor debates and recorded legislation, reports compiled by the Congressional Research
Service, and public record communications from the President to Congress. Many of
these materials have been made publicly available online in recent years by the Library of
Congress, though during the course of research the invaluable personal assistance of
Library’s staff and its microfilm holdings were of particular value in discovering relevant
case study materials. A subset of other significant public materials were documents
submitted by the inter-agency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, the
personal papers of involved policymakers, documents and reports produced by U.S.
government research bodies such as The National Defense University’s WMD Center,
and the United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center.
Formerly classified or restricted materials relevant to the study include a wide variety of
relevant document types such as briefing memoranda, memoranda of conversations,
minutes of meetings (including participant lists), National Security Council Reports,
National Security Directives (first Bush Administration), Presidential Decision Directives
(Clinton and second Bush administrations), Presidential Review Directives (Clinton and
second Bush administrations), reports, policy papers, briefing books, histories, cables,
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personal notes and letters. One of the most significant resources for these materials is the
voluminous document sets collected by the National Security Archives at George
Washington University. These document sets are largely the result of comprehensive
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review requests,
and cover such topics as U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy (2,651 documents),
Presidential Directives on National Security (2,100 documents), and a collection of so-
called ‘Iraqgate’ documents related to U.S. policy towards Iraq before the Gulf War
(1,913 documents).
Valuable archival assistance was also provided by the staff of the National Archives in
College Park, Maryland, and by the Department of Defense Office of Freedom of
Information & Security Review (OFOISR). The National Security Archives and DOD
OFOISR are particularly important resources for formerly classified materials concerning
counterproliferation policy, considering the difficulty individual researchers face in
directly appealing to the U.S. Government for timely declassification of relevant
documents. During the course of the research for this thesis, several FOIA requests were
filed for classified policy planning and defense strategy documents, but to date only one
document from an extensive list of requested materials was declassified in response to a
individual FOIA request by the author.28
Finally, a number of interviews with relevant current and former policymakers were
conducted in the Washington D.C. area and by phone. Interview subjects selected were
those identified as participating closely in key periods of counterproliferation policy
development, largely from within the DOD and relevant Congressional staff offices.
                                                 
28 Much of the lack of individual success with FOIA requests should be attributed to the backlog of
declassification requests, many from the U.S. Government itself associated with ongoing investigations,
inter-departmental reviews and Congressional oversight functions, rather than unwillingness on the part of
relevant agencies and departments to declassify documents. As one staff member of the National Security
Council responsible for document declassification related in a private discussion, “To be quite honest, it
would probably be faster for you to get your PhD, apply for a job here, pass your security clearance and
declassify them yourself.”
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Organization of the Thesis
The historical focus of this thesis is on the period from the imminent end of the Cold War
in 1989 to the announcement of the so-called Bush Doctrine with the public presentation
of the National Security Strategy of 2002, and divided into three major periods. The first
period takes the analysis of counterproliferation from its early post-Cold War origins in
1989 to the announcement of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in December of
1993. This period is significant as the formative strategic-cultural and organizational
thinking on the problems posed by post-Cold War proliferation occurred during this time,
culminating in the announcement of a major defense initiative that was intended to direct
defense efforts at more effectively responding to supposedly emerging proliferation
issues.
The second period covers from the immediate reaction to the DCI in early 1994, to the
rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate at the end of 1999. It
was during this period counterproliferation became institutionalized and transformed
within the DOD, solidifying early conceptions of proliferation threats and codifying
organizational capabilities responses to those threats. Also during this period, a
significant political challenge occurred between competing strategic cultures, resulting in
a transformed political framing of proliferation threats, and formalized challenges to
existing norms and practices of nonproliferation and deterrence.
Finally the period of 1999-2002 is examined, with the public transformation of
counterproliferation in the 2002 NSS placed in perspective as a highly institutionalized
policy with strong existing strategic cultural support and significant associated political
framing of proliferation threats, already largely in place before the attacks of September
11, 2001. Such historical divisions will assist in clarifying the distinct stages of
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counterproliferation policy evolution and allow for clearer comparisons of the military
and political features of this policy evolution.
Chapter 1 places counterproliferation in the wider context of competing theories of
foreign policy analysis. It begins with a review of theoretical assumptions central to
existing explanations of CP policy evolution, offering critiques of the rational actor
model, bureaucratic politics model and cognitive models. The chapter then presents the
alternative theoretical perspectives of strategic culture and organizational theory.
Chapter 2 examines the period 1989 to 1993 from an organizational perspective, arguing
that a strong organizational drive for uncertainty reduction in the wake of the Cold War
and Gulf War, coupled with existing cultural biases, fundamentally reshaped how the
DOD approached the issue of proliferation.
Chapter 3 looks at the same period of time from a strategic culture perspective, arguing
that collective ideational concerns, rather than objective external realities, were central to
answering questions of American post-Cold War power as they pertained to
reformulating U.S. NP policy.
Chapter 4 makes an in-depth examination of CP policy institutionalization within the
DOD from 1994 to 1999. This chapter argues that shifting the focus of CP
institutionalization from civilian policymakers to the functional units of the military was
crucial to altering organizational practices and capabilities, allowing a more offensively
oriented CP doctrine to emerge from organizational efforts.
Chapter 5 examines competing strategic cultures in the period 1994 to 1999, arguing that
a crucial determinate of policy outcomes during this period were conservative strategic
culture assumptions and preferences informed by neoconservative strategic thought and
empowered by a highly coordinated and effective Republican Party machinery of policy
promotion.
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Chapter 6 looks at the end stage of counterproliferation policy evolution from 1999 to
2002, examining both organizational and strategic cultural forces to explain the policy
response to 9/11 that led to a preventative doctrine of counterproliferation as articulated
in the 2002 National Security Strategy. This chapter argues that while the central
policymakers of the Bush Administration were certainly important in prioritizing and
articulating policy, their role in “shaping” CP was largely to give prominence to CP
policy responses that had been designed, legitimated and institutionalized by others
preceding them.
The thesis concludes with policy implications flowing from the case study, and avenues
for further research into the cultural and organizational impacts on policy.
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Chapter 1
Examining Assumptions: Competing Theories of CP Policy Evolution
Because simplifications are necessary, competing simplifications are essential.
- Graham Allison 1
Exploring the evolution of counterproliferation brings the researcher into contact with
source material resembling a jigsaw puzzle with thousands of pieces, made up of a wide
range of opinions, academic analyses, public arguments, policy documents, intelligence
assessments, military plans, interagency policy reviews and participant interpretations,
among others. Though it is tempting to assemble the pieces into the first clear image and
call the task finished, one soon discovers that the pieces can be arranged into a number of
different images, each with its own internal logic and organizing pattern. The easiest
picture to assemble often not only presents an oversimplified image, but may leave
crucial pieces of the puzzle sitting on the side willfully ignored. The question is thus not
one of how many facts make up the phenomena to be explained, but how these facts
should be interpreted.
In examining the evolution of CP policy, a number of explanations for its development
and transformation are offered in the existing literature and by participants who helped
shape the policy. Generally, these explanations fall into three broad categories, each with
its own set of underlying assumptions. The first explains CP policy evolution as a rational
response by the United States to changes in material capabilities of adversaries, and
features assumptions common to many state-centric, rational action models commonly
used in IR literature and general armchair analysis. The second are accounts that see CP
evolution as the result of rational self-interest on the part of involved bureaucracies, and
focus on competing bureaucratic interests as the determinant of change. The third major
set of explanations views CP policy evolution as the result of the selective decisions of
                                                 
1 Allison and Zelikow, The Essence of Decision, (1999), p. 9
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individual policy makers, and shares many common assumptions with cognitive theories
that place individual bias and powerful individual action as the explanation of outcomes.
In examining why the assumptions at the core of current explanations of CP fall short in
providing convincing accounts of its evolution, it will be argued that all three of these
models fail to provide adequate explanation for the evolution of counterproliferation
because of their inability to adequately address the impact of ideas, culture and
institutionalization. This thesis will then make two theoretical moves simultaneously in
seeking to expand our understanding of both the evolution of CP and the broader
dynamics at play in the process of foreign policy making. First, the concept of strategic
culture will be examined, with particular emphasis placed on its inclusion of cultural
inputs ignored by the other theories, such as collective preferences and normative beliefs.
Then suggestions are made for improving the theory, with an argument made that current
approaches to strategic culture limited to monocultural case studies unnecessarily limit
the explanatory reach of the theory. Monocultural strategic culture studies neglect an
opportunity to apply the theory to the explanation of policy process representing
challenge to normative beliefs, rather than simply general policy orientation of states with
static normative content. Furthermore, a monocultural approach to strategic culture
under-theorizes the role of political argument, often restricting it to the reinforcement of
cultural identity and defense of policy preference, rather than accepting the challenge to
explain how tensions between cultural identities challenge or delegitimize existing
normative beliefs, and legitimize new norms in their place.
Second, the concept of organizational theory will be examined and integrated with
strategic culture to provide an explanation for the specific contributions of the U.S.
military to the evolution of CP. Organizational preferences and the capacity for
institutionalization through organizational practices and capabilities will be of particular
focus. However, while many excellent studies have been written examining the impact of
organizational culture and behavior on subjects such as military doctrine, organizational
safety and organizational learning, such studies often isolate the impact of organizations
in the interests of parsimony, neglecting the larger interaction of organizations and other
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significant political entities affecting the process of foreign policy. Neither strategic
culture, nor organizational theory has yet been used to explain CP policy evolution,
despite the fact that both offer valuable insights into the forces that shape long term
policy evolution, especially in areas concerning the use of military force. Together, these
theories will be argued to provide a fuller explanation of the legitimization of
preventative and preemptive aspects of CP, the concurrent deligitimization of existing NP
norms and practices, and the institutionalization of CP which is likely to make these
issues salient for policymakers long after the specific policymakers who ushered CP onto
the public stage have departed.
The Rational Actor Model
According to one prominent set of accounts explaining the rise of CP policy, as the
United States approached the end of the Cold War it began to reassess the changing
international strategic environment, focusing on the potential redistribution of military
power in the post-Cold War system.2 One of the implications of the emerging Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA) was that high technology with transformative military
applications was seen to be both proliferating widely, and also occurring outside the
framework of controls and influence of the superpowers. More and more states had
access to high technology with military applications, thus opening up the possibility that
even small states could leverage an asymmetrical advantage over the United States in
future conflicts.3 The experience of the Gulf War reinforced this assessment, as potential
                                                 
2 For accounts of CP policy evolution dependent on RAM assumptions, see Ashton B. Carter and L. Celeste
Johnston, ‘Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative’, National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1999,
pp. 64-71; Mitchel B. Wallerstien, ‘Concepts to Capabilites: The First Year of Counterproliferation’, in
Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on
Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; Mitchel B.
Wallerstein, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, in Peter L. Hays,
Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Companies, 1998), pp. 21-36; Lewis A. Dunn, ‘Proliferation Prevention: Beyond Traditionalism’, in Stuart
E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on
Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; and United
States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2001)
3 Brad Roberts, ‘From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1
(Summer 1993), pp. 139-173
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Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons against Coalition forces or Israel might have
dramatically altered the course and scope of the conflict. The Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative was unveiled by the United States in December of 1993, as
an approach to improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces operating in future
unconventional weapons environments, thus reducing the expected utility of such
weapons by potential adversaries.
Throughout the 1990’s, the United States incorporated more active defensive measures
such as ballistic missile defense, and counterforce measures such as deep, precision strike
capabilities in response to growing evidence indicating that potential regional adversaries
were continuing to pursue unconventional weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems.
Events like the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system by a little known
religious group indicated that the unconventional weapons threat now included terrorist
organizations as well as potentially adversarial states. The asymmetries of power between
the United States and these groups meant that the United States would have to view
unconventional weapons usage as an inevitable feature of future regional conflicts and
terrorist attacks, as no group could hope to match the conventional force advantage of the
United States. The events of 9/11 only further demonstrated this dynamic of shifting
relative power positions and the ability to leverage asymmetric means to deliver powerful
blows to major states, forcing the United States to respond by elevating CP as the primary
policy response to the proliferation of unconventional weapons and associated delivery
systems.4
Basic assumptions of the Rational Actor Model
Implicit in these accounts is the assumption that the United States government, for all
intents and purposes serves as a unitary actor, formulating policies as a rational response
to objective external changes in the international security environment. Theoretical
approaches viewing states as whole units are a powerful tool for abstraction in the social
                                                 
4 Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation:
Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)
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sciences, as the assumption of interacting whole units allows for analysis of action on the
systemic level in international relations. In these models, state behavior can be untangled
from the highly complex web of social relationships at the individual level, and given
meaningful analysis in order to generate both explanations and predictions about state
behavior.  The literature concerning neorealist and liberal institutionalist thinking about
IR for example, begins with the premise of an anarchical international system whose
primary units are rationally self interested unitary actors interacting with each other
through various forms of competition or cooperation.5
This particular group of theories has traveled under the name of materialist, structural,
actor-general, rational choice models or more generally the rationalist tradition.6 Such
theories hold similar assumptions about agency and structure, and for the purposes of this
thesis can be loosely grouped under label of the Rational Actor Model (RAM). 7 One of
the analytic benefits of the RAM approach, especially in its rational choice variants, is
that by “black-boxing” internal processes, analytic focus can be more easily placed on the
relations between actors.8 The RAM type approaches have served an invaluable function
in the analysis of international behavior, as they focus analytical energies on the
international strategic environment, helping especially to illuminate interactions between
nation states, rather than devoting intellectual energies into the internal processes of the
states in question.
                                                 
5 The classic competing examples are Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York:
Random House, 1979); and Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986)
6 For discussion of “materialist theories”, see Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The
Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), 391-425; for
“structural”, the seminal neorealist text is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York:
Random House, 1979); see also Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics; for “actor-general”, see
Alexander L. George, “The Two Cultures of Academia and Policy-Making: Bridging the Gap”, Political
Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994), pp. 143-171
7 One of the first to explicitly categorize this approach as the Rational Actor Model (RAM) was Graham T.
Allison in his 1969 article, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, (September 1969), pp. 689-718. This was subsequently expanded to form
the basis for his now classic, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown, & Co., 1971). A second edition, with important evidentiary updates was published in 1999. See
Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis -
Second Edition, (New York: Longman, 1999).
8 For similar arguments on the supposed benefits of rational choice analyses, see Jonathan Bendor and
Thomas H. Hammond, ‘Rethinking Allison’s Models’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2
(June 1992), p. 308
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Taken as an umbrella term, the core assumptions of the RAM are threefold. First, the
relevant unit of analysis is assumed to be the state, and states are assumed to be unitary.
That is to say states can be abstracted as decisionmakers, whose subunit inputs are
aggregated into unitary action.  This does not deny that individual action is significant,
but rather that international relations “cannot be adequately understood in terms of
individual attitudes and behaviors.” 9 Such an assumption of unitary action and state level
of analysis is implicit in the most common forms of popular and academic analysis of
international relations, which depict states as a type of “black box”, in which the inner
workings are less relevant to the analyst than the characteristics of its inputs and
outputs.10
The second set of assumptions focus on the relationship between those inputs and outputs
insofar that states are assumed to be self-interested actors that make rational, value-
maximizing choices. Rationality in decisionmaking is often seen in terms of ends vs.
means, with states weighing the costs and benefits of their choices in order to best
maximize their gains and minimize their losses. The basic assumption of preference-
maximizing behavior produces simple propositions central to most RAM explanations.
The general principle can be formulated as follows: the likelihood of any particular action
results from a combination of a state’s: (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived
alternative courses of action, (3) estimates of consequences which will follow from each
alternative, and (4) net valuation of each set of consequences.11 This model assumes that
the agent of the decision is aware of the possible consequences, and chooses the one that
maximizes its interests. 12
The final set of assumptions concerns these state interests, which are often broadly
construed as being material in nature, and socialized by conditions of international
                                                 
9 Sidney Verba, ‘Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System’,
World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Oct. 1961), p. 93
10 The origins of this term are purported to be from RAF pilots in WWII, who after being taught the
working of their radios commented that radios were in fact boxes that ran on black magic contained inside.
11 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision (1999), p. 25
12 Verba, ‘Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System’
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anarchy. 13 Often in RAM accounts, states are depicted as concerned with opportunities
and threats in the international system measured in terms of relative power.14 Material
interests in an anarchic system are therefore viewed as causally constructive of interests.
Together, systemic pressures and the pursuit of national interest serve as the motivation
for state behavior to advance or protect national interests. The shifting of relative power
positions of states in an anarchical international system, whether by changes in material
capability of states through military advancement, or by shifting alliances or changes in
relative power among other states, determines what threats and opportunities exist for a
state’s national interests.
Challenges to the RAM assumptions
Cumulatively, such assumptions carry a certain inevitability, or idealization of strategic
interaction. If the material capabilities and actions of international actors themselves
carry objective meaning, then the task of the policy maker is to correctly interpret the
meaning, and devise strategies that maximize utility relative to national interests for any
given situation. However, while the parsimony inherent to RAM type analyses have
allowed for a steady flow of quantitative analysis and attendant predictions to develop,
important critiques of each category of simplification have been made, ultimately calling
into question its overall utility in generating meaningful insights about state behavior –
particularly in the realm of foreign policy outcomes.
While it may be practical for certain analytic purposes to treat states as unitary actors, a
significant body of research argues that accounting for sub-state action such as the forces
of bureaucratic or domestic politics is critical to understanding many foreign policy
                                                 
13 Holsti remarks that scholars who take this approach “regard the structure of the international system as a
necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations.” See Ole R.
Holsti, ‘Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 13, No. 1,
(January, 1989), pp. 15-44
14 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
After the Cold War,’International Security 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56
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dilemmas.15 In his landmark study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison
demonstrated that many of the central strategic puzzles of the conflict cannot be fully
understood without investigating the impact of sub-state units on state decisionmaking.16
From the events leading to the discovery of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba, to the range
of potential U.S. responses culminating in a naval blockade of Cuba, Allison
demonstrates that examining the influence of sub-state units on state behavior is critical
to understanding overall state behavior.
Similarly, scholars such as Elizabeth Kier have demonstrated that understanding the
development of military doctrine is often not be possible without a substantive
accounting for the preferences and biases of the individual military organization in
question. Challenging assumptions of rational action by the state as a whole, Kier
demonstrates how the development of a defensive military doctrine between WWI and
WWII in France was largely the result of military biases questioning the ability of
conscripts to execute an offensive doctrine.17 What these and other studies have in
common is the argument that accounting for sub-state phenomena is not simply necessary
to “fill in the gaps” of existing analytical puzzles, but in fact key to a meaningful
understanding of international behavior.
Secondly, the assumption that foreign policy outcomes are the result of a rational
response to strategic dilemmas, as based on value maximizing behavior, has been
repeatedly called into question by historical case studies, and empirical evidence
accumulated in laboratory experimentation and the close study of decisionmakers in
                                                 
15 Prominent examples include Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’; Richard C.
Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International
Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin,
‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications’, World Politics, Vol. 24 (Spring 1972),
pp. 40-79; Robert J. Art, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique’, Policy Sciences,
Vol. 4, (December, 1973), pp. 467-490; Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy,
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1974); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999); and Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific
Theory and the Ground of International Relations’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, (March 2005),
1-35
16 Allison, Essence of Decision, (1971, 1999)
17 Kier, Imagining War
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action.18 Such studies have called into question assumptions that there is a world of “brute
facts” that decision makers appeal to when making utility maximizing calculations. It is
argued that those making decisions generally utilize some form of objective criteria, free
from the burdens and distortions of such things as previous experience, peer pressure,
ideological predisposition, fear and so forth.
As Robert Jervis persuasively argued in his influential 1970 study of foreign policy
making, not only do decision makers routinely violate the requirements of rational
decision making, but that decision makers, assuming rational, unitary decision making
processes in their adversaries, are far more likely to misinterpret actions as being driven
by duplicity rather than confusion when facing inconsistent responses.19 Further erosion
of assumptions for rational action based upon objective criteria was provided by Irving
Janis’ study of group decisionmaking dynamics, whereby “the motivation to maintain
group consensus and personal acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of
decision-making quality.”20 Together these studies do not deny that rational action is
possible, merely that decisionmaking in the real world rarely meets the criteria for such
action. This is not to say that foreign policy decisions are inherently irrational, but rather
that significant questions remain about the stated realist assumption of states exhibiting
egoistically motivated value maximizing behavior.
Finally, even a casual examination of state behavior in the 20th century would seem to
indicate that states do not in fact exhibit such relative similarity in decisionmaking
approaches, and that relative power positions do not serve as accurate guide to behavior.
                                                 
18 Jeffrey D. Berejikian, ‘A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 2
(2002), p. 165-183; Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes,
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (eds.), Choices,
Values and Frames, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro
(eds.), Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Martha Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors and Thomas
Preston (eds.), Introduction to Political Psychology, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004)
19 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976); a similar argument was articulated by U.S. Circuit Court Judge Laurence Silberman, “Every
government looking at the actions of another government and trying to explain them always exaggerates
rationality and conspiracy, and underestimates incompetence and fortuity.” as quoted by Donald Rumsfeld
in ‘Rumsfeld’s Rules’, The Wall Street Journal, (January 29, 2001),
http://www.opinionjournal.com/wsj/?id=85000505 (accessed August 15, 2007)
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As an example, Thomas Berger has argued that German and Japanese foreign policy
behavior shifting from militarism to pacifism in the 20th Century has been far from
consistent with what would be expected simply from objective analysis of their relative
power position in an anarchic system.21 Though some realist scholars have argued that in
the post-Cold War security environment German security interests would be best served
by a less pacifist foreign policy orientation, this has hardly been in line with what the
German government and people have chosen for themselves.22 In fundamental ways, the
political systems, cultural identity, historical experience and decisionmaking structure of
states matters.23
Explanatory shortcoming of the RAM in the case of CP policy evolution
The weakness of the RAM in accounting for sub-state influence, plus its overstatement of
rational action and materialist motivations on policy outcomes all factor into providing
for an unsatisfactory explanation of CP policy evolution. A RAM approach is not
equipped to answer why CP policy evolution featured a gradual shift away from a
conception of proliferation threats posed by the weapons themselves, to one where
proliferation threats were framed primarily in terms of the identity of the potential
proliferator. Material interests also would not specify why individual states with
objectively little change in relative power at the end of the Cold War would be identified
as suddenly presenting grave threats to U.S. national security, nor do supposedly rational
ends/means calculations explain why such states would be eventually assumed to be
unresponsive to traditional forms of conventional or nuclear deterrence.24
There is a need to explain how and why certain actors were singled out as potential
adversaries of the United States warranting a new approach to the problem of
                                                 
21 Thomas U. Berger, ‘Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan’, in Peter J.
Katzenstein, (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms, and Identity In World Politics, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 317-356
22 Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’
23 Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “On Strategy”, in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and
Alvin Bernstein (eds.), The Making of Strategy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 9
24 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response; see also United States
Government, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, (September 2002)
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unconventional weapons proliferation. The process is illustrative of the subjective
ideational and organizational dynamics at play in establishing and legitimizing “common
sense” views of the post-Cold War international security environment. As will be argued
in the historical chapters of this thesis, what counted for “common sense” in terms of
threat identification and policy response for CP was often a consciously contested area of
the policymaking process, with the winners of those contests gaining the ability to
redefine the boundaries of legitimate discourse, and thus ultimately the framework for
policy decisions. 25 Thus an important addition to our understanding of the evolution of
CP will require space for examining specific ideas, not just general interests. We need an
understanding of not only how the international security environment is in any real sense,
but also in how it is represented by those making decisions about threats and responses.
How such representations are formed and propagated will tell us as much about the range
of supposedly ‘legitimate’ responses and thus more adequately explain the challenge to
the norm of NP practice presented by CP.
Bureaucratic Politics
A second major set of explanations for the rise and evolution of CP policy are oriented
around the motives and actions of powerful bureaucratic actors such as the Departments
of Defense and State and their respective leaders. According to these accounts, as the
United States approached the end of the Cold War, the leadership of the Department of
State and the Department of Defense recognized that many of their traditional missions
would be challenged by the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a major adversary.26 For
the Department of Defense in particular, the lack of strategic consensus immediately
following the end of the Cold War was seen as a potential challenge to its existing
                                                 
25 Similar arguments about the creation of collective social understanding are made in Jutta Weldes,
Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999)
26 Important accounts of CP policy largely dependent on Bureaucratic Politics explanations include, Henry
D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s campaign against strategic weapons proliferation, (Westport:
Praeger, 2001); Avner Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Ossirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate’ in
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missions and funding.27 Fearful of budgetary starvation in an era of more diverse,
potentially less military oriented security challenges, the Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative can be seen as an example of bureaucratic opportunism by a Department of
Defense preemptively protecting its interests and missions in an era not focused on a
military standoff with a rival superpower. 28
Throughout the 1990’s, turf battles between the DOD and the State Department resulted
in bureaucratically negotiated marginalization of the DCI, with CP being relegated to a
minimal supporting role for existing NP policies. Throughout the years immediately
following the announcement of the DCI, CP represented less of a coherent policy
approach to proliferation threats than a bureaucratic cover for the funding of budget
heavy programs such as national missile defense. It was the militarized response to the
attacks of 9/11 requested by the executive that brought the DOD into a leadership role in
formulating policies to address threats from terrorism and unconventional weapons
proliferation. CP emerged as a challenge to traditional NP policy due to a basic
reorganization of bureaucratic prominence, rather than any deeper reorganization of
normative beliefs about appropriate responses to proliferation.
Basic assumptions of the Bureaucratic Politics Model
These accounts of the development of CP policy rest on a number of assumptions about
policy outcomes as the result of bargaining games between bureaucratic sub-units,
referred to in the literature as bureaucratic politics.29 Following from the argued
                                                 
27 Interview with Rebecca Hersman, Senior Research Professor, NDU and former Special Assistant to the
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shortcomings of a rational actor model that posits international structural forces as
determinate of policy outcomes, the bureaucratic politics model places an analytic focus
on the bureaucratic sub-units and individual bureaucratic leaders. In the case of the
United States, for example, the focus of the bureaucratic politics model has generally
been placed on bureaucracies such as the State Department and Department of Defense,
and individuals such as the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense. The bureaucratic
politics model presents an important challenge to the analytic focus of structural theories,
as it accepts the significant impact of governmental sub-units on policy outcomes.
Bureaucratic politics offers a framework for assessing the impact of ever-present and
often public disagreements over policy by officials and organizations, providing
explanatory space by incorporating conflicting bureaucratic interests within a state.
The first assumption of the bureaucratic politics model is that policy outcomes are the
result of “bargaining games” between representatives of different government agencies
rather than result of unitary state interest. A policy outcome is depicted not as
representative of a rationally chosen solution to a particular problem, “but rather results
from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unique
influence.”30 Policy outcomes are also constrained by the political “bargaining along
regularized channels among individual members of the government.”31 Thus while
decision makers are assumed to be rational, final decisions are often not representative of
careful cost / benefit analysis, but rather of the outcome of collective “pulling and
hauling.”32 Simply put, the outcomes of bureaucratic decisionmaking do not conform to
expectations of what a unitary rational actor would have chosen, with bureaucracies
viewed as “weakly” rational, in that choices are viewed as intentional, if not conforming
to the narrow dictates of strict ends / means calculation under conditions of objective,
“full disclosure” of possible informational inputs.33
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Secondly, positions taken in such bargaining games are reflective of parochial interests as
a function of organizational roles. The most famous formulation of this assumption of
determinacy is known as Miles’ Law, which asserts, “Where you stand depends on where
you sit.”34 For example, Secretaries of Defense would be expected to take policy
positions that promote the budgets and prominence of the Department of Defense, often
viewing problems as either military in nature, or with a military solution. Conversely,
Secretaries of State would be expected to promote the interests of the State Department
and favor the usage of the diplomatic tools of statecraft that are the department’s stock
and trade. Such primacy of parochial interests is what allows broader expectations about
bureaucratically unitary action to be made, rather than requiring the analyst to peer inside
the mind of bureaucratic leaders and account for personal bias and preference.
Finally, the ability of bureaucratic decisionmakers to influence policy outcomes is
assumed to be a function of their relative bargaining power.35 In the short term, relative
bargaining power is argued to be a function of the political influence, knowledge of the
“rules of the game”, and the ability and will to use bureaucratic leverage held by the
decisionmaker in question.36 In the long term, relative bargaining power is assumed to be
a function of the skill of policymakers at identifying moments of favorable political
conditions and then merging policy ideas with identified problems.37 Such ability often
rests on a particular actor’s knowledge of how to exploit institutional procedures for
facilitating or implementing decisions.38 Partly these assumptions flow from the need to
account for significant observed executive involvement without ceding more influence to
executive actors in situations where their ultimate decisions are the product of the choices
presented to them and advocated by bureaucratic functionaries.39
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Weaknesses of the Bureaucratic Politics Model
The years of analysis following Allison’s influential study of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
however, have seen a number of serious challenges presented to the central assumptions
of the bureaucratic politics model.40 While these challenges are numerous and cover a
broad array of logical, methodological and evidentiary concerns, for the sake of
simplicity we will focus briefly on three issues relevant to the subject of this thesis. These
include an overly broad category of potential influences on policy outcomes, the
questionable assumption of parochial interest expressed in adage of “where you sit
determines where you stand”, and the problem of differentiating between the interests of
individuals and that of organizations, including a lack of accounting for the effects of
institutionalization.
One of the most common critiques of the bureaucratic politics model, especially as set
forth by Allison, is that there are far too many potential variables included for this to be a
useful explanatory paradigm.41 One scholar singled out Allison’s inclusive approach to
proposing determinants of governmental behavior as a “grab bag of influences” serving
to spread a patina of scientific lingo over what essentially amounts to “eclectic palace
politics”42 Indeed, Allison’s articulation of the bureaucratic politics model, and indeed
many later bureaucratic politics studies, offer as possible explanations of government
behavior such a range of potential players, possible influences and avenues for policy
influence as to beg the question of what would not be considered significant from this
                                                 
40 Particularly important examples include, Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison
Wonderland)’, Foreign Policy, vol. 7 (Summer, 1972), pp. 159-179; Art, ‘Bureaucratic Politics’; Bendor
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perspective.43 This problematic lack of analytical selectiveness is summarized by Bendor
and Hammond who state, “a model that is as complicated as the phenomena it represents
is of little use.” 44
A second, more fundamental challenge to the assumptions of bureaucratic politics, are the
findings that challenge the primacy of parochial interests in shaping choice. An important
case study empirically challenging the assumptions of “where you sit determines where
you stand” is Edward Rhodes’ 1994 study of the U.S. Navy. 45 Rhodes looked for
correlation between those who held the positions of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
and budgetary allocations to the different branches of the Navy – naval aviation, surface
fleet and the submarine fleet. Since the CNO position is rotated between those who
climbed the ladder from within one of these branches, and the position of CNO offers a
high degree of autonomy in formulating budgetary recommendations, Rhodes argued that
if bureaucratic politics had a significant influence on decisions, this would be an excellent
place to see it in action. Rhodes findings, however, showed that CNO affiliation was a
relatively poor predictor of budgetary allocations, thus challenging one of the central
assumptions of bureaucratic politics through extensive case study analysis.46 Further
studies of bureaucratic politics have argued little consistent correlation exists between
bureaucratic position and policy advocacy, and that issues such as preexisting individual
beliefs about the role of military force, for example, often play a stronger role in shaping
preferences once in office.47
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Explanatory shortcoming of Bureaucratic Politics in the case of CP policy evolution
In the case of CP policy evolution, the bureaucratic politics model rightly focuses
attention on the inputs of bureaucratic entities such as the Department of Defense and
State Department, but its simplified conception of bureaucratic interests leaves important
questions unanswered. Parochial interests can explain early turf wars over the DCI, as
overly broad mandates threaten mission overlap in an environment of limited
bureaucratic turf. However, such dynamics provide little guide for interpreting the then
steady support for counterproliferation programs and capabilities in the DOD throughout
the 1990’s. Why were specific programs and capabilities with offensive orientation
prioritized and funded, pairing them with the rationale that unconventional weapons
usage was an inevitable, rather than a potential condition of future warfare, but for very
different reasons than those proposed by many members of the legislature and executive?
If budgetary starvation and parochial interest were sufficient guides in and of themselves,
a number of alternative force modernization efforts could have been implemented that
would have addressed the missions undertaken by the U.S. military at the time, rather
than invested in hypothetical scenarios of threat that were actively challenged by
powerful legislative and executive actors as threatening existing norms of NP.
Much of the focus on the bureaucracy as a political actor has certain value in the analysis
of short term decisions, but carries less ability to explain long term trends, such as how
organizing ideas change, and how new norms replace old ones. Such long-term views
incorporating a clearer sense of how the organization operates and sees the world around
it are essential, as they provide insights ignored by models focusing on the simple
preservation and promotion of bureaucratic interests. An examination of CP policy
evolution will need to look carefully within the Department of Defense to examine how
CP fit into the organization’s practices, capabilities and particular view of the
international security environment, not just how the domestic political environment
shaped its approach to policy formulation and implementation. The following chapters
will demonstrate how the approach to CP within the DOD was shaped by organizational
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preference, but not necessarily preferences that were tied to the promotion of bureaucratic
budget or turf.
The bureaucratic politics model focuses our attention on institutional power and the ways
in which such power can shape policy agendas and policy implementation. However,
though the bureaucratic politics can point to how bureaucratic action restricts the “menu
of options” presented to policymakers in the short term through offering of options and
expert advice, it gives little insight into the potential for institutionalization of new
strategic conceptions and normative beliefs that present a much more lasting effect on
choices. 48 Counterproliferation policy is a combination of specific military capabilities
and ideas about how those capabilities are to be exercised in the efforts to prevent
proliferation. Understanding its evolution requires examining the ideas and organizational
practices that transcended individuals representing the organization, fundamentally
shaping the framework of policy choice for decisionmakers through the
institutionalization of a military capabilities driven challenge to NP.
Cognitive approaches
A third group of accounts identifies particular individuals with predetermined views on
the international security environment as key to the establishment or development of
counterproliferation policy.49 In this view, it was the existing worldviews, cognitive
biases, and historical reasoning employed by key individuals that account for CP
evolution. In this set of accounts, CP came into existence largely as a result of the
individual biases and preferences of the first Secretary of Defense under Clinton, Les
Aspin. Aspin won his position as Secretary of Defense partly on his public criticism of
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the first Bush Administration’s policies that allowed Iraq to arm itself with a considerable
unconventional weapons capability, and he imagined himself a “defense intellectual”
who could craft a range of novel responses for the DOD to the emerging post-Cold War
security environment. However, once Aspin left office soon after the announcement of
the DCI, responsibility for implementing the DCI fell to lower ranking successors.
Without a prominent and powerful backer to champion the initiative, CP largely faded
from the agenda of policymakers. Missile defense programs, however, were kept alive by
the efforts of prominent Republican lawmakers, each with cognitive biases towards
defense policy that placed strong emphasis on increased funding for the U.S. military as
the primary focus of protecting their individual vision of American national interests.
The arrival into office of the Bush Administration introduced key policymakers such as
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
Deputy National Security Adviser J.D. Crouch, and senior director for defense policy and
arms control at the National Security Council, Frank Miller, who brought with them
strong individual biases against policies of disarmament and nonproliferation. Each
arrived in office with a belief system shaped by formative experiences during the Cold
War that viewed a United States more willing to exercise its military muscle to protect its
national interests as a force for peace. These policymakers harbored a deep skepticism of
the motives of non-democratic regimes and tended to regard traditional NP methods and
practices applied to so-called “rogue regimes” as analogous to appeasement with its
historical precedent drawn from the legacy of Munich. To these policymakers, reliance
on NP as an instrument of policy to address the problem of unconventional weapons
proliferation was not merely unhelpful, but actually served to undermine the security
interests of the United States. Thus when the attacks of 9/11 “cleared the table”, these
decisionmakers championed a radically reoriented, preemptive military vision of CP,
transforming it into a formal challenger to existing NP policies.50
Basic assumptions of cognitive models
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This third general approach for explaining the development of counterproliferation policy
found in the literature and participant interviews is based upon assumptions about the
impact of cognitive factors on decisionmaking. Cognitive models, though diverse and
often drawing strongly from a wide range of fields in the social sciences, present an
attempt to look inside the minds of decisionmakers.51 As such, they focus on the
cognitive boundaries between individuals and their environments, seeking to demonstrate
how psychological limitations on the ability to acquire, organize and use knowledge
affect policy outcomes.52 The focus on individual cognition as a driver of political action
is thus introduced in a standard text on political psychology:
To put it most simply, people are driven to act by internal factors, such as
personality, attitudes, and self-identity; they evaluate their environment and others
through cognitive processes that produce images of others; and they decide how
to act when these factors are combined.53
Again, while taken as a whole the rich diversity of cognitive theories do not represent as
cohesive an axiomatic approach to international relations as, for example, structural
theories, some central features and contributions of cognitive theories can be identified.
Of particular interest are the examinations of belief systems and individual bias, and the
importance of historical analogies in rationalizing decisions and developing threat
perceptions.
Belief systems and biases
A belief system, loosely defined, encompasses a set of assumptions about the world –
“how it works, what it is like, what kinds of actions are most likely to be successful” –
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that are useful in guiding action in indeterminate circumstances.54 One type of belief
system used to produce a number of insightful studies of decisionmaking is that of
operational codes.55 Much of the research on operational codes represents an attempt to
answer questions about the potential consistency of individual decisionmakers’ choices
that would contradict the expectations of rational choice such as found in structural
theories of International Relations. Their analytic focus is placed on philosophical and
instrumental beliefs individual leaders have drawn from their formative experiences that
shape their “beliefs about the nature and source of conflict in the political universe…
[their] control over historical development and the role of chance.”56 Operational codes,
though not assumed to unilaterally determine choices, are assumed to be causal
mechanisms in explaining foreign policy decisions.57
Without delving into a full detailing of the components and assumptions about belief
systems in the cognitive theory literature such as the concept of the operational code, it is
sufficient to say that such studies claim that belief systems are seen to regulate political
decisionmaking to some degree by inserting highly individualized filtering and
assumptions into the process of simplifying information and choices. The analytical
establishment of a particular leader’s operational code have often involved detailed
psychobiographical studies of individual leaders in the hopes that such a profile might
explain why certain norms are accepted or rejected by individuals, and why certain
leaders have preferred accommodationist or conflictual strategies for interacting with
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strategic adversaries, among other factors.58 It should be noted, however, that although
foreign policy beliefs of many leaders have been demonstrated to be highly resistant to
change, studies have often presented contradictory evidence establishing casual links
between individual belief systems such as operational codes and overall state behavior,
leading some to conclude that larger group biases and preferences must be accounted
for.59
The related literature examining biases also begins from the premise that policymakers do
not arrive in their position of influence as a tabula rasa, but rather enter their roles with a
host of preexisting beliefs, attitudes, memories, emotions and patterns for processing
information.60 Preexisting biases can serve to misinterpret the behavior and motivation of
adversaries, as neutral or positive behavior is discounted as anomalous and negative
behavior used to reinforce negative stereotypes and expectations. The cognitive rigidity
and biases policymakers bring to their positions can ameliorate or exacerbate tensions
between states, create barriers to signaling of credible threats, and serve to discount or
dismiss information that contradicts policymakers’ existing beliefs.61 As Robert Jervis has
noted, cognitive theories such as formative experience may go some ways towards
explaining the rationale for biases, which transcends simple filtering and simplification to
cognitive forms of interpreting information and arriving at decisions that are pre-
weighted towards certain outcomes.62
The use and misuse of historical analogies
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When confronting new situations, decisionmakers sometimes make shortcuts by drawing
upon historical analogies. Drawing lessons from history through the use of historical
analogy has proven to be a pervasive heuristic in framing problems and justifying action
or inaction. 63 In the American context, the historical analogy of Vietnam is commonly
employed when political debate centers on questions of intervention in situations as
diverse as U.S. involvement to oppose Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait to the
question of using U.S. military forces to serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia.64 The use of the
Vietnam analogy is most commonly used to argue against military involvement, with the
military action in question being represented as presenting the threat of a political or
military “quagmire” with the potential to drain lives, resources and morale for a cause
that is not central to American national security interests.
An opposing potent historical analogy often appealed to in the American political
discourse is that of Munich. In this analogy, adversaries are often depicted as bloodthirsty
tyrants in the mold of Hitler, and strategies for diplomatic resolution of crises are
depicted as analogous to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of
Hitler over the Sudetenland Crisis of 1938; a decision widely argued to have emboldened
the Nazi leader, encouraging him to seek even broader territorial claims leading to the
outbreak of WWII. In his landmark study of the Johnson Administration’s advocacy for
deeper military involvement in Vietnam, Yuan Foong Khong demonstrates how the
“specter” of Munich affected how the President and his close circle of advisors viewed
North Vietnamese motives. Interpreting them as reminiscent of the expansionist Nazi
regime, the Johnson Administration argued that further U.S. military involvement in
Vietnam was necessary to prevent a “domino” effect of communist expansion in South
                                                 
63 The best study of historical analogy as a constraint on the rationality of decisionmaking is Yuen Foong
Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992). Other important studies include Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: The
Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973);
Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, (New
York: Free Press 1986); and Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the
Advisory Process in Foreign Policy Making, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); historical
experience as significant to the formation of cultural identity is addressed in Murray and Grimsley, “On
Strategy”; and Sylvan and Voss (eds.) Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making
64 Preston, The President and His Inner Circle, Ch. 6, 7
45
East Asia.65 While such simplifications are often inaccurate and are considered by some
to be an “abuse” of history for political purposes, scholars such as Neustadt and May
argue it is important to recognize that such use of historical analogy can have a
fundamental impact on foreign policy outcomes.66
As will be argued in the historical chapters of this thesis, the issue of political ideology
opens the door to a broader questioning of the use of historical analogy. Do politicians
use historical analogies like Vietnam and Munich when publicly assessing strategic
choices because they truly believe the accuracy of such analogies, or because they find
them to be effective political tools to sway public opinion and discredit opponents? For
scholars such as Jack Snyder, the answer is the later. Supporting the placement of
historical “lessons” within a social and actively political context, Snyder argues, “It is
more accurate to say that statesmen and societies actively shape the lessons of the past in
ways they find convenient than it is to say they are shaped by them.”67 While assessing
ultimate intention is a difficult, if not impossible task for the outside observer, an
awareness of the dynamics of argumentative legitimization and delegitimization is
essential to explaining the impact of the broader social and political environment on
decisionmaking.
Limitations of Cognitive Approaches in explaining CP
Cognitive theories make a significant contribution to our understanding of
decisionmaking and the evolution of policy. Understanding how policymakers simplify
the huge amount of information drawn from the external environment, and take shortcuts
in reasoning to either formulate or justify policy responses, takes us much closer to the
actual forces affecting policymaking than can be provided by an abstraction that
marginalizes the individual such as the rational actor model. However, it is this focus on
the individual that may also form the crucial limitation of cognitive theories. Just as it is
true that states as abstractions can’t be realistically assumed to possess agency, human
                                                 
65 Khong, Analogies at War
66 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time
67 Snyder, Myths of Empire, p. 30
46
agency is also limited, especially in the United States, by the variety of institutional
frameworks and political structures that routinely place limits on the ability of individuals
to place too broad a personal stamp on policy outcomes.
If CP policy evolution resulted largely from a series of individual biases, with each major
transformation bearing the individual biases of the decisionmaker, then how are we to
explain why the substantive basis of CP capabilities as it was presented in the 2002 NSS
in the aftermath of 9/11 was indistinguishable from what it had become at the end of the
Clinton Administration? Policy evolution in the case of counterproliferation is
simultaneously a story of continual change and remarkable continuity. It is a story of both
individual pressures for change and institutional limitations on the extent of those
changes. Therefore any explanation of CP policy evolution must broaden its focus
beyond simply the ideas individuals possess into an account of the impact of the identities
they share, and the institutions that provide ideas with longevity and stability. As Jack
Snyder further argues the need to place cognition in the social sphere,
Mental scripts and operational codes used by statesmen are not, at bottom, strictly
cognitive. Rather, they are bound up with the social order, the political balance of
power within it, its legitimation, and the justification of policies favored by
particular social groups. Strategic beliefs exist more in the realm of ideology than
in that of pure cognition.68
 Clearly the impact of biases, belief systems and use of historical analogy are important
insights into real-world decisionmaking as are understandings of the structure of the
international system and the impacts of bureaucratic politics. However, as will be argued
in the following section, these are more useful concepts when elevated from the purely
materialist / structural or individual spheres into the larger social world in which strategic
discourse plays out and policy is made.
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Culture and norms: the social sphere of policy evolution
All of the theoretical approaches presented thus far offer important perspectives for
explaining the evolution of counterproliferation policy. However, it will be argued there
is a need to accept that the international security environment, and the material
capabilities of other states are issues of serious consideration for policy makers, without
assuming that the meaning of such capabilities are objectively given, as much as socially
constructed. There is a need to accept that bureaucracies and organizations can play a
significant role in shaping policy outcomes through their involvement in problem
articulation, policy option identification and implementation, but without viewing
bureaucratic interests as exclusively determinate of policy outcomes. Finally, there is a
need to accept that individuals bring strong cognitive biases and preexisting worldviews
to their positions of influence, and that social experience is often subjective, but without
assuming that government behavior is merely a function of individual psychological
processes. Above all, there is a need to situate policymakers in their social world, rather
than attempt to imagine their assessments and actions taking place in an environment of
objective, rational decision.
As argued by FPA scholar Valerie Hudson, “Social science is unlike the physical
sciences in that what is analyzed possesses agency.”69 A strong case has been made that
connecting human agency to human society in which assumptions about supposedly
objective facts must be brought into question.70 This is not to say that meaningful things
cannot be said about the world, but merely that when dealing with the inherently
complex, non-mechanistic dynamics of the social world, some modesty about the bounds
of probabilistic statements drawn from social inquiry should be maintained.71 Not only
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must some modesty about the limits of predictive knowledge be maintained, but an
acceptance that to draw insights from the social world, the collective / intersubjective
features of the social world such as culture and norms must be viewed as legitimate and
necessary objects of study. Such an approach seeks to inform our existing knowledge of
International Relations by providing accounts of what people believe and share in the
ideational sphere, rather than relying too heavily on assessments of what they possess in
the material sphere.72
Culture
Although decidedly difficult to limit to a single definition, attention must briefly turn to
the concept of culture, which represents part of a larger debate of the role of ideas in the
study of International Relations.73 If ideas are most simply defined as  “beliefs held by
individuals” then culture can most broadly be construed as the aggregation of ideas and
practices that constitute and regulate a society.74 Cultures are furthermore assumed to be
collective models of nation-state authority or identity, comprised of patterns of activity,
and the symbolic structures that give those activities meaning. As such, culture refers to
both the collectively held ideas in a given society and the rules governing how social
actors relate to each other in a system.75
Cultures exist in meaningful ways at numerous levels in any given society, providing for
both the establishment and maintenance of group identity, and in providing important
regulative functions. In examples as diverse as hand signs used to communicate
membership in street gangs, to larger shared understandings of appropriate state behavior
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such as in the case of general anti-militarism in contemporary Germany and Japan,
cultures give meaning to the activities and symbolic structures of social identities.76
Elizabeth Kier’s research, for example, identifies culture constraints on behavior in
military organizations reinforced by pervasive indoctrination and socialization, drawing
the conclusion that, “military organizations develop strong collective understandings
about the nature of their work and the conduct of their missions, and these organizational
cultures influence their choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines.”77
Such social identities condition a range of group expectations and behaviors, from the
aforementioned expectations of behaviors particular to certain types of organizations, to
collective consensus on the appropriate use of force in international affairs. Therefore,
understanding political action requires understanding how actors define themselves, and
what is accepted as reasonable behavior and practice. Cultural variables are important
objects of study, as they can affect state behavior in ways that contradict assumptions of
rational, value maximizing behavior implicit in bureaucratic or structural explanations of
state behavior.78
Norms
A particularly important concept in most cultural approaches to International Relations is
that of norms. While the literature on norms is as diverse and complex as that of culture,
again, some basic questions relevant to this study can be asked and propositions about
norms given. Are norms simply shared beliefs similar to conventions – “this is what we
normally do” – or do they carry prescriptive meaning – “these are things we should /
should not do”? Additionally, are norms merely representative of culture, or are they
constitutive of culture? While there is hardly academic consensus on such questions,
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some literature points towards helpful clarification on the meaning of norms.79 Neta
Crawford attempts to clarify the concept by distinguishing between behavioral norms and
normative beliefs.80 According to Crawford, behavioral norms are equivalent to
conventions, simply serving to define what constitutes normal practice. Normative beliefs
on the other hand, provide the prescriptive basis for rules, laws and principles. It is
through such definition that she concludes, “ethical arguments are characterized by the
use of prescriptive statements that rest on normative beliefs.”81 For Jepperson, Wendt and
Katzenstein,
Norms are collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity…
Sometimes norms operate like rules defining (and thus "constituting") an
identity… In other instances, norms are "regulative" in their effect. They operate
as standards for the proper enactment or deployment of a defined identity… Thus
norms either define ("constitute") identities in the first place (generating
expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context) or
prescribe or proscribe ("regulate") behaviors for already constituted identities
(generating expectations about how those identities will shape behavior in varying
circumstances). Taken together, then, norms establish expectations about who the
actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors
will behave. 82
In setting out to examine the practical regulatory effect of norms on state behavior,
Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald argue that the longstanding taboo against the
employment of chemical weapons is explained far more convincingly by the regulative
effect of norms than by traditional self-help behavioral expectations.83 Accounting for the
constitutive and regulatory effect of norms has been used by Mark Suchman and Dana
Eyre to explain the puzzle of investment in expensive modern weapons systems by
smaller states that do not realize significant improvements in national security from these
investments, by Martha Finnemore to illustrate the dramatic changes in global approaches
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to intervention, and by Neta Crawford to explain the rapid and widespread global demise
of colonialism, to name but a few such studies in which cultural identity and normative
approaches trump traditional rational action, bureaucratic or cognitive explanations in
providing for convincing explanations for state behavior.84
This thesis similarly argues that although the external world and individual preference
can provide some clues about the drivers of policy evolution, it is more centrally the
shared understanding of the external world by cultural groups possessing policymaking
and policy implementing responsibilities that determine policy outcomes. It is the culture
and accepted norms of these groups that determine what their responsibilities are and
what actions are appropriate to that identity, often aided by an identification of who they
are not. Such identities are not static, but require constant maintenance, and defense
against challenges to their legitimacy and position. 85 When properly maintained, such
identities serve the essential function of reducing uncertainty about the external
environment, allowing the categorization of other groups along the spectrum of friends
and foes. Categories of appropriate or inappropriate actions by these groups are largely
determined by their collective understanding of norms; both behavioral norms and
normative beliefs. These norms are not static, but subject to challenge, transformation
and replacement. To see how norms give meaning to group action and underpin policy
transformation, it is necessary to examine the social “residues” they leave, tracking them
through public discourse into policy implementation. 86
There are two very useful cultural models for exploring these social issues. First is
strategic culture, which places its analytic focus on the collectively held beliefs of civilian
policymakers and their efforts to legitimize those beliefs through argument and put them
into action through policy outcomes. Strategic culture argues that policymaking must be
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seen as a continual series of challenges to both identity and norms by domestic groups,
who themselves are ideationally constructed. The second model is organization theory,
which focuses on the beliefs collectively held within particular military organizations and
their ability to shape policy options and institutionalize emergent norms through
organizational practices and capabilities.
Finally, the critical linkage between strategic culture and organizational culture will be
examined, and the argument made that the policy impacts of these two on the evolution
of CP, while distinct, cannot be understood in isolation. This thesis argues that any study
of strategic culture is incomplete without a corresponding study of the institutions tasked
with execution of policy. The forces that shape cultural beliefs and confer legitimacy
cannot be separated from the formal institutions that provide longevity to those policies
through the development of organizational practices and capabilities. Examining the
interrelationship and recursivity of these two forces is crucial to understanding the link
between cultural behavior, institutionalization and, ultimately, foreign policy behavior.
Strategic culture
Strategic culture provides a theoretical lens through which to understand the influence of
domestic politics and culture on strategic choice, specifically how state action regarding
military force is shaped by beliefs collectively held by decision-makers and policy elites.
The approach posits that different states with similar material conditions and in similar
strategic circumstances will likely formulate different policy responses to the security
dilemmas they face. Thus strategic culture attempts to account for how decision-makers
in different societies, or even decision-makers in the same societies think and respond to
strategic circumstances differently, even when faced with the similar strategic
circumstances and choices. 87 Furthermore, it is argued that strategic cultures play
significant roles in challenging and establishing dominant normative beliefs through the
causal pathway of political argument.
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Basic assumptions and definitions of strategic culture
Although the concept partly emerges from the literature on domestic political culture, the
term, ‘strategic culture’, was first coined by Jack Snyder in explaining the cultural roots
of Soviet nuclear strategy. 88 Snyder’s attempt to explain the non-material sources of
difference in nuclear strategy between the superpowers resulted in a broad definition of
strategic culture as, “a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns
socialized into a distinctive mode of thought.”89 As such, Snyder’s work tried to explain
what made Soviet nuclear strategy distinctly “Soviet”, as opposed to what might have
been expected by rational choice models. Later scholars attempted to clarify the link
between culture and state behavior by claiming strategic culture as a “generator of
preferences” or “preference structures”, though this language represented a challenge to
structural theories while retaining many of the central assumptions of rational choice
theories.90
Early generation strategic culture studies, while significant in opening up analysis to an
investigation of cultural or ideational influences on behavior, on the whole did not offer
many serious improvements over RAM, bureaucratic politics or cognitive theories. It is
hard to say, for example, how the original strategic culture identification of distinct
modes of thought or ranked preferences alone were anything more than a reformulation
of central conditions for rational choice models. Not only was little insight generated into
how preferences were generated, sustained and put into action, but early studies also
featured overly broad categories of “cultural” influences. Studies that incorporated
geography, history, technology and ideology were so broad in the end as to leave little
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room for non-cultural explanations. 91 Another related shortcoming of the early strategic
culture literature was that such a broad interpretation of culture gave no indication where
strategic cultural impacts were to be observed.
Only more recently have strategic culture studies made new inroads into the theory by
limiting the definition of strategic culture, especially in terms of what can reasonably be
considered to inform strategic culture biases and preferences, and where observation of
strategic culture is possible.92 A particularly useful redefinition of strategic culture is
provided by Alasdair Ian Johnston:
Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation
structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and
long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy
of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions
with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely
realistic and efficacious. 93
Three aspects of this definition serve to clarify many of the undefined or overly broad
aspects of earlier strategic cultural scholarship. First, in identifying strategic culture as an
integrated system of symbols, Johnston argues the object of study requires a focus not
only on biases and preferences but also on the discourse that sustains and propagates
those biases and preferences. Second, in drawing from earlier efforts an emphasis on
pervasive and long lasting preferences, we are equipped to examine strategic culture as
guide to behavior, rather than simply a synthesis of possible cultural variables.
Significantly, this conception does not claim that preferences are immutable or
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unchanging, but rather that they serve to interpret structural or material changes in the
international security environment, rather than themselves being directed by those
changes. Finally, if strategic cultures succeed in “clothing these conceptions in an aura of
factuality”, it would follow that ideas bear the potential to condition decision-making
behavior in particular ways.
Distinct strategic cultures can be differentiated largely by their long-term collectively
held assumptions about the strategic environment and subsequent decision guiding
behaviors. As Johnston and other theorists have claimed, the most salient categories of
collective assumptions concern questions about the role of conflict in human affairs, the
nature of perceived strategic threats and the efficacy of the use of force to address these
threats.94 First, do the members of the group view conflict as inevitable in human affairs
or an aberration? Second, do members view the nature of international threats as posing a
zero-sum, or variable sum dilemma? Finally, what is the group view on the utility of
force to control outcomes and eliminate perceived threats?
The answers to these questions drive operational assumptions about what options are best
suited to dealing with strategic threats, and provide long-term policy preferences that are
applied to various strategic circumstances and environments.95 A group assuming the
inevitability of conflict, zero-sum threats and a high utility of armed force would be
predicted to try and ‘solve’ problems posed by strategic threats through offensive
strategies rather than accommodation. A group holding the opposite assumptions would
likely prefer to manage threats through the application of diplomatic tools or compromise
/ cooperative strategies. Strategic cultures thus provide established, relatively static
preferences for action across different strategic circumstances and time periods through
the orienting device of deeply held beliefs and accepted norms that shape views on the
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nature of international threats and the utility of the use of force to address such threats.
As Johnston further elaborates, “ideas as independent variables are useful only because
they interpret or give meaning to material facts. Thus changes in relative capabilities, for
instance, mean something different to a realist politician concerned about relative gains in
a competitive world than they do to a liberal concerned about absolute gains.”96  
Strategic Culture “membership”
In terms of “membership”, policy elites, political institutions such as parties or domestic
coalitions, and formal institutions have all been identified as potential bearers of strategic
culture. Significant members include policy makers, intellectuals, and other powerful
actors who attempt to promote or legitimize strategic conceptions that are in line with the
dominant biases and assumptions of the particular strategic culture. The relative fluidity
of the membership of strategic cultures within contested political systems assumes a
natural turnover of these groups. 97 By the nature of its fluid membership, influence and
acceptance, an individual strategic culture is not entirely static, but prone to a certain
degree of adaptation and evolution. All those who possess the biases and assumptions of
a strategic culture can legitimately be considered members. Again, emphasis should be
placed on collectives rather than individuals, as it is the collectively held beliefs that
shape policy outcomes that are of central interest to this study.
This thesis largely focuses on the U.S. Congress and Office of the President in its
examination of strategic culture. This is not a claim that other groups and individuals
should be considered insignificant in terms of establishing and maintaining shared
ideational assumptions and preferences, simply that Congress and presidential
administrations play outsized roles in the general foreign policy process, and have been
particularly important in the evolution of counterproliferation policy and its underlying
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strategic conceptions.98 Focus on Congress and the Presidency in this study of strategic
culture is also useful as a theoretical counterpoint to many existing studies of the
interaction of these two groups.99
Much has been written on the relative weakness of the U.S. Congress in “determining”
foreign policy outcomes as it has progressively abrogated significant legal authority to
the Executive branch. While certainly a valid focus for analysis, such arguments tend to
overemphasize qualitative factors of tangible power such as legal precedents for
decisionmaking authority, and minimize the often intangible ideational function such an
institution plays. A central challenge of this thesis to such instrumental accounts of
legislative influence is by repositioning analytic focus on the ways in which influential
members, often loosely clustered into identifiable strategic cultures, can establish and
maintain “legitimate” policy conceptions. It is such normative legitimization functions
embedded in political argumentation that allow the U.S. Congress to control the forms of
discourse that can limit the range of appropriate responses to strategic challenges, and
steer policymaking away from the “rational” decisionmaking conditions assumed in
much of the literature.
The need to account for competing strategic cultures
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An important weakness of strategic culture literature is that in the interest of parsimony,
states are assumed to possess a single strategic culture in order to map preferences over
time to exclude behavioral influences of structural or relative power changes. The
advance of strategic culture theory has thus been hobbled by needing to appeal to the
narrow methodological confines of structural theories. Such limitations represent an
admirable necessity for establishing their analytical validity, but a limiting convention
nonetheless. That competing strategic cultures can exist within the same state, each with
highly differentiated biases and preferences, challenges any presumption that strategic
cultures are themselves the product of structural forces. Thus this thesis argues there is a
need to account for the impact of competing strategic cultures on state behavior.
In the strategic culture literature, Germany, Japan and various Scandinavian states have
provided good case studies for strategic cultural explanations of policy.100 They appear to
be largely culturally homogenous, and they have made security policy choices in the
post-Cold War that seem to, if not directly challenge structuralist assumptions about what
policies would be rational, then at least provide accounts of state actions in “structurally
indeterminate situations.”101 It is tempting for purposes of parsimony to attribute security
policy to factors such as “Japanese society.”102 However, this ignores the fact that
individual societies may experience relatively powerful competition between distinct sets
of cultural beliefs and values held by those attempting to shape security policy. Thus
strategic culture does not serve as an ideational representation of the state, but rather
belongs within the state, and can serve to illuminate significant intra-state political
competition. It is assumed that in societies where normative debates are minimal,
strategic culture may be homogenous, whereas strategic cultures in polarized societies
may be equally representative of such divisive forces.
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This thesis posits there are two major competing strategic cultures active within the U.S.
that can legitimately affect foreign policy outcomes. Though any divisive labels are
incomplete and potentially carry extra theoretic baggage, for purposes of identification,
‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ strategic cultures will be the two groups examined in this
thesis. Though later chapters will explain specific divisions on proliferation issues, it is
important to briefly explain the choice of these labels, so as to avoid later confusion.
Liberal and conservative in this thesis are drawn from the American political context,
rather than in reference to International Relations theory. The linguistic division of
‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ popular in much writing since the Vietnam War is avoided for its
oversimplification of a conflict / pacifist divide that is not representative of the strategic
debates over the issue of proliferation.103 ‘Democratic’ and ‘Republican’ are avoided,
because although liberal and conservative often overlap with the respective major
political parties, these labels carry a much larger set of domestic political connotations
inappropriate to the examination of foreign policy analysis. Finally, the descriptions of
‘soft idealpolitik’ and ‘hard realpolitik’ strategic culture favored by theorists such as
Johnston are avoided, as the notion of realpolitik is often linked to Rational Actor Model
and other systemic theories challenged by this thesis.104 Additionally, this thesis argues in
later chapters that neoconservatives were instrumental in shaping conservative strategic
culture in the U.S., and neoconservatives are often opposed to Realists and realpolitik
minimization of the role of ideas and identity in favor of concerns such as the balance of
material power.105 Therefore labels of liberal and conservative have been chosen as a
middle ground between potentially misleading or otherwise theoretically problematic
alternatives.
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It is important to note, however, that while “liberal” and “conservative” are useful labels
for the purposes of this thesis, such categories should not be mistaken as a blanket
homogenization of all liberal and conservative factions within the U.S. political context.
For example, while the arguments and activities of the neoconservative wing of the
Republican Party are important to incorporate into the analysis of the thesis, it would be a
mistake to portray neoconservative positions as representative of those held by all U.S.
conservatives.106 Therefore, although this thesis argues that for purposes of distinguishing
broadly divergent strategic assumptions within the U.S. context, such categorization
serves as a necessary simplification, such a move should not be taken to imply a lack of
meaningful divisions within each category.
Political argument: linking strategic cultural preferences and policy outcomes
Even if we establish that strategic cultures exist in meaningful ways and serve to maintain
longstanding preferences and biases, this still leaves several important questions to be
answered before causal links to policy outcomes can be made. How can strategic culture
help explain the evolution of CP? How does the existence of competing strategic cultures
with their associated preferences help explain the evolution of CP in a way that
substantially differs from simple cognitive, bureaucratic or rational action models? Is
policy evolution more than simply a function of which group holds the reins of political
power at any given time? In essence, we still need to connect strategic culture and its
associated ideas to the process of foreign policy. This requires asking how strategic
cultures bring about change - and not just individual policy change, but more
fundamental normative changes that provide a framework for future policy debates and
organizational action. To redress this weakness, the existing strategic culture framework
will need to be expanded if it is to prove useful in explaining the evolution of CP, not
merely its end state.
The path to such an explanation lies in exploring how strategic cultural preferences are
translated through political argument into more lasting ways of framing sets of problems,
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and in the way in which such efforts translate into longer term expectations of what is
both necessary and possible in the practice of foreign policy. An examination of
argument and framing can illuminate the ways in which strategic cultures legitimize or
delegitimize normative frameworks, providing a causal pathway to policy outcomes. It is
by exploring these dynamics that a clearer link can be drawn between strategic cultural
preference, resulting policy and ultimately the institutionalization of such preferences in
organizational practice and capabilities.
Ideas must be expressed in order to be shared, leaving what Theo Farell calls “physical
residues” – codified or recorded clues as to their meaning and path of dissemination.107
Thus we can in some ways treat the investigation of such shared beliefs by examining not
only their origins in strategic cultural preference, but also their methods of transmission
and implementation. As ideas in the political sphere are transmitted through argument,
and the ideas embedded in argument are both representative and constitutive of culture,
analysis should focus on how leaders describe their strategic environment and argue for
specific responses to that environment.
Political argument serves not only to express methods of reasoning and convey and
reinforce cultural preferences, but also to persuade others of the value of such reasoning
and justify courses of action.108 Argumentative vehicles such as policy positions,
legislative debates, public speeches, internal correspondence, and other persuasive forms,
often do not serve merely to present a course of action as appropriate to address a
particular strategic dilemma, but rather represent an attempt to establish or reinforce
larger conceptions of cultural identity and appropriate forms of action. Political actors are
often concerned with more than the resolution of a particular dilemma, and use the
argumentative tools at their disposal to make broader claims about which kinds of actions
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appropriately serve their conceptions of “national interest”. Political arguments are thus
manifestations of not only particular policy prescription, but also larger normative
frameworks. As Price and Tannenwald have argued in their study of the chemical
weapons taboo, “Discourses produce and legitimate certain behaviors and conditions of
life as ‘normal’ and, conversely, construct categories that themselves make a cluster of
practices and understandings seem inconceivable or illegitimate.”109
Even in Berger’s strategic culture analysis of relatively homogenous German and
Japanese strategic culture, especially their positions on the external use of force, he
admits that, “In both cases, these lessons were shaped by the fierce political debates of
the early postwar years…”110 Eventually a single Japanese or German strategic culture is
argued to have won the battle for institutionalization, with its biases and preferences
established as legitimate starting points for political discourse and debate. Thus if
ultimately successful in both argumentation and institutionalization, dominant
conceptions act as starting points for discussion, serving to control what is considered
legitimate discourse, potentially reshaping normative beliefs about appropriate categories
of behavior and thereby limiting both the legitimate ends of foreign policy as well as the
means to pursue those ends. Challenger conceptions that fall outside of these boundaries
do not start on equal footing, but need to first delegitimize and displace existing
conceptions to be themselves accepted as legitimate. This dynamic means there is often a
relatively narrow range of legitimate conceptions about identified security threats at any
given time. 111
Neta Crawford presents a similar line of argument in claiming that the cyclical process of
legitimization and delegitimization is central to understanding how dominant beliefs and
practices undergo change:
First, persuasive ethical arguments deconstruct: they denormalize and
delegitimize dominant beliefs and practices. Second, persuasive ethical arguments
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offer a reconstruction, the articulation of an alternative that meets normative
criteria. In this phase, alternative conceptions of possibility and interest are
discussed and adopted by some actors. And, in the third phase, actors begin to
change their social world. If arguments are persuasive among enough individuals
and groups (and “enough” depends on the context), then the balance of
capabilities between those who favor the dominant normative belief and the new
normative belief will begin to change.112
How do certain arguments, if successful, shape the boundaries of future discourse? The
legitimization / delegitimization dynamic of political argument hints at a larger meta-
argumentative function beyond the immediate resolution of policy questions – that of
framing.
Framing
Consider for a moment, some specific political arguments over the nature of the
proliferation threat that emerged during the evolution of CP. An argumentative divide
emerged in the early 1990’s over how to interpret the motives of certain potentially
adversarial states such as Iraq, North Korea and Iran. One side in the debate argued that
while particular behaviors of those states required U.S. response, such behavior was
reflective of rational states with limited ambitions. Common sense from this perspective
dictated that enhancing traditional forms of defense and deterrence, coupled with
strengthening the mechanisms of the NP regime would serve to dissuade such states from
engaging in confrontation with the United States. The opposing argument, however,
argued that such states were in fact irrational actors, whose ideological motives did not
provide reasonable limits on their behavior. Common sense from this perspective dictated
that any method that did not ultimately serve to rollback the unconventional capabilities
of such states would lead to potentially more catastrophic conflict with the United States,
when such conflict ultimately occurred.
This example illuminates the powerful concept of argumentative framing, as defined by
communications scholar Robert Entman, “to select some aspects of a perceived reality
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and make them more salient in communicating… in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation.”113 The focus is on an active process of selection from within a larger
set of potential perceptions or interpretations, consisting of a selector attempting to shape
the perceptions of an audience.114 Thus in the act of political argument / discourse, the
choice of language is vital because it has the potential to evoke moral and conceptual, not
to mention emotional associations that condition perceptions of efficacy and
legitimacy.115
Effectively framed political messages, sufficiently reinforced through cohesive repetition
have a greater potential to create an intense emotional resonance with political audiences
than purely ‘rational’ explanations of policy details. Such emotional resonance increases
the potential that messages and frames will be perceived as ‘common sense’, or uniquely
realistic and efficacious. 116 The ultimate goal of such a communications strategy being
the bridging of public perceptions of ‘common sense’ policy with the preexisting
assumptions and preferences of strategic culture. As Republican communications
strategist Frank Luntz commented on the efficacy of this process when successfully
employed:
“Common sense” doesn’t require any fancy theories; it is self-evidently correct…
“Common sense” is not just the best argument for almost any policy prescription
you might propose – it’s essential. If you win and occupy the rhetorical territory
owned by “common sense,” your position will be virtually unassailable.117
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Such political strategy mirrors the findings of Nobel Prize winning behavioral economists
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whose research has explored the limits of
analytical insight and predictive capacity achieved by treating human beings as rational
actors.118 The pair introduced the concept of framing into behavioral economics, whereby
central axioms of rational choice often do not hold depending on how choices are framed
(i.e., presented).119 What the research on framing problems demonstrates is that in the real
world of social interaction, how a problem is presented is often as important as what
problem is presented. This further opens the door to a wider questioning of the
assumptions of rational choice models insofar as they assume a world of decisions made
about objective facts
If, as Crawford argues, “Meta-arguments are causally important when their exponents
succeed in setting the framework for understanding events”, then a satisfying strategic
cultural perspective must account for both the realities of political competition and
purpose of political argument.120 Tracing how arguments about the issues of proliferation
were framed by different groups of policymakers, and how those arguments shaped or
limited the range of subsequent inquiry as reflected in the content of political argument,
will be a central feature in the examination of strategic cultural impacts on the evolution
of CP. Thus we need to move beyond simply tracking which groups successfully
establish domestic political dominance at any given time, and more importantly
determine which groups are most successful in establishing the legitimacy of their
arguments over time. Such an approach can both produce a powerful explanation of
policy evolution as well as expose the longer-term effects of political argument that may
survive the political dominance of the strategic culture that brought about such changes.
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Strategic culture offers a useful framework for explaining policy transformation as
partially a function of competitive ideational groups at the domestic level. Once
expanded to accept political competition and paired with a deeper understanding of
political argument, strategic culture emerges as a useful framework for explaining the
evolution of CP.  While there is little doubt that the international threat environment had
changed as a result of post-Gulf War discoveries about the nature and scope of Iraqi
unconventional weapons programs, this should not be taken as bearing implying
inherently preferential policy responses. This is not to argue that threat conceptions were
merely invented or ignored by various actors, but rather that foreign policy actors
interpret events and material changes in the international security environment and then
attempt to shape appropriate responses based on these interpretations. Rather than simply
imagining threats in isolation from external stimuli, a strategic culture perspective assists
in looking within the subjective assumptions and interpretations that form the basis for
policy evolution.
Furthermore, as the forces that shape cultural beliefs and confer legitimacy to particular
normative conceptions cannot be separated from the formal institutionalization of those
conceptions, this thesis argues that any study of strategic culture is incomplete without a
corresponding study of the institutions tasked with execution of policy. The forces that
shape cultural beliefs and confer legitimacy cannot be separated from the formal
institutions that provide longevity to those policies through the development of
organizational practices and capabilities. Therefore, the thesis will now turn to
organizational theory, which focuses on the beliefs collectively held within particular
military organizations and their capacity to shape policy options through their
development or use of military capabilities and their ability to institutionalize emergent
norms. Examining the interrelationship of strategic cultural preferences and modes of
discourse, together with the role of functional organizations tasked with policy
implementation is crucial to understanding the link between ideas, culture,
institutionalization and ultimately foreign policy behavior.
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Organizational theory
From explanations that began, “It was obvious that the United States needed to…” and,
“senior policy maker ‘x’ decided that we needed to…” a number of explanations for CP
evolution have been offered in informal conversations and interviews with former DOD
policy makers and the writings of members of the military charged with the
implementation of counterproliferation. Such explanations generally mirror the
theoretical assumptions embodied in the RAM, Bureaucratic Politics and Cognitive
models presented at the beginning of the chapter, and are represented by participants as
supposedly “common sense” explanations for CP evolution. However, as argued
throughout this thesis, what appeared to be self-evident to those involved is often
precisely what requires explanation if we are to more fully explain the types of cultural
preferences, argumentative structures and institutional processes that ultimately serve to
develop one set of foreign policy responses at the cost of another. In the case of the U.S.
military, a satisfying explanation must answer how this particular set of preferences came
to be seen as not just “common sense” for military leaders but also became embedded in
the organizational routines and capabilities of the military itself.
Retrospective explanations of “common sense” fail to adequately explain why a defense
initiative intended to provide strictly defensive force protection measures and highly
constrained support of NP regime enforcement measures would quickly become heavily
invested in counterforce capabilities with strong offensive utility. Similarly, common
sense inadequately explains why an initiative senior DOD officials strongly defended
from criticism as potentially indicating a preemptive orientation, would very quickly lead
to the types of training, missions and capabilities across the different branches of the
military that would directly support an eventual preemptive doctrine.
Cultural preferences for policy, and the political arguments that championed those
preferences are necessary considerations for explaining the evolution of CP, but alone do
not constitute sufficient explanation of that evolution. This section will address why we
also need to understand the role of the DOD in CP policy evolution, what special
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contribution the DOD made to the evolution of CP by virtue of being a military
organization, and how this fits with the impacts of strategic culture.
Organizational biases and preferences
Literature on organizations has demonstrated how the special cognitive and ideational
features of organizations can place constraints on rational decisionmaking.121 Similar to
strategic cultures, military organizations often filter inputs and generate preferences in
regularized ways. These reified concepts and general worldview are embodied in the
umbrella term of organizational culture, “the set of basic assumptions, values, norms,
beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understanding,” the acceptance of
which is central to the socialization of new members and thus maintenance of the status
quo. 122 For military organizations in particular, incoming members must demonstrate
awareness of concepts transmitted in their training throughout their professional careers,
and the credibility and effectiveness of individuals often rests on their apparent
acceptance of organizational knowledge.123 Additionally, career advancement is often
contingent on perceptions of a member’s explicit acceptance and promotion of such
concepts. Thus organizational behavior is strongly conditioned by the assumptions and
preferences generated through the dissemination and maintenance of organizational
culture.124
Research into military culture indicates that elite members of military organizations are
more likely than civilian policymakers to view conflict as inevitable in the long run, and
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more likely to be skeptical of non-military solutions to traditional security problems. 125
Due to their particular responsibilities and training, professional members of the military
are socialized to focus on the purely military influences on conflict outcomes, and thus
often “see the world through lenses that filter out important political considerations that
can (and should) influence strategic decisions and military outcomes in war.”126 Such
findings have led to questions about propensity for militarism in the form of an excessive
faith in military solutions to a wide range of political problems, leading to greater
potential for expansionist foreign policies.127 Fear of a tendency towards militarism was
an important consideration in the early structuring of balance of powers and strong
civilian control over the military in the United States. 128
An additional concern has been the so-called “cult of the offensive”, in which strong
identity functions stemming from organizational culture and organizational routines
impact the development of military doctrine.129 Scholars such as Barry Posen, Jack
Snyder and Scott Sagan have argued that assumptions about the international security
environment such as the inevitability of conflict, preferences for the overwhelming rather
than incremental use of force, and knowledge-laden routines such as the requirements for
coordination of battle, lead to strong preferences within military organizations for
offensive doctrines.130 Military organizations are largely expected to favor offensive
doctrines, and if left to their own devices, even preventative doctrines, as these are
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assumed to both reduce unexpected battlefield variables in the minds of most military
leaders, and limit the long-term opportunities adversaries have to gain military
advantages through the development of their own military capabilities.131 For Posen,
“Military organizations will generally prefer offensive doctrines because they reduce
uncertainty in important ways.”132
Successful execution of military plans often rests on being able to choose combat
conditions and execute standard exercises acquired in training, rather than to be forced to
react to adversarial initiative.133 The training and analytical skills of military
organizations favors the calculation of requirements to defeat measurable adversarial
traits such as military capability and force structure, rather than intangible political or
social forces such as the will of the adversary to fight, or their motivations in conflict.134
Offensive operations by their logistical nature also require more extensive budgetary
allocations to support and maintain in both war and peacetime, thus serving to support
what some have argued is an organizational tendency to jealously guard and seek to
increase turf and strength, as well as to preserve undiluted what it feels to be its “essence”
or “mission.”135
Are such issues of militarism and offensive doctrinal tendency relevant in the case of the
United States? Recent U.S. civil-military relations research illuminates some of the more
complex realities and challenges to conventional wisdom about military views on the use
of force such as militarism and offensive bias.136 In one of the most thorough analyses of
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elite U.S. civilian and military attitudes towards the use of force, Peter Feaver discovered
that American military attitudes support such expectations of offensive doctrinal bias, but
are limited to the question of how force is to be applied in conflict, rather than question of
whether force should be initiated.137 Furthermore, elite military members in the United
States appear to be significantly less willing to initiate conflict than their non-military,
non-veteran civilian counterparts, especially in circumstances that reach beyond
traditionally threats to ‘national security,’ such as humanitarian intervention.138 However,
once conflict occurs, elite military members are much more likely to favor the
overwhelming, decisive use of force and fewer limitations on the use of that force.139 One
of the most significant conclusions of Feaver’s detailed analysis is a finding that runs
contrary to a central expectation of much military organizational theory literature - that it
is civilian policymakers in the U.S. rather than military leaders who tend to have “more
expansive foreign policy goals and tend to have greater faith in military solutions to
political problems.”140
How can we fit this view of the U.S. military as being generally conflict averse, except in
cases of traditionally defined central U.S. national interests, into a better understanding of
the forces which shaped CP evolution? Consideration must first be given to how these
particular preferences and biases are operationalized in the organizational routines,
knowledge processes, and capabilities development practices of the DOD. It is these
essential uncertainty reduction functions that fundamentally underpin military doctrine,
and ultimately hold the potential to reshape the landscape of choice for civilian
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policymakers. Such an examination will set the stage for exploring the interaction of
military organizations and strategic cultures in producing unique causal pathways for
policy change.
Organizational routines and knowledge processes
A significant way in which military organizations both simplify their interaction with the
external environment and transmit knowledge is through the use of standard operating
procedures (SOP’s). Large organizations tend to develop SOP’s, which, while allowing
them to react reflexively despite their inherent unwieldiness, permit little flexibility or
creativity.141 Organizations simplify inputs to produce decisions that serve the larger
interests of the organization and provide it with a certain degree of predictability and
continuity of action. Simply put, large military organizations require constraints on
rationality in order to perform as cohesive units.
Even a casual reading of U.S. military literature will reveal a vast array of standardized
operations and regulations governing a range of military functions from the proper use
and maintenance of major weapons systems, to the officially accepted length of a
soldier’s hair.142 Military training and socialization places a great deal of emphasis on
attention to detail, with the explicit message that the precise adherence to routines,
checklists and regulations is what may mean the difference between life and death both in
training and combat.143 Such routines thus serve not only to impose some regulatory
behavior in incredibly complex, often chaotic environments such as the heat of battle, but
also allow for a scale of operations that would simply be impossible with autonomous
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units responsible for entirely individual responses to local conditions. However, such
regulatory necessity can easily lead to unintended organizational behavior.
In one of the classic texts dealing with the implications of organizational theory for
‘rational’ policy outcomes, Graham Allison argues that organizational procedures led to
outcomes unintended by supposedly rational decisionmakers.144 One of the more
illustrative examples in Allison’s study concerning the effects of SOP’s on decisions was
in explaining the longstanding mystery of painstaking Soviet secrecy in shipping missiles
to Cuba in the early 1960’s and yet subsequent failure to camouflage missile sites from
detection by U.S. spy planes. Rather than the intended direct provocation it was assumed
to be at the time by U.S. decisionmakers, Allison demonstrates that the difference
between the clandestine shipment of missile components and then open missile site
construction was simply a function of the KGB and Soviet Missile command acting out
their respective SOP’s for transportation of clandestine goods and the physical
construction of missile launch facilities. 145 Both were tasked with the execution of duties
considered to fall under particular organizational SOP’s – in the case of Soviet Missile
Command, the construction of missile bases in Cuba was undertaken according to
published organizational guidelines. Allison’s examination of the role of SOP’s in the
Cuban Missile Crisis served to further highlight the role of uncertainty in
decisionmaking, with decision-makers revealed as not in full control of the
implementation of their orders.
In her book, Whole World on Fire, Elisabeth Eden challenged and expanded Allison’s
description of SOP’s, positing another significant role for organizational routines – that
of formalizing and disseminating organizational learning, and ultimately shaping the
course of future organizational inquiry.146 Eden sought to explain why the U.S. military
developed extensive modeling of blast effects of nuclear weapons, but not the effects
from fire. Her answer points to a tendency of organizational learning to be path-
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dependent. 147 Eden argues that the significant time required to solve problems through the
development of capabilities means that once particular ways of solving or addressing
problems becomes embedded in organizational routines, they become subsumed in the
larger organizational approach to the issue in question. The continued use of “knowledge-
laden routines” leads to refinements of routine and a greater ability to “solve” problems.
Finally, this increased ability (or assumption of said ability) creates a self-sustaining
perception of greater efficacy and provides the organization with a strong rationale for
the continued use of such routines.
Taken together, organizational routines and knowledge processes often function not only
to simplify and coordinate organizational action, but also filter environmental inputs,
allowing for uncertainty to be “absorbed” by the organization and turned into fact.148 The
success of military missions often hinges on the anticipation of adversarial capabilities
and tactics, rather than dwelling on the range of potential adversarial motives that might
seek to employ such capabilities and tactics. As perfect intelligence about adversarial
capability is highly unlikely, especially in the case of unconventional weapons, military
organizations generally take a worst-case scenario to questions of preparedness and
doctrine in response to potential strategic threats. Such a normal and indeed, necessary
attitude towards environmental uncertainty reduction by military organizations can,
however, lead to certain self-reinforcing behaviors and circular logic.
In the case of the evolution of counterproliferation policy, the integration of early
counterproliferation capabilities into the individual military services and regional
warfighting commands meant that CP became part of the military organization’s overall
doctrinal approach to combat planning and training. Subsequently, an increased
perception of the ability of the DOD to deal with proliferation threats through militarily
means reinforced a sense that addressing such threats militarily was both increasingly
possible and necessary. The continued inability to provide accurate intelligence on
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proliferation only fueled the impetus to reduce environmental uncertainty that was itself
rationale to continue with the development of CP capabilities. As will be argued in later
chapters, the establishment of organizational routines served to disseminate culturally
derived strategic assumptions, ultimately aiding in the institutionalization of practices
that were themselves instrumental in challenging normative beliefs about the use of force
to address the threat of proliferation.
Capabilities development
By virtue of their responsibility for the application of military force, military
organizations occupy a unique position within the cluster of formal institutions
responsible for implementing foreign policy decisions and broader strategic conceptions
selected by policymakers. Though certainly not possessing complete autonomy in the
question of which military capabilities are best suited to meet current and likely future
threats to the ambiguous category of “national interests”, the U.S. military in particular
possesses the bulk of responsibility for providing appropriate force structure,
modernization, unit readiness and sustainability of operations.149 This broad sense of
responsibility to meet environmental uncertainty with all available means was articulated
by one senior military professional tasked with managing the research and development
of advanced defense capabilities as an institutional obligation to, “be able to give the
President the widest number of options.”150 However, providing military options does not
occur outside the policy process, but is partially constitutive of the policy process itself.
Military capabilities have historically altered both the framework of decision and menu of
choice for policymakers through the development of revolutionary, incremental or
ambiguous capabilities.
Revolutionary changes in military capabilities alter policy options in a variety of
unpredictable ways. An obvious example of a revolutionary military capability was the
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development of nuclear weapons as part of Allied efforts to end WWII. Aside from
bringing about the rapid conclusion of hostilities with Japan, nuclear weapons presented
policymakers with a host of policy challenges and normative dilemmas that would largely
define American foreign policy for decades to come. The specter of post-war nuclear
anarchy, coupled with the strategic assumption in the 1950’s of aggressor advantage in a
nuclear conflict, helped create what has been referred to as an “ordering imperative.”
This eventually gave rise to sweeping political and strategic changes resulting in the
creation of the NP regime, as well as the doctrine of containment backed by the strategy
of deterrence that dominated U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War.151
Incremental changes in military capabilities which affect policy options are less dramatic
in their immediate impact on policy choice, but over time can lead to significant
challenges to broadly accepted normative beliefs motivating policy, especially in
wartime. In his magisterial study of strategic bombing of Germany during WWII, Jörg
Friedrich examines the effect on Allied considerations of targeting civilians in bombing
raids concluding that the effective development of new bombing technologies had a
dramatic effect on both the policy alternatives and normative beliefs of civilian
decisionmakers during warfare.152 Each incremental step of military capabilities
development allowed for incremental encroachment on existing norms against the
intentional targeting of civilians. Although the end result was a type of military campaign
designed to inflict mass casualties that had been vigorously rejected by civilian
policymakers at the onset of the war as immoral, each intermediate step was viewed by
both policymakers and military leaders as necessary for the pursuit of strategic
objectives. Although warfare arguably speeds up such a process of incremental
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encroachment on normative practice, it is by no means a phenomenon exclusive to
periods of overt conflict.153
Finally, ambiguous capabilities are those whose doctrinal orientation is a matter of
application, rather than inherent technological purpose. Such capabilities can blur the line
between different doctrinal orientations such as deterrent, offensive, defensive,
preemptive and preventative, opening opportunities for political challenges to normative
beliefs about use of force. A recent example of such ambiguous capabilities is the debate
over so-called “bunker busting”, deep penetration weapons argued by many military
leaders to be an essential component of a defensively oriented counterforce component
necessary to prevent the deployment of unconventional weapons by potential adversaries
in wartime. Both critics and supporters of such technologies point out that the effective
development of such capability would effectively lower the barrier for future preemptive
or preventative doctrine, as there is nothing inherent to the technology itself that would
determine whether its effectiveness would be maximized during or before the outbreak of
hostilities.154 Kenneth Waltz’s dictum that “Capabilities foster policies that employ
them”, should serve as a general cautionary note that existing rationales for military
capabilities often ignore their potential future use outside of existing normative
frameworks.155
Functional organizations such as the DOD play an essential role in the execution of
policy, as well as potentially shaping the landscape of choice for policymakers. Military
organizational biases and preferences shape organizational views of appropriate doctrine
and condition threat perceptions in predictable ways. The tendency to see conflict and the
spread of military capabilities as inevitable leads military organizations such as the DOD
to prefer offensive doctrines that leave the organization with as much ability to maintain
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strategic initiative and political autonomy as possible. Organizational routines and
knowledge processes allow for large-scale coordinated action, but simultaneously
reinforce organizational biases and preferences for certain forms of action believed to
reduce environmental uncertainty. Finally, capabilities development by military
organizations can create new and often unanticipated choices for decisionmakers.
Together, these organizational inputs may eventually combine to institutionalize
emergent policy conceptions into established military practice, conferring longevity and
stability to new forms of action, and altering the landscape of choice for future leaders.
Examining the CP policy through the lens of both strategic culture and organizational
theory is important, as both political and military inputs to the policymaking process have
strongly shaped its ultimate evolution. However, rather than view each perspective in
isolation, attempting to construct a linear progression from political policy inputs to
military outputs, it is important to consider the interaction of political and military
components of the policy process.
Interaction of the military organization and strategic culture
Although strategic culture and organizational theory make distinct claims about likely
policy impacts, this thesis argues that the two perspectives are mutually interdependent.
The process of developing threat conceptions and policy responses depends on both
civilian and military decisionmakers, and their policy inputs interact in ways not
explained by either perspective taken in isolation. This section will offer a brief series of
general propositions that are drawn from the two perspectives of strategic culture and
organizational theory:156
1) Successful long-term challenges to existing normative practices will not be
those simply championed by the dominant strategic culture, but those that
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successfully reframe the strategic conceptions on which those practices are
based.
In the United States the balance of domestic political power and the relative strength of
issue advocates are constantly in flux. The American political system was designed with
constant tension in mind as a safeguard against either tyranny or stagnation. Political
actors within the United States are continually engaged in argumentative struggles over
threat perceptions and appropriate policy responses, as a constant demonstration of this
systemic tension. However, the fact that certain foreign policy preferences and behaviors
often maintain a high degree of consistency and longevity points to forces that transcend
the ebb and flow of this constantly shifting balance.
As noted earlier in this chapter, such stability is often ascribed to systemic or structural
factors stemming from either material endowment or the “rational requirements” of
relative power relationships. This thesis, however, argues that relative consistency in
security policy is often due to the stabilizing influence of collective ideational forces
rooted in broadly shared strategic cultures, and the institutionalized practices of military
organizations. With particular relevance to the impact of strategic cultures, the strong
appeal to legitimacy and ‘common sense’ found in political discourse suggests that
argument frames are key to controlling policy outputs over time.
Framing plays a larger role than mere transient justification for strategic conceptions and
policy choices. More fundamentally, framing provides the basis for lasting expectations
of what is both necessary and possible in making foreign policy choices. Pervasive
normative beliefs that drive policy choices and have their roots in broad social acceptance
depend on the establishment and maintenance of conceptual legitimacy. Normative
legitimacy in the political sphere is established, maintained and challenged through
political argumentative framing. Once an issue is both effectively framed and legitimized,
subsequent challenges must be made not from an equal discursive position, but in
reference to the legitimate frame. This potential to create discursive space around certain
issues is what gives effective framing and argumentation the power to establish lasting
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threat conceptions and policy approaches that place constraints on the ability of shifting
groups of decisionmakers to refashion policy to their personal whim. Political argument
serves as the larger competition for dominance in the articulation of danger, and
successful framing establishes the central pillar around which subsequent competing
“solutions” are oriented.
As will be examined in chapters 3 and 5, successful framing does more than “explain”
arguments to various audiences. Framing can normalize certain types of behavior and
belief, and make embedded policy prescriptions seem uniquely effective at addressing
identified strategic dilemmas. Framing is thus key to the cycle of legitimization and
delegitimization necessary to change the social world in lasting ways. Strategic cultures
with members more coordinated and skilled at effectively framing or reframing their
strategic conceptions and policy preferences will likely enjoy more success in the
struggle for policy dominance than those who simply wield functional power and
temporary authority.
2) Successful institutionalization of new normative practices requires
penetration of guiding conceptions throughout the functional organization
tasked with policy implementation.
Literature on strategic culture suggests that reframing of security practices is essential to
legitimization in the political sphere, but also that such practices must also be
‘institutionalized’ in order to enjoy lasting influence. 157 Once institutionalized in
organizational practices and capabilities, policy concepts become highly resistant to rapid
challenge or transformation. Recognizing this, civilian decisionmakers in the U.S. often
attempt to drive policy initiatives and strategic conceptions downward through the DOD,
utilizing senior civilian appointees to act as hierarchical stewards of policy priorities.158
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Though policy conceptions are ostensibly promulgated in a top-down form representative
of the formal hierarchy of the military, functional implementation of meaningful change
in the military rarely follows such a rigid top-down process. Institutionalization that
affects the practices and capabilities of the military is a time-intensive process involving
a number of feedback loops. Organizational learning, capabilities development, mission
planning and consensus on emerging strategic conceptions all follow a more broadly
distributed pattern within the organization that involves all layers of the hierarchy in the
process of institutionalization. Far from being an automatic mechanism set in motion by
civilian leaders, meaningful change requires active involvement at all levels of the
organization in decisionmaking, learning, adaptation and functional capabilities
development. The ultimate effectiveness of civilian leaders of the DOD – the “thin patina
of political appointees” – does not come from a personal ability to mandate change, but
rather results from collective skill in guiding and coordinating the much larger, more
stable base of career organizational members. 159
As current U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has noted,
It’s really important, if you want lasting change, to involve the professionals in
the institution. Because then the solution, at the end of the day, is their solution,
and they’re going to defend it once the person who initiated it is long gone. I think
that a lot of people who come to government, often from business… don’t
understand how big public bureaucracies work and the capacity of the
bureaucracy to outlast anybody.160
Attempts at policy implementation and institutionalization should be seen as requiring
penetration throughout the functional layers of the organization. Additionally, it is argued
that bottom-up approaches allowing professional members to shape policy to fit the
existing perceptions and practices of the organization will likely be much more effective
and pervasive over time than top down edicts intended to force the organization into
compliance with policy orientations desired by civilian decisionmakers. Civilian policy
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entrepreneurs face tradeoffs in embedding policy ideas, as there is a generally inverse
relationship between organizational longevity and the capacity for immediate action
when it comes to new policy implementation.161 Efforts to implement change from above
must gain the acceptance and support of the lower ranks of the organization tasked with
the actual implementation of directives, and failure to do so often results in paralyzing
organizational resistance.162
Once successful, institutionalization of new policy practices can serve to ‘normalize’ new
normative behavior, often through incremental application. Just as military organizations
depend on civilian policymakers to provide policy guidance and establish legitimacy for
new military doctrine, civilian policymakers depend on military organizations to serve as
institutional sources of policy predispositions.163 Legitimacy and institutionalization are
thus intimately bound, with new forms of military action and supporting normative
beliefs requiring both to succeed in the long term.
3) Without strong civilian oversight to the contrary, capabilities driven defense
initiatives will tend to become more offensively oriented over time.
Policymakers working with the Department of Defense face an essential tension in
attempting to institutionalize new policy priorities. Meaningful institutionalization
requires respecting and leveraging a certain degree of organizational autonomy in
shaping implementation of policy, yet granting too much autonomy to the organization
may result in transformation of policy contrary to the original intent of civilian leaders.
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With too much oversight and external direction, policy initiatives are likely to meet
crippling organizational resistance, yet without strong and attentive oversight, policy
initiatives with a military component are likely to drift into more offensively oriented
methods of practice.
Decision makers establish policy guidelines and boundaries for organizations through
oversight functions, budgetary discretion or other forms of pressure, often serving to
define what policy approaches are acceptable or unacceptable in normative terms.
However, this guidance function often operates with a strong dependency on functional
organizations for the generation of policy choices to fulfill stated objectives. Thus the
work of organizations is crucial, not only for implementing the decisions of
policymakers, but in shaping the decision environment in which political ends are
themselves determined. Military practices for reducing uncertainty, particularly through
the development of capabilities to meet perceived threats, can strongly affect the
subsequent “menu of choice” for decisionmakers, potentially providing new policy
options, or by reducing the apparent opportunity costs of existing decisions.
Political and military components of the policy process interact in a recursive manner,
requiring fine balancing on both the civilian and military sides, and requiring great care
in clearly identifying policy ends and monitoring that military means are in line with
underlying normative beliefs. Military capabilities that affect questions of what can be
done to respond to strategic threats have significant impacts on political calculations of
what should be done, and even on broader political questions of what constitutes a
strategic threat. Together, these dynamics pose important implications for the course of
future policy and existing normative beliefs if the offensive tendencies of the military
organization are not checked by civilian oversight.
4) Normative challenges will require significant time for successful
institutionalization, often leading to mismatch between operationalized
policies and current conceptions of appropriate action.
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Policy that changes most quickly in organizational terms is often also the least likely to
survive long enough to become institutionalized into lasting practice. Substantive policy
change often experiences a time lag between the moment when an idea is presented to a
functional organization, and when that idea can survive the struggle against existing
ideational challengers and eventually become institutionalized.
The strategy-doctrine cycle by its very nature, and especially in cases of high tech
capabilities development or employment, leads to delayed institutionalization of doctrine
to match strategic conceptions. 164 Even bringing existing weapons systems “off the shelf”
into meaningful military capabilities requires a huge investment in time, as integration of
equipment into organizational procedures, practices and training all possess individual
timeframes that may be extensive.165 The military organizational bias towards offensive
capabilities and doctrine presents an oversight dilemma to civilian policymakers. As there
is often a gap between the time required for effective implementation of policy initiatives,
and the tenure of civilian policymakers (not to mention the attention span of
policymakers), disconnects between policy ends and military means to achieve them are
not only possible, but likely.
This time delay factor between the emergence of “legitimate” threat conceptions and
organizational capabilities response implies there will often be inconsistent doctrine,
policy decisions eventually implemented in inappropriate circumstances, and clashes
between policy needs and the operational lag in capability to satisfy those policy
requirements. Effective changes in national security strategy will tend to outlive the
environmental circumstances that created them, in all but the most dynamic, adaptive
organizations. Effective implementation of new strategy requires corresponding changes
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in the operation of the organization – the distribution of resources, identification of
priorities and establishment of organizational responsibilities, to name a few.166
In the case of CP policy, entirely new classes of capabilities were called for by civilian
and military decisionmakers, which significantly extended the timeframe for meaningful
institutionalization. This process implies that little may happen in public terms during the
process of institutionalization, and that such a process may be highly resistant to change
once underway. Once in motion, strong organizational and budgetary forces offer
resistance to counteracting policy without an equally significant investment of time and
effort being made.
Ultimately, strategic culture and organizational theory do not interact in a linear process
that simply begins with strategic cultural preferences and ends with institutionalization.
Cycles of strategic cultural challenges to dominant norms that shape policy directives are
often already influenced by limited informational inputs and existing capabilities offered
by organizations. Military responses in organizational practices and capabilities in turn
depend upon the legitimacy of strategic conceptions to give meaning to organizational
action, initiate the process of institutionalization and sustain the process with budgetary
allocation. Therefore, it is important to consider the impacts of strategic culture and
organizational theory as both distinct and interdependent. A pairing of the two in analysis
of CP aims to reveal many of the significant forces and long-term implications for future
policy that have been largely ignored in literature on the subject.
This thesis now turns to the first historical chapter, examining how the strategic dilemmas
of the early post-Cold War were conceptualized by the DOD, with special emphasis
placed on the subjective “lessons” drawn by the organization from the Gulf War, and
how these shaped the genesis of counterproliferation policy.
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Chapter 2
Organizational Reassessment: 1989-92
This chapter begins in the final years of the Cold War, as the Department of Defense
(DOD) began to reassess the international security environment with the apparent demise
of the Soviet military bloc. The rapid evaporation of a monolithic Soviet-centered
military threat promised a significant reorientation of American defense strategy, with the
relative stability of a bi-polar system giving way to a far more fluid and uncertain multi-
polar system. In this emerging security environment, hard questions were asked about the
proper structuring and capabilities of U.S. military forces to meet the most likely threats
to emerge from this shakeup, with much legislative and public sentiment arguing for a
sizable “peace dividend” that would see a greatly reduced post-Cold War role and budget
for the DOD.
By the end of the first Bush Administration, the massive military threat posed by the
Soviet Union had effectively disintegrated and the United States had led an
overwhelmingly successful multilateral response to regional aggression posed by the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. So why the dire warnings from the DOD during this period
about the threat of proliferation of unconventional weapons, vocal articulations of the
‘failures’ of the Gulf War, and spirited efforts to resist post-Cold War cuts in defense
spending? Why the need for a new approach to proliferation aimed at strengthening the
NP regime, yet one that ultimately undermined key NP norms, questioned the utility of
deterrence and left open the option of preventative military action to rollback
proliferation?
The chapter will argue that a strong organizational drive for uncertainty reduction in the
wake of the Cold War and Gulf War, coupled with existing cultural biases and
organizational learning processes, fundamentally reshaped how the DOD approached the
issue of proliferation in ways poorly explained by bureaucratic or structural models. The
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DOD’s response to uncertainty was not by nature an objective assessment of potential
adversaries and the international security environment, but an attempt to predict what the
nature of adversarial capabilities and potential conflicts might become. An organization
facing greater environmental and political uncertainty from the dissolution of their central
organizing threat responded with a scramble for both orientation and relevance in a new
security environment, entailing a projection of revolutionary American military
capabilities onto potential adversaries in ways strongly conditioned by military
organizational culture. The end result being that although the DOD was conservative on
the principle of use of force and argued its role to be supporting the norm of
nonproliferation, its doctrinal response to proliferation served to undermine confidence in
the NP regime and played directly into its own cultural vulnerability to developing an
offensive military doctrine based on uncertainty avoidance that embraced the utility of
preventative action.
This chapter will first examine how the DOD framed the emerging security environment
through the process of generating strategy documents intended to guide near and long-
term organizational planning. Such planning processes, especially focused on emerging
asymmetric technologies were well underway when the United States engaged in the first
major post-Cold War conflict against Iraq in the Gulf War. The organizational ‘lessons’
drawn from this conflict, especially pertaining to potential unconventional weapons
capabilities of future adversaries, strongly conditioned a pessimistic organizational
reassessment of nonproliferation policy. Such pessimism and advocacy of strategies to
limit environmental uncertainty mirrored debates about deterrence and preventative war
that emerged in the early years of the nuclear age. This earlier period will be briefly
examined to provide further perspectives on the organizational biases and assumptions
that drive military thinking on appropriate doctrine in similar circumstances. The chapter
ends with an analysis of the first major strategy document to emerge from the formative
period of post-Cold War organizational uncertainty, the highly controversial 1992
Defense Planning Guidance.
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The question of a post-Cold War military doctrine
The first serious attempts to develop an organizational assessment of the emerging
strategic environment in the waning years of the Cold War were undertaken as the result
of a Presidential directive to produce a series of reports focused on reviewing the basic
national defense strategy of the United States.1 This directive was issued in light of a new
global strategic environment emerging from ongoing political changes in Eastern Europe,
announced reductions in Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces, and a troubled Soviet
economy. In addition to calling for a reassessment of the Soviet military threat, the
directive called upon the DOD to examine the implications of advanced weapons
acquisition by so-called “third countries” for changing regional balances of power and
impacting U.S. “contingency operations” in areas such as Central America and the
Persian Gulf. 2
The DOD strategy documents that emerged in response to these directives began with the
premise that the Cold War was already over and that the U.S. was no longer facing the
continuing threat of nuclear annihilation from a major adversary. Thus the United States
would need a more agile military not structured to fight a single major conflict, but rather
multiple Major Regional Conflicts (MRC’s).3As many military leaders argued, the
looming end of bipolarity meant that Soviet security guarantees and influence over the
military activities of certain states would likely come to an end.4 The end of Soviet
military aid and the regional power vacuums left by the Soviet Union meant “an
economically multi-polar world and militarily uni-polar world that is more disorderly,
                                                 
1 White House, National Security Review 12, ‘Review of National Defense Strategy’, March 3, 1989, NS
Archives PR01789
2 Ibid, pp. 3-8
3 This assessment, sketched out in early memos such as the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, was
eventually articulated in detailed form in the 1993 Bottom-Up-Review (BUR); see Les Aspin, Secretary of
Defense, ‘Report on the BOTTOM-UP REVIEW’, October 1993,
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html, (accessed September 10, 2005); see also Department of
Defense, ‘1993 Bottom Up Review – Talking Points’, October 1993, NS Archives CH01621
4 Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, ‘Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution’, Director of
Net Assessment, 15 July 1992, p. 47. DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-1/847.PDF; Committee on Science,
Engineering and Public Policy, Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global
Environment, (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1991); interview with Henry Sokolski
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more unstable, and more uncertain, with an increased likelihood of Third World
conflicts.”5
A strategic environment featuring the inevitability of conflict is a premise long assumed
by military cultures worldwide. However, what began to be argued as novel about the
emerging security environment in the minds of U.S. military thinkers, was the
inevitability of conflict combined with a wider availability of high-tech military
capabilities and so-called asymmetric capabilities such as nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons and their associated long-range delivery systems. Such technological
capacity was argued to be fueling a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) that would
likely bring about “a fundamental change in warfare, a change comparable in scope to the
introduction of armor and airplanes, or nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.”6   
US military perspectives on technology and unconventional weapons proliferation
At the heart of the supposed RMA was the combination of high-technology information
systems and precision guided long-range weapons. The capacity for highly precise non-
nuclear strikes to be quickly launched deep within enemy territory, combined with the
capacity to quickly deploy, track and command forces in revolutionary ways posed
several dilemmas for defense planning. First, the technological and operational quality of
armed forces would presumably count more than the quantity of forces at the command
of military leaders. Second, the capacity to inflict massive, precise damage meant than
reaction time for defense would be greatly reduced. Finally, the combined effect of
increased offensive capacity and decreased reaction time meant a potential advantage to
                                                 
5 Defense Science Board, ‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Precision
Interdiction’, (Washington DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
1994), p. 11
6 The original phrasing used in DOD documents at the time was a ‘military-technical revolution’ (MTR) – a
term borrowed from Russian military documents written in the 1980’s. See Memorandum for Secretary of
Defense, ‘Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution’, Director of Net Assessment, 15 July 1992, p.
47. DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-1/847.PDF. However for purposes of clarity, the equivalent later term
RMA, which was soon adopted into standard usage by the DOD will be used throughout the thesis.
90
aggressors, much as was assumed in the early years of the Cold War resulting from the
development of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.7
The global proliferation of high technology supply sources was presented as signaling a
corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of export control measures.8 The dilemma as
seen by the DOD was summed up by then Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Seth
Carus, “The issue isn’t really that these people have Scuds… The issue is that they know
how to make Scuds. That means they no longer have to rely on Western technology.”9
DOD officials begin to publicly argue that there was already a high level of proliferation
in the world, and not only nuclear weapons technologies, but also a much larger category
of materials and technologies that could pose a threat to U.S. forces and interests
abroad.10
Concurrent with warnings about the effect of a RMA on regional military forces was the
reiteration by the DOD of its longstanding concern with the proliferation of
unconventional weapons. Countries that held no hope of matching U.S. technological
investment in developing greater military power were assumed by DOD strategists to
likely turn to unconventional weapons in order to provide a means of advancing their
national security objectives. In the immediate post-Cold War period, DOD strategic
threat assessments concerning unconventional weapons proliferation also began with the
assumption the multilateral nonproliferation regime would ultimately fail. Indeed, the
DOD had remained throughout the later years of the Cold War the most consistently
                                                 
7 Ibid.
8 See briefing slides, ‘Manufacturers of GPS Consumer Products’, ‘There is Already a High Degree of
Crossover Between Commercial and Military COMSATS’, and ‘Findings to Date’, in Institute for Defense
Analyses, Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The Operational Implications of
Proliferation’, DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-869.PDF, pp. II-27, II-78 and II-89 respectively
9 Michael Wines, ‘U.S. Explores New Strategies to Limit Weapons of Mass Destruction’, New York Times,
September 30, 1990, sec. 1, p. 20; (“Scuds” are a type of unguided medium-range ballistic missile capable
of delivering unconventional warheads, first developed by the Soviet Union. In addition to the proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, high technology in general, skills and information control
were identified as critical proliferation concerns.)
10 See Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Department of Defense, to House
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, ‘Proliferation Issues and
Recommended Policy Responses’, June 29, 1990, NS Archives NP02633
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hawkish specialist bureaucracy concerning proliferation threats, especially the
proliferation threat posed by Iraq.
Such longstanding skepticism of the efficacy of the NP regime to effectively control
proliferation had been echoed in recurring interdepartmental disputes in the later Cold
War years over capabilities and intentions of regional powers. Of the various agencies
tasked with supporting U.S. NP policy, the DOD regularly held the most pessimistic view
on global proliferation. As stated in a Department of State memo from the mid 1980’s,
DOD differs radically from all other agencies in its assessment of the proliferation
threat from Iraq. Using the same intelligence available to DOD, the CIA, DOE
and State all agree that there is now effectively no Iraqi proliferation threat – not,
of course, because Iraqis have become virtuous, but because they do not have the
resources for a nuclear weapons program and will not have in the foreseeable
future.11
The nonproliferation role of the DOD during the Cold War had focused largely on
harnessing the resources of the defense intelligence community in order to support the
efforts of relevant multilateral nonproliferation efforts such as those of the IAEA and
various export control bodies.12 Intelligence support for export controls in particular were
seen as the primary contribution of the U.S. military, supporting a strategy of denial
focused on keeping certain materials and technologies off the global market. Hence the
efficacy of export controls in particular, and the NP regime in general to halt proliferation
was the focus of a sustained critique by DOD officials. Though not overtly seeking a
broader military role in proliferation prevention, numerous defense officials long argued
the minimal efficacy of non-discriminatory diplomatic and economic approaches to
proliferation.
                                                 
11 United States Department of State internal memo, ‘Computers for Iraq: DOD’s Proliferation Concerns’,
April 3, 1986, NSArchives IG00319; see also United States Department of State, Action Memorandum,
‘Response to Secretary of Defense Cheney Concerning Iraq and Nuclear Export Controls’, October 4,
1990, NSArchives IG015448.
12 Mitchel B. Wallerstien, ‘Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation’, in Stuart E.
Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on
Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 21
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The refrain that the United States was living in a “proliferated” world became a common
theme among DOD officials during this period, creating friction with other specialist
bureaucracies such as the Departments of State and Energy, whose nonproliferation
policy support roles were much more prominent, and who generally disagreed with the
pessimistic conclusions of the DOD.13 Thus, although the DOD dutifully filled its
intelligence support role, military assessments challenging the central mechanisms of the
NP regime reflect a military organizational world view that anticipated both the
pervasiveness of conflict and assumed the inevitable application of available technologies
to worldwide arsenals. While the DOD had traditionally held to the governmental
consensus that nonproliferation was a diplomatic and political mission, during this period
many voices from the DOD began to identify proliferation as a potentially pressing
military issue, arguing both that the consequences of proliferation would likely fall on
their shoulders, and that greater capabilities and resources would be needed to effectively
address the threat.
Strategic reassessment and organizational bias
In this sense, the DOD conception of the emerging security environment was not a
strictly rational assessment, as much as a cultural projection of existing biases onto the
security environment in lieu of a tangible threat of known capability. From the unique
perspective of a professional military organization, the DOD was drawing on an
historical lesson taught at all military academies and passed down through organizational
indoctrination – that revolutionary technology and operational capacity may be initiated
by a single state, but the advantage such developments confer are likely to be short lived
as competitors adapt.
                                                 
13 See Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the
Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on
Intelligence Issues, March 7, 1991, NS Archives IG01651, pp. 35-40, also John D. Dingell, Memorandum
to Members, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, ‘Closed Hearing on the Department of
Energy’s Efforts to Prevent Iraq and Other Countries from Getting a Nuclear Weapons Capability’, April
23, 1991, NS Archives IG01692
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What also emerged from the DOD threat analysis documents in this period was, in many
ways, a conceptual return to its early thinking about nuclear weapons during the opening
years of the Cold War, when nuclear capabilities were often assumed to drive adversarial
political ambitions, rather than to be subservient methods of achieving larger political
ambitions. The message from defense officials was that America must invest to secure its
technological advantage, that the deterrent capability of American nuclear forces could
not be assumed, and that a lack of knowledge about the motives of potential adversaries
necessitated a doctrinal focus on capabilities that might shape the material conditions of
future conflict. Questions of whether potential adversaries would possess either the
operational capacity or political motivation to make use of these technologies were
largely secondary and rhetorical areas of exploration in the DOD literature during this
period, with a greater emphasis placed on strictly technical questions of potential
adversarial capability.14
It is now beneficial to briefly examine the similar strategic rationale that existed at the
dawn of the nuclear age, when the United States possessed a monopoly on new military
technology, and faced a similarly uncertain international security environment. Many of
the ways in which the Department of Defense approached that dilemma – a sudden and
dramatic military capabilities advantage for the United States, and a corresponding
certainty that the advantage would be short-lived – can illuminate how military
organizations are expected to respond to such environmental uncertainty.
Deterrence and preventative war in the post-War era
In the late 1940’s and early 50’s, strategic rationale held that due to the devastating power
of nuclear weapons, in a nuclear conflict, advantage lay with the aggressor. As a result,
                                                 
14 Such capabilities dependent logic pervades military threat analyses as a function of the material nature of
military planning. An example can be found in the apolitical criteria for inclusion in the DOD’s Militarily
Critical Technologies List – “does the technology significantly negate or impair a major military capability
of the United States or significantly advance a critical mission area of a potential adversary.” DOD
Directive 2040.2, ‘International Transfers of Technology, Goods, Services, and Munitions,’ January 17,
1984, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/204002p.pdf, (accessed November 7, 2006); see also,
Institute for Defense Analyses, Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The Operational
Implications of Proliferation’, (April 15, 1990), DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-869.PDF, p. I-1
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much anxiety in the United States and Soviet Union focused on determining the critical
date at which the other country would have a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deliver a
“knockout blow” from which they would be incapable of responding.15 This rationale of
“enough weapons”, however, was quickly exhausted by the realities of weapons
production in both countries. The logical conclusion of rapid arms development was that
both countries would eventually reach the point where neither would have any
meaningful advantage over the other in terms of destructive capability.16
It was clear to leaders such as President Eisenhower and influential strategists like
Bernard Brodie that a framework to establish restraint between nuclear powers was
needed.17 As Henry Kissinger commented on the typical European rationale for going to
war before the nuclear age, “…countries went to war because the consequences of defeat
and even of compromise were deemed worse than those of war.”18 In the nuclear age,
when entire states risked being wiped off the map in a matter of minutes, the costs of
nuclear powers going to war assuredly outweighed any tangible benefits. It was precisely
this disparity between ends and means in nuclear war that could be considered an
important rational dissuasion from aggressive behavior. As Kenneth Waltz noted,
“Because catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchanges are easy to imagine, leaders of
states will shrink in horror from initiating them.” Following from this logic, Waltz argues
that one way to engender restraint in military relations between states is to “build
retaliatory forces able to threaten unacceptable punishment upon a would-be aggressor.”19
Forces based on retaliatory threat are referred to as deterrent forces, as opposed to
defensive forces, which only promise to make gains in warfare difficult to achieve. Both
types of forces are intended to dissuade states from attacking one another, but deterrence
was particularly relevant to the offensive dilemma posed by nuclear weapons. At its most
                                                 
15 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, pp. 25-27
16 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 16
17 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, pp. 32-35
18 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the Twenty-First
Century, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2001, 2002), p. 23
19 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘More May be Better’, in Scott D Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), p. 3, 4
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basic theoretic construction, deterrence assumes that the threat of massive punishment
will moderate the hostility of others. As Lawrence Freedman has argued, the essence of
deterrence consists of “deliberate attempts to manipulate the behavior of others through
conditional threats.”20  However, the successful maintenance of a deterrence strategy
requires the assumption of a adversarial rationality. Assumptions of rationality are key to
successful deterrence as a potential adversary must both recognize one’s retaliatory
capabilities, and calculate that the application of such capabilities will more than offset
the benefits of agression.21
The path to a doctrine of deterrence, however, was by no means a self-evident “rational”
end in itself. Rather, it was the result of a highly disputed and extremely dangerous
navigation between policies advocating either deterrence based on voluntary restraint, or
preventative warfare intended to indefinitely maintain strategic advantage.22
Preventative military action, it should be noted, is quite different from preemptive
military action, though often the different concepts are confused in the public discourse.
Preventative actions are those intended to slow or stop the development of significant
military capabilities by an adversary before they constitute a threat, whereas preemptive
actions are those intended to stop the imminent use of existing capabilities by an
adversary.23 Arguments in favor of preventative military action often rest on the claim
                                                 
20 Freedman, Deterrence, pp. 2, 6
21 Ibid, p. 11
22 An excellent and concise examination of the early Cold War history of arguments in favor of
preventative warfare by the U.S. military is found in Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation:
Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security, Vol.
18, No. 4 (Spring, 1994) pp. 74-82; see also William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, (New York:
Doubleday Books, 1992); Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1995), epilogue; Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1996), Ch. 1
23 A textbook case of preventative military action was the 1981 attack by Israel on the Iraqi nuclear
facilities at Osirak, intended to shutdown Iraqi nuclear weapons development capabilities before weapons-
grade fissile material could be produced. See Avner Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak and the American
Counterproliferation Debate’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (ed.), International Perspectives on
Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 76-79; see also
Michael I. Handel, ‘The evolution of Israeli strategy: The psychology of insecurity and the quest for
absolute security’, in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (ed.), The Making of
Strategy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 551-553; and Rodger Claire, Raid on the
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that it is necessary to fight now in order to avoid unfavorable circumstances for war later,
or in the words of Randall Schweller, to “take advantage of a closing window of
opportunity, or prevent the opening of a window of vulnerability.”24
As discussed in the previous chapter, the U.S. military possesses many common military
organizational biases, assumptions and practices that make advocacy of preventative
force options more likely than would be assumed by many non-military decisionmakers:
- First, elite members of military organizations are more likely than civilian
policymakers to view conflict as inevitable in the long run, and more likely to be
skeptical of non-military solutions to traditional security problems. 25
- Second, due to their particular responsibilities and training, professional members
of the military are socialized to focus on the purely military influences on conflict
outcomes.26 The training and analytical skills of military organizations favors the
calculation of requirements to defeat measurable adversarial traits such as military
capability and force structure, rather than intangible political or social forces such
as the will of the adversary to fight, or their motivations in conflict.27
- Third, military organizations are largely expected to favor offensive doctrines,
even preventative doctrines, as these are assumed to both reduce unexpected
battlefield variables, and limit the long-term opportunities adversaries have to
gain military advantages through the development of their own military
capabilities.28 As Barry Posen has argued, “Military organizations will generally
                                                 
24 Randall L. Schweller, ‘Domestic Structure and Preventative War: Are Democracies More Pacific?’,
World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), p. 236; Another excellent general introduction to the
literature on preventative war is Jack S. Levy, ‘Declining Power and the Preventative Motivation for War’,
World Politics, vol. 40, no. 1 (October, 1987), pp. 82-107
25 For studies indicating military officers are generally more inclined than the broader population to believe
that war is inevitable, see John P. Lovell, “The Professional Socialization of the West Point Cadet”, in
Morris Janowitz (ed.), The New Military, (New York, Russell Sage, 1964), p. 129; Bengt Abrahamsson,
“Military Professionalization and Estimates on the Probability of War”, in Jacues van Doorn (ed.) Military
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26 Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’, p. 18
27 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 49-50
28 Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’, pp. 18, 19
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prefer offensive doctrines because they reduce uncertainty in important ways.”29
Successful execution of military plans often rests on being able to choose combat
conditions and execute standard exercises acquired in training, rather than to be
forced to react to adversarial initiative.30
- Finally, offensive operations by their logistical nature also require more extensive
budgetary allocations to support and maintain in both war and peacetime, thus
serving to support what some have argued is an organizational tendency to
jealously guard and seek to increase turf and strength, as well as to preserve
undiluted what it feels to be its “essence” or “mission.”31
Military advocacy of preventative warfare in the early years of the Cold War
Early Cold War thinking on preventative warfare by some senior member of the U.S.
military focused on the argued necessity of preventing the development of transformative
nuclear weapons technology by adversaries such as the Soviet Union and China. Some of
the earliest documents to emerge from the military in the post-war period featured strong
advocacy for preventative action to keep the Soviet Union from developing nuclear
capabilities that could challenge U.S. nuclear dominance and thus substantively threaten
the physical security of the United States and its allies. In September of 1945, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) obliquely advocated planning for preventative warfare in a top
secret report on post-war U.S. military doctrine which vaguely stated, “When it becomes
evident that forces of aggression are being arrayed against us by a potential enemy, we
cannot afford, through any misguided and perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive
behavior to permit the first blow to be struck against us.”32
                                                 
29 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 47. A notable exception is presented by Elizabeth Keir, who
presents doctrinal choice as socially conditioned, and thus dependent on how a particular military
organization interprets its own cultural practices and perceives environmental uncertainty, rather than
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30 Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine’, p. 18
31 Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 28
32 SWNCC 282, ‘Basis For the Formulation of a U.S. Military Policy’, September 19, 1945, as quoted in
Sagan, ‘Perils of Proliferation’, p. 77
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Such opinions, which left the door open to preventative strategies, were not shared by
civilian leaders, and indeed generated considerable friction between some military
leaders and senior civilian policymakers. In 1950, President Truman personally
reprimanded Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews for giving a public speech that
argued in favor of preparing for a preventative war against the Soviet Union.33 One week
later, Major General Orvil Anderson of the Air Force was abruptly fired after advocating
preventative war against the Soviet Union, stating in a newspaper interview, “Give me
the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week… And when I
went up to Christ – I think I could explain to him that I saved civilization.” Furthermore,
Anderson specifically challenged emerging U.S. deterrence doctrine, saying, “to assume
that Russia won’t use their A-bombs if we sit by and watch them build them is a
dangerous assumption.”34
Though by no means a consistent position throughout the DOD, such senior voices
advocating preventative war staked their claims on the necessity for such action in terms
familiar to scholars of military organizational behavior. America’s strategic advantage in
the early development of nuclear weapons would ultimately come to an end. Military
leaders who argued for preventative war strongly believed that if the United States failed
to forcibly prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons it would lose an important
offensive advantage, with catastrophic nuclear war as the inevitable result. Furthermore,
the U.S. military was argued to possess a “moral duty” to keep nuclear weapons out of
the hands of its adversaries due to their inherent irrationality and aggressiveness. Any
national security strategies that depended on political approaches to managing
environmental uncertainty ignored the inevitability of nuclear conflict, and effectively
squandered tangible military advantage in favor of intangible political risk management.
Such strategies were argued to take the safeguarding of national security out of the hands
of the military by eliminating the possibility for offensive initiative, reducing the
military’s role to one of merely responding to adversarial action.
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Even after the clear rejection of preventative warfare options by President Truman, senior
military officials continued to support the development of such doctrinal options in
official studies such as “Project Control”. 35 Led by Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper
throughout the early 1950’s at the U.S. Air War College, Project Control was a multi-
year study by the Air Force of how to use strategic air power to “force the Soviet Union
to acquiesce to strong U.S. policy initiatives and national interests.”36 Colonel Sleeper
was primarily concerned with developing innovative means of leveraging U.S. air power
to “control the aggressiveness” of the Soviet Union and halt Soviet development of
nuclear weapons.
Project Control garnered strong support from senior Air Force officials, whose concerns
were not always limited to pessimistic shared assumptions about the ability of the U.S. to
deter the Soviet military threat. Notably, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Nathan
F. Twining argued for the development of Project Control out of a fear that U.S. reliance
on a doctrine of deterrence would limit both the future roles and budget of the Air Force.
Twining feared that the establishment of a doctrine of deterrence would limit the role of
the Air Force to nothing more than delivering massive retaliation in the event of a major
war, and that such arguments, “contain a fundamental implication that surface forces are
more capable of dealing with localized aggressions than are air forces.” 37 Further
underlining parochial fears of marginalization, Twining complained to other senior
officials that if plans for a doctrine of deterrence against the Soviet Union continued
unchallenged, the Air Force did not, “appear capable of justifying increased air power to
meet the military threats anything short of major war.”38 However, lest Twining be
accused of little more than the defense of narrow parochial interests, he also argued in
favor of preventative war on the grounds that the Soviet Union was fundamentally
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irrational – “proven barbarians” as he stated – with an ideological predisposition for
aggression. 39
Rejection of preventative warfare in favor of deterrence
While it is outside the scope of this thesis to fully examine the evolution of deterrence
thinking, it is sufficient to say that early Cold War American leaders strongly rejected
preventative war in favor of deterrence on both practical and normative grounds.
President Truman in particular presented a clear articulation of normative belief against
preventative war by stating, “We do not believe in aggression or preventative war… Such
a war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United
States.”40 For President Eisenhower, the case against preventative war was framed in
similarly normative terms of how the United States could guarantee the prevention of
nuclear weapons development in the Soviet Union short of the total destruction of the
Soviet government and society. As Eisenhower stated to a group of military officers in
1954,
Gain such a victory and what do you do with it? Here would be a great area from
the Elbe to Vladivostok and down through Southeast Asia torn up and destroyed
without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and
disaster. I ask you what would the civilized world do about it? I repeat there is no
victory in any war except through our imaginations, through our dedication, and
through our work to avoid it.41
Subsequently a doctrine of containment was formally articulated in the national security
strategy document NCS-68, which argued a similar blend of practical and normative
reasons why a policy of containment with nuclear deterrence as a method would be
chosen over preventative war in promoting national security objectives. Preventative war
was rejected in NSC-68 as unlikely to be capable of restraining Soviet military forces
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from dominating Europe in retaliation, and as “repugnant” to both Americans and
European allies.42 The acceptance of adversarial rationality that laid the foundation of a
strategy of deterrence was not inherently derived from structural realities, but eventually
assumed by senior policymakers from arguments about the strategic motivations of the
Soviet Union, and the articulation of normative beliefs about preventative war.
Reliance on a doctrine of deterrence eventually rested on a practical issue of accepting
“rational” adversaries in possession of offensive forces that assured mutual destruction,
and a rejection of preventative war on normative grounds. A secondary normative issue
was also subsequently presented in favor of maintaining mutual vulnerability through
formal agreements limiting defensive forces. Although nuclear weapons presented an
offensive dilemma to the superpowers, mutually destructive arsenals also created a
corresponding defensive dilemma. If nuclear deterrence depended on the credible threat
of retaliation, then effective defenses against nuclear weapons (such as a working anti-
ballistic missile defense system) would once again increase the offensive value of these
weapons. Stable deterrence was thus argued to be highly dependent on the mutual
vulnerability of states to nuclear attack, and any defensive measures to protect against
nuclear strikes threatened the balance of deterrent forces.43 This principle of mutual
vulnerability, later formally recognized in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, provided a
degree of stability to the nuclear order by placing formal and voluntary constraints on the
development of ballistic missile defenses, providing limitations on the offensive value of
unconventional weapons.
Cultural expectations about the inevitability of conflict and the utility of technological
advantage shaped the early DOD reassessment of the post-war security environment in
ways that projected an assumed structure onto a fluid environment where no such
structure or definitive patterns yet existed. As such, the assessments of strategic
“necessity” that emerged from certain senior officials offered a uniquely military
approach to environmental uncertainty, by turning such uncertainty about adversarial
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703-724, p. 707
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motive into ‘facts’ that could be answered with military capabilities.44 While structural or
bureaucratic explanations would not exclude such behavior, an organizational perspective
incorporating military cultural biases gives meaning to the specific forms of military
behavior in structurally indeterminate situations. It does so in ways that move beyond the
mere motivation for the expansion of bureaucratic turf or rational response to structural
imperatives. Policy outcomes during this period resulted not from structural imperatives
or strictly rational utility maximization, but from the ideas that senior policymakers
possessed. In the end, it was these ideas, culturally conditioned and transmitted through
heated argumentation that made the crucial difference between doctrinal choices of
deterrence or preventative war.
Now this chapter will return to the post-Cold War, and examine how the experience of
the Gulf War provided many parallel “lessons” to military officials facing a structurally
indeterminate security environment with similar sources of strategic uncertainty.
Organizational ‘lessons’ drawn from the Gulf War experience
The organizationally appropriate fixation on the potential military implications of the
post-Cold War attained a broader cultural impact within the DOD through the experience
of the Gulf War. Military organizations routinely glean “lessons” about the shape of
future warfare from conflict, and the particular experience of the Gulf War and its
aftermath gave considerable weight to the longstanding proliferation pessimism of the
DOD, and emerging concerns about the implications of the RMA to U.S. security
strategy. Ironically, it was the success of the United States in applying RMA technologies
to the battlefield that spurred many within the DOD to argue that the American
technological advantage, coupled with an enhanced ability to control proliferation, would
need to be strengthened and expanded if the United States hoped to retain meaningful
military superiority well into the future.
                                                 
44 Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 50
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From a public perspective, the Gulf War was largely a story of unqualified American
military success. The 44-day combined air and ground operation featured an
unprecedented demonstration of the capability of a new generation of high-tech
weaponry, especially precision guided munitions, ballistic missile interceptors and
coalition forces coordinated via GPS-based battlefield management technologies.
Coalition forces faced approximately 500,000 Iraqi troops during the conflict, inflicting
more than 20,000 Iraqi battle deaths in the course of the combined air and ground
assaults, with U.S. military forces themselves suffering only 147 battle related deaths.
The impression drawn by most outside observers of the Gulf War was of the sweeping
and technologically unprecedented operational dominance of the U.S. military over a
major regional adversary.
Yet in the months after the ticker-tape victory parades, a very different and more sober
assessment of the conflict began to emerge from the DOD. Far from basking in the public
limelight of success, the organization argued that the Gulf War served as both a model for
future conflict, and presented a case study of near disastrous failure for the U.S. military.
According to DOD officials, inadequate strategic intelligence meant that U.S. forces did
not know the scope of Iraqi unconventional weapons programs; inadequate tactical
intelligence meant that U.S. forces could not find and destroy Iraqi unconventional
weapons in the field; and inadequate force protection meant that U.S. forces were
unprepared to carry out their mission in a “WMD environment.”45 Particular weaknesses
in force protection were in the detection of chemical or biological agents, and the
vulnerability of U.S. troops, forward bases and regional allies to attack from ballistic
missiles. This vulnerability came both from the difficulty facing U.S. forces in finding
and destroying such weapons on the ground, and the spotty record of missile interceptors
in destroying Iraqi ballistic missiles in flight.46
                                                 
45 Wallerstein, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, p. 23
46 On the difficulty of U.S. forces to find and destroy Iraqi missiles on the ground, see Mitchel B.
Wallerstien, ‘Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation’, in Stuart E. Johnson and
William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation,
(Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 29, 30; for the controversial record of
American forces in intercepting ballistic missiles once in flight, see Postol papers and testimony.
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In examining the DOD response to the Gulf War, in its post-conflict operational
assessments and the longer-term lessons gleaned from the conflict, an important picture
of the organizational biases and proclivities of the DOD begins to emerge. Parochial
interests in the form of inter-service rivalries within the DOD shaped much of the post-
conflict strategic and tactical assessments, as individual military services reflexively
focused on the operational shortcomings of their competing branches. 47 The focus on
these operational shortcomings heightened a sense of environmental uncertainty for the
organization that was met with an extremely pessimistic capabilities-centric response
that, despite conspicuous non-use by Iraq in the Gulf War, assumed widespread
adversarial unconventional weapons use in future conflicts. The continuing political
uncertainty of shrinking budgets contributed to this highly critical organizational
response, as both combat successes and failures were used to support claims for the
advancement of force modernization efforts. Ultimately, the DOD drew lessons from the
conflict that reinforced its prewar organizational defense planning emphasis on
adversarial capabilities over adversarial motives, and created a great deal of
organizational self-projection in future threat planning. Such organizational factors would
eventually play a defining role in shaping the policy response to proliferation in the form
of counterproliferation.
Operational shortcomings
The potential threat posed by assumed Iraqi nuclear, chemical or biological weapons was
not lost on the U.S. military. The list of priority targets for U.S. air strikes included Iraqi
nuclear, chemical and biological research facilities, with the intention being to, “Reduce
                                                 
47 Indeed, the clearest early assessments of operational shortcomings emerged from the competing inter-
service accounts and self-critical service literature, rather than from the DOD as a whole. The final report
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reconcile these divergent positions by largely ignoring the legitimate operational issues raised. See,
Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Washington DC, April
1992, http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf, accessed July 20, 2006; The largely Air Force driven
post-conflict assessment in Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, (United
States Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1993),
http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/gwaps.htm, (accessed January 10, 2005) is a
far more illuminating and forthright concerning issues of operational shortcomings than the DOD report to
Congress.
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[the] long-term international threat.”48 Among the targets bombed within Iraq in the first
day of the air campaign was the same Iraqi nuclear research facility at Al-Tuwaitha that
had been attacked by Israel in 1981.49 Iraqi unconventional weapons stockpiles were of
great concern to coalition forces in the Gulf, particularly considering the Iraqi use of
chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.50 DOD fixation on Iraqi unconventional
capabilities extended into post-conflict assessments despite the fact that such weapons
were not employed during the conflict, seemingly indicating the success of traditional
deterrence despite massive Iraqi military losses.
An uncomfortable further lesson drawn by the DOD from the experience of the Gulf War
and subsequent IAEA revelations was the argument that covert nuclear weapons projects
by determined proliferators had become increasingly difficult to stop. In 1981, four
Israeli warplanes had attacked a nuclear facility in Iraq in broad daylight, setting the Iraqi
nuclear weapons program back by at least 10 years.51 Yet in those ten interceding years,
Iraqi expansion, diversification and ‘hardening’ of their nuclear program, coupled with
incomplete U.S. intelligence, meant that an air campaign lasting 43 days, consisting of
42,600 strike sorties dropping 88,500 tons of munitions, failed to inflict as much damage
to the Iraqi nuclear program as the single strike carried out by the Israelis.52
                                                 
48 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff / Air Force briefing slides to Commander in Chief, United States
Central Command, ‘Iraqi Air Campaign Instant Thunder’, August 17, 1990, p. 9, DOD OFOISR 00021-
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Times, September 5, 1990, sec. A, p. 15
49 Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate’, p. 94; see also R.W.
Apple Jr., ‘War in the Gulf: The Overview; U.S. Foils Missile Attacks on 2 Saudi Cities; Claims Hits on
Iraqi Nuclear and Gas Sites’, New York Times, January 21, 1991, sec. A, p. 1
50 See CIA Reference Aid, ‘Prewar Status of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 03/20/1991, CIA
Intelligence Assessment, ‘Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments’, 1990,
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd03.pdf, (accessed June 5, 2005); See also
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/ 651.PDF
51 See Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb,
(New York: Broadway Books, 2004), the setback was not only through direct material damage to Iraqi
nuclear facilities, but also by forcing an end to French nuclear cooperation with Iraq before critical nuclear
materials had been shipped. See also Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak’
52 Eliot Cohen and Lewis D. Hill, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 5: A Statistical Compendium and
Chronology, (Washington DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1993)
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Defensive lessons from the conflict were equally ambiguous. The Patriot missile system,
originally designed as an anti-aircraft missile system, was pressed into service in the Gulf
War to counter the threat posed by Iraqi Scud missiles. While initially reported as a
dramatic success by both the U.S. military and media, later studies revealed that Patriot
missiles did not entirely destroy any incoming Scud warheads, and furthermore that
employment of the Patriot system quite possibly caused more casualties and damage to
civilian areas than had no Patriot interceptors been launched.53 In the most significant
display of this vulnerability, on same day that Iraq announced its withdrawal from
Kuwait, U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia were hit by a SCUD attack that killed 27 and
wounded 98. Overall, 18% of all U.S. battle deaths and 20% of all wounded in the Gulf
War resulted from this single attack utilizing a crude ballistic missile armed with
conventional high explosives.54 The DOD unsurprisingly argued that much more money
needed to be dedicated to ballistic missile defenses, despite strongly disputing such
claims of Patriot interceptor ineffectiveness.55
Inter-service rivalries and post-conflict responses
The “public success” of the Gulf War in many ways served as a catalyst for parochial
interests within the DOD to highlight operational shortcomings of competing military
branches. Ground commanders sensitive to claims that air power had ‘won’ the Gulf War
                                                 
53 Theodore A. Postol and Albert Carnesale, Testimony before Committee on Armed Services: Defense
Policy Panel, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, and the Subcommittee on
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for Congressman John Conyers Jr., March 31, 1992 (Cambridge, MA: Defense and Arms Control Studies
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Research Service Report, prepared for House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and
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(Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1991), briefing graphic 16.
54 Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Iraq Orders Troops to Leave Kuwait But U.S. Pursues Battlefield Gains; Heavy
American Toll in Scud Attack’, New York Times, February 26, 1991, sec. A, p. 1; see also Department of
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55 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress
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were quick to point out the spotty record of the Air Force in critical mission areas such as
ground destruction of ballistic missile launchers and unconventional weapons
stockpiles.56 Ground commanders serving as the public face of the Gulf War faced
particular embarrassment and irritation from continued SCUD missile attacks. Coalition
commander Norman Schwartzkopf’s claims that all 30 of Iraq’s fixed missile launching
sites, and 16 of their 20 mobile missile launchers had been destroyed, were later
discovered to be highly inaccurate.57
In riposte, Air Force commanders were quick to argue both that air operation
shortcomings were largely the result of inadequate intelligence, and that ground forces
were under-prepared for combat in the face of potential Iraqi chemical or biological
attacks.58 These competing discourses highlighted not only the standard historical
competition between practitioners of air and land warfare, but also served to shape
specific conceptions of the nature of an emerging post-Cold War environmental
uncertainty. Challengers to assertions of air or land military dominance backed their
criticism with specific identification of the operational shortcomings of competing
branches regarding discovered and potential Iraqi military capabilities, pressing a
continued discourse of “failure” within the organization.
Proliferation concerns highlighted by the Gulf War experience
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Although questions of air vs. land war doctrine were unsurprisingly met with a distinct
lack of consensus, ultimately this interservice and intraservice criticism and reflection
served to shape a general DOD-wide consensus that the proliferation and potential use of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would pose one of the most likely threats to
U.S. military forces and interests in the post-Cold War. Preceding the conflict, known
Iraqi chemical and biological weapons (and their missile delivery systems) presented the
U.S. military with an inversion of traditional deterrence relationships, with the U.S. now
placed in the unfamiliar position of possibly being deterred from action in a strategically
crucial region by a militarily inferior adversary. The inability of the U.S. military to
accurately identify and destroy these weapons during the conflict pointed to an important
intelligence and capabilities gap, with the general sentiment being that the U.S. military
“dodged a bullet” in terms of its ability to fight and prevail against an adversary armed
with unconventional weapons.59 Together these experiences formed a set of ‘lessons’
widely agreed upon within the DOD that would significantly shape an emerging
counterproliferation policy. As later Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counterprolfieration Policy, Mitchel Wallerstein concluded, “Our Gulf War experience
revealed too many limitations on our forces when they are required to confront an
adversary armed with WMD.”60
Furthermore, the execution of the Gulf War provided a clear demonstration that a
technological revolution in warfare had occurred, if only in evidence from the application
of such technology by US-led coalition forces. In this area in particular, military analysts
effectively inverted the impact of U.S. capabilities and projected them on future
adversaries. As internal DOD documents noted soon after the conclusion of the Gulf
War, “there is a surprising degree of consensus that a military-technical revolution is
underway and that we are just at the beginning. Desert Storm had a major role in creating
this consensus.”61 By the organizational logic of the military, the lessons of technological
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advantage would be drawn by militaries worldwide, and thus the technological edge held
by American forces had diminished merely through the demonstration of such
technological superiority.
Responses to uncertainty and organizational support for the NP regime
Why were the pessimistic organizational lessons about Iraqi unconventional weapons the
new model for future conflict and a damning indictment of the NP regime and binding
power of NP norms, rather than seen as an isolated case of regional proliferation that
could be adequately dealt with through uniquely tailored means such as the UNSCOM
mission?
Underestimating the military capabilities of adversaries does not make for a successful
military career. The DOD’s assessment of the post-Cold War security environment and
lessons from the Gulf War were exercises in conservative military organizational
thinking, largely predicated on the long-term assumption that the political and economic
enforcement mechanisms of the nonproliferation regime would fail to hinder those
determined to develop unconventional capabilities, and that such unconventional military
capabilities would likely be utilized in future warfare by adversaries freed of the political
limitations on action provided by Cold War bi-polarity. The lesson of ‘failure’ from the
Gulf War by the DOD was not only one of addressing the environmental uncertainty
generated by the experience of the conflict, but also in addressing political uncertainty in
the form of budgetary downturn to justify the advancement of force modernization
efforts, and shift away from a peripheral NP role tied to military doctrine of deterrence.
Post-conflict assessments largely avoided questions of Iraqi decisionmaking, and thus
rationality, but rather emphasized the centrality of potential adversarial capabilities as a
crucial factor for defense planning. The lack of answers on Iraqi non-use of
unconventional weapons during the Gulf War was not viewed as a success of deterrence,
merely as an unresolved mystery.62 Such strategic ambiguity served to increase
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environmental uncertainty for the DOD - an uncertainty that was partially “resolved” by
assuming adversarial use in future conflicts. In further developing lessons from the Gulf
War, organizational learning combined with uncertainty mitigation as a function of self-
projection upon future adversaries. Future threat scenarios became a virtual replay of the
Gulf War with a more informed, more capable Iraqi military. 63 In lieu of answers to
questions of Iraq’s non-use of unconventional weapons, military planners assumed use
would occur in future warfare scenarios, and thus began to plan accordingly.
Now in the post-Cold War, U.S. defense planners were left with both a lack of clearly
identifiable adversaries, and a lingering ambiguity as to the military capability of
potential adversaries. This drove DOD strategists to argue that the U.S. should move
towards a capabilities-based defense model, in which acquisitions, training and force
posture would be oriented towards the potential capabilities of future adversaries.64 What
this implied was a shift away from calculations of adversarial motives and rationality –
the sort of thinking that was central to adopting a doctrine of deterrence during the Cold
War – and towards a general assumption of capabilities usage. If advanced or
unconventional military capabilities became more widely available, usage by adversaries
during conflict with the United States should be assumed. Such assumptions would have
sweeping implications for the DOD’s sense of global responsibility, and in particular,
organizational support of traditional NP regime functions and roles.
While the institutions of the nonproliferation regime were still the cornerstone of U.S.
policy in limiting the spread of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, concern was
well established within the DOD that no combination of regime enforcement measures
and diplomatic pressure would keep “the most determined proliferators” from developing
unconventional weapons capabilities. 65 It was also precisely the “most determined” states
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such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea that were seen as the most likely potential opponents
of the United States in major regional conflicts.66 In several internal assessments of post-
Cold War defense requirements, the DOD singled out the need to develop offensive and
defensive capabilities to effectively fight and prevail in future conflicts involving
unconventional weapons armed adversaries.67 As the DOD sought to define its future
missions and capability requirements in the post-Cold War, it was the proliferation of
unconventional weapons that continually headed the lists of likely threats.
The post-Gulf War debate over the viability of the NP regime to address proliferation
threats exposed longstanding organizational tensions with overall U.S. NP policy that had
been long maintained by the DOD. Although the DOD had long given meaningful
support to the NP regime through its assigned arms control intelligence support role, U.S.
NP policy always provided a source of tension for an organizational culture inclined to
skepticism about the utility of normative agreements that were premised on voluntary
restraint of military power by potential adversaries, and limited economic barriers to
indigenous unconventional weapons development. Many DOD officials had never
believed that states like Iraq would play by the rules of a normative regime, and the
evidence emerging from Iraq after the Gulf War bore out many of these doubts. This
evidence further reinforced a widespread skepticism within the DOD of an NP regime
incapable of containing emerging proliferation threats. In order to meet future
proliferation threats, military leaders began to argue that military alternatives to the
multilateral diplomatic and economic enforcement mechanisms of the NP regime would
need to be developed. It was from such a conception of unconventional weapons threats
separated from questions of adversarial political motive that the concept of
counterproliferation was born.
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Counterproliferation
Even in the years before the Gulf War, DOD officials had discussed alternative
approaches to proliferation that were not dependent on normative strategies of
disarmament and deterrence. The term anti-proliferation had been used sporadically and
unofficially for some time when defense officials discussed alternative approaches to
proliferation issues that deviated from accepted nonproliferation activities.68  Although no
evidence indicates organizational advocacy of the sort of preventative military action
exampled by Israel’s bombing of the Iraqi Orisrak nuclear reactor at al-Tuwaitha in 1981,
defense officials were beginning to “think beyond” the confines of the NP regime even
before the end of the Cold War. 69 As the DOD official credited with coining the term
counterproliferation during the period of strategic reassessment before the Gulf War
commented,
The world had already proliferated… There was a hell of a lot of proliferation
going on in the world… so I thought we ought to change the label. Anti-
proliferation to me was an attitude, not a program. But counter-proliferation as a
term seemed to signal to me that we could counter the existing proliferation,
rather than continue to pretend like we were doing non-proliferation.70
Counterproliferation appealed as a new label for proactive rather than reactive
approaches, implicitly advocating moving beyond strategies of disarmament and
deterrence to active denial of the operational ability of adversaries to develop and deploy
unconventional or other asymmetric capabilities. CP assumed proliferation would
inevitably occur, departing from the basic assumption of nonproliferation that a
‘nonproliferated’ world could be achieved through the mechanism of the NPT and the
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norm of nonproliferation. CP thinking also assumed that the military utility of such
proliferation for potential adversaries could be mitigated through the development of
technologies, force posture and doctrine that minimized the impact of unconventional
weapons or high-technology.71
This early conception of counterproliferation provides an important window into the
organizational culture of the DOD, and its views on both its own responsibility and its
capacity for shaping the emerging security environment. Rather than simply holding the
line to prevent proliferation through supporting the norm of nonproliferation and
mechanisms of nonproliferation such as export controls, this larger military strategy
envisioned an attempt to shape the emerging security environment into a form less
threatening to U.S. interests. This amounted to an inward looking conception of
organizational responsibility that assumed adversarial acceptance of benign U.S. military
hegemony, and also assumed potential adversarial calculations of military development
would be largely determined by their strategic relationship with the United States, rather
than that of their regional neighbors or other factors. Such an approach would not
incidentally entail a far greater military role in post-Cold War national security strategy
than congressionally proposed budgets had anticipated.72
In analyzing the DOD’s view on proliferation in the early post-Cold War years, it is
important to examine how the lessons of the Gulf War, coupled with its established
cultural biases shaped a response to the unique circumstances of environmental and
political uncertainty as viewed by the organization. How did the DOD view its
responsibility in the post-Cold War security environment in the aftermath of the Gulf
War? How did the organization envision responding to emerging strategic threats,
especially those posed by unconventional weapons programs in the hands of regional
aggressors such as Iraq? While no definitive and uncontested answer emerged between
the conclusion of the Gulf War and the transition of Administrations from Bush to
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Clinton, some indication of how military planners conceptualized both the emerging
security environment of the post-Cold War, and its responsibilities to respond to that
environment, can be drawn from the controversial and ultimately abandoned 1992
Defense Planning Guidance.73
The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance
In principle, U.S. military warfighting plans are developed in a cascading, top-down
system. Ultimate national security objectives, priorities and decisions are articulated in
National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs).74 If they contain a military
component, these large-scale decisions then flow to the Secretary of Defense who is
responsible for coordinating a semi-annual document called the Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG).75 The DPG serves as an orienting guide for the military departments to
formulate their budgets, bringing their spending plans in line with the overall focus of
current U.S. national security strategy. Then the Joint Staff, representing the commanders
in chief of the unified commands (CINC’s) and chiefs of the military services, produces
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP is a “cornerstone” planning
document that provides guidance to the CINC’s and chiefs of the military services to
accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities.76 It also “assigns
tasks and resources to the unified commands for preparing their theater plans.”77 As one
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DOD analyst has noted, “Field manuals, JCS publications, and the like may not be
standard reading for most Americans, but they are the lifeblood of the services. They
form the basis on which our military writes plans and actually prosecutes wars in the
interests of the American people.”78
In early 1992, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz asked the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to assist the Pentagon’s civilian leaders in developing scenarios for future conflicts
in order to begin budget planning from 1994-1999. The result was a “regionally focused
military strategy”, prominently featuring DOD proliferation pessimism that expected the
threat of a resurgent Iraq, unburdened by embargoes and trade sanctions that were
predicted to “slacken” and be rendered “largely ineffective by 1995”. 79 Other major
threat scenarios included an invasion of South Korea by a nuclear-armed North Korea,
conflict in the Balkans, the Philippines, Panama and a resurgent superpower or coalition
of states allied against the United States.80
Significantly, the report by the Joint Chiefs emphasized threat scenarios that would
require U.S. forces to be prepared to fight in two simultaneous major conflicts against
adversaries armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The force posture to
meet such threats would, in the eyes of the Joint Chiefs, require a reversal of projected
defense spending cuts to enable the armed forces to maintain a technological and
doctrinal edge, “and a credible capability to expand military forces.” 81 Congressional
oversight committees had been requesting detailed threat scenarios against Pentagon
resistance for months, so when the Joint Chiefs’ report was leaked, Congressional
skepticism was high over plans that appeared designed to preserve defense budgets rather
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than to meet existing national security requirements. 82 However, nothing in the joint
Chiefs’ report generated nearly as much controversy as the broader Defense Planning
Guidance, leaked to the New York Times the following month.
First appearing in the New York Times on March 8th, 1992, the document known as the
1992 Defense Planning Guidance (1992 DPG) set out for the first time, a revolutionary
new role for the DOD in the post-Cold War. Far from merely envisioning likely threat
scenarios to guide defense planning, the 1992 DPG envisioned U.S. military power
playing a defining role in shaping the emerging security environment, rather than merely
responding to emerging threats. The central organizing vision of the document is worth
quoting at length:
Defense Strategy Objectives: Our first objective is to prevent the emergence of a
new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere… This
is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and
requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region
whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate
global power.
There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the U.S. must show the
leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that hold the promise of
convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or
pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in
the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the
advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or
seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must
maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to
a larger regional or global role.
While the U.S. cannot become the world’s “policeman,” by assuming
responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent
responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our
interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle
international relations. Various types of U.S. interests may be involved in such
instances; access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from
terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics
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trafficking… Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any
potential future global competitor. 83
The draft continued with the implications of implicit American global leadership by
asserting that while coalitions such as that gathered for the Gulf War, “hold considerable
promise for promoting collective action”, the United States must be prepared to act
independently.84 A key ingredient of the success of American support for “world order”
was thus the capacity for independent action, a capacity that could only be guaranteed by
continued high levels of defense spending. Such budgetary support was argued to be key
to ensuring that the United States maintained sufficient force posture to meet potential
threats, and to ensure American technological and doctrinal superiority sufficient to
dissuade regional powers from even attempting to challenge or threaten U.S. national
security interests.
On the issue of the threats posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons, the draft proposed a dramatically more assertive role for the DOD. Challenging
the traditional NP intelligence support role played by the DOD, the report commented
that, “The U.S. may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to
prevent the development of usage of weapons of mass destruction.” Such military steps
were proposed to include possible preemptive strikes in the case of imminent attack, or
even preventative strikes on nuclear, chemical or biological weapons manufacturing
facilities in adversarial nations.85 The report also considered the potential implications if
the NPT failed to be renewed in 1995, “should it fail, there could ensue a potentially
radical destabilizing process” leading to, “critical challenges which the U.S. and
concerned partners must be prepared to address.” 86
Here is a Pentagon vision of a post-Cold War role that proposes a bold and direct
challenge to the environmental and political uncertainty faced by the organization. The
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major areas identified in previous threat assessments and planning documents, whether
the aspirations of regional powers or the proliferation of unconventional weapons, were
to be potentially dealt with through a much more assertive and forward projected use of
U.S. military force. Especially in the area of proliferation, the traditional multilateral,
political mechanisms of the NP regime were viewed as potential areas of failure with
direct military consequences. Rather than wait for these threats to present themselves
directly, or create deeper levels of environmental uncertainty, the 1992 DPG sought to
head off such outcomes by establishing a role for the DOD in actively reducing such
uncertainty.
Assessing the meaning of the 1992 DPG from an organizational context
Although the 1992 DPG has often been cited as an early attempt by neoconservatives to
establish a unilateral, Pax Americana turn in American foreign policy (drafting had been
supervised by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary for Policy, working
under Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney), such arguments downplay both the
bureaucratic constraints of the DOD and the relevance of this document as a nascent self-
identification of post-Cold War organizational responsibility.87 Though it is tempting to
view this document as a debate over unilateralism vs. multilateralism, it is vital to note
that in foreign policy terms, the document represents little more than a case of the
Pentagon overstepping its bureaucratic boundaries, to articulating a vision of grand
strategy for the United States that it had no mandate to formulate. Unsurprisingly, the
reaction from Administration officials, members of Congress and senior officials in
competing bureaucracies was swift and damning.88 So although indeed revolutionary in
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its own terms, the 1992 DPG is ultimately a document of marginal insight to U.S. foreign
policy in the years immediately following its release. Yet the document is highly
insightful as a guide to examining the organizational response to the considerable
strategic and political uncertainty of the times.
Unsurprisingly, the 1992 DPG stands as a strategic reassessment that places a strong
emphasis on the possible military consequences of the end of the Cold War. If its
premises and proposed responses to the emerging strategic environment were to be
adopted, U.S. military forces would play a central role in shaping the post-Cold War
security order. Force modernization, expanded forward basing and new ‘missions’ would
in large part preserve a defense role and budget that otherwise faced significant
reductions in the post-Cold War – a point that was not lost on some lawmakers and rival
organizations. As Democratic Senator Joseph Biden commented at the time, “the
Pentagon vision reverts to an old notion of the United States as the world’s policeman – a
notion that, not incidentally, will preserve a large defense budget.”89
It should also be noted that such budgetary assertiveness at this specific point in time was
an act of political savvy by veteran Pentagon officials. Although pressing for budgetary
expansion in a time of economic recession seems an unlikely plan for success, the
relationship of defense spending, especially that of assertive force posturing and
acquisitions, to the overall U.S. economy must be taken into account. While proposed
expenditures by the Pentagon may have been set artificially high, the economic pain
associated with defense cuts, especially huge job losses resulting from closed bases and
cancelled contracts, hitting in a time of economic recession was something likely to face
strong resistance in Congress, regardless of party arguments about alternative ways to
distribute funds.90 So rather than a simple discourse of challenging grand strategy, the
1992 DPG must be viewed in context as a combination of attempted strategic positioning
and opportunistic political maneuvering.
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It was widely feared within the corridors of the Pentagon that any emerging military
doctrine designed to prepare the U.S. military to cope with post-Cold War security threats
would likely face an uphill battle due to significant proposed cuts in the U.S. defense
budget.91 Budgetary shortcomings have a rather different significance for military
organizations than other organizations, such that in few other organizations are life and
death so closely tied to otherwise mundane issues such as budget allocations and
personnel training. Budgets being limited, preparedness cannot be unlimited, thus
military preparedness is a function of what missions have been successfully argued and
thus supported by budgets. While some members of Congress saw the opportunity to
seize a post-Cold War peace dividend as the massive Soviet bloc military threat
crumbled, Pentagon planners saw the danger that long-planned force modernization and
readiness efforts might be lost in the ensuing flood of red ink.92
The transition years between the Cold War and post-Cold War found the DOD arguing
for protection of Cold War budgets levels partially through the rationale that even though
the unprecedented military buildup since the end of the Carter Administration had created
an agile and capable force, such capability was “fragile” and cutbacks would create
“shockwaves” in the armed services and defense industries that would put readiness at
risk.93 So although the central organizing threat of the Cold War had disappeared, the
changing technological landscape was argued by DOD planners to require the U.S. to
maintain high levels of defense spending. Such arguments formed an acknowledgement
that the United States was in a vastly superior position, but that only continued strong
budgetary support could ensure American military preeminence, and ensure that no
effective rivals could emerge.94
                                                 
91 The Bush Administration had proposed a $50 billion cut in military spending, while Les Aspin, the
influential Democratic chair of the Senate Armed Services committee had proposed defense cuts totaling
$100 billion. See Partick E. Tyler, ‘Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget’, New York
Times, February 23, 1991, sec. 1, p. 1
92 Interviews with Henry Sokolski and Larry Seaquist
93 Defense Science Board Task Force Report, ‘FY 1994-99 Future Years Defense Plan’, (Washington DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1993), p. 3
94 Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, ‘Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution’, DOD
OFOISR 00019-CDR-1/847.PDF
121
Organizational views on the inevitability of unconventional weapons proliferation and
subsequent use by future adversaries is key to this line of argument. No adversary or
combination of adversaries could hope in the near-term to match U.S. conventional
superiority. The only area of significant potential weakness was in leveraging
unconventional weapons. That evidence of such sweeping adaptation by regional
adversaries was sparse at best, and that recent experiences in the Gulf War in many ways
disconfirmed fears of unconventional weapons usage did not impact DOD projections of
future warfare and salient features of an emerging security environment. According to the
logic of a capabilities-based defense, and flowing from well-established military biases
and cultural assumptions about the impact of technology on warfare, the mere possibility
of such trends was more than sufficient to justify a more broadly activist doctrine.
Conclusions
With the broad strategic reassessment of the emerging security environment, and its
particular emphasis on unconventional capabilities by the DOD well established by the
end of this period, questions must now be asked of the utility of the organizational theory
approach in offering a compelling explanation of these responses and trends. As a model,
the organizational perspective downplays individual choice and systemic factors such as
structural determinacy, offering a broadly cultural and organizational process-oriented
explanation for policy preference. How does such an explanation stack up against
alternatives such as the RAM and bureaucratic politics models?
Although a RAM perspective would not seek to explain DOD actions and preferences at
this time as independent of larger state behavior, could the identified trends be explained
as more broadly representative of rational state response to external stimuli? Again, even
if the DOD is assumed to be merely an ancillary component of larger state behavior in
adapting to systemic changes, important unanswered questions present themselves.
Firstly, from a perspective of relative power relationships, the Gulf War should be seen as
a largely successful maintenance of the status quo and affirmation of the success of
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existing U.S. deterrence strategy. Leaving aside for the moment Iraqi motivation for the
invasion of Kuwait, the response of the U.S. and its allies to Iraqi actions decisively
confirmed both the overwhelming military superiority of the United States, as well as the
relative ease by which the major powers could rebuff challenges to the status quo.
There is very little reason to suspect, from a rational value maximizing perspective, that
there would be obvious utility in pursuing a radically preventative strategy in a system
featuring unmatched U.S. military might and broad international legitimacy for
established normative approaches NP policy. Furthermore, these normative approaches
had led to a quick and uncontroversial multilateral response to Iraqi unconventional
weapons programs by the IAEA. Though Iraq was an exceptional cheater within this
system, there seemed little reason from a value maximizing perspective to suspect that
the system was irreparably broken and unable to provide future security assurances to its
members. Hence a RAM perspective would have to discount openly pessimistic DOD
behavior as anomalous, or at the very least unrepresentative of larger state value
maximizing choice.
Realist scholars such as Schweller are correct to assert that it is not actual shifts in
relative power, but perceived shifts that are relevant to the calculations made by
policymakers. However, divisions over the use of preventative force in the case of
unconventional weapons development present fundamental challenges to the assumptions
central to rational actor models in U.S. foreign policy decisions. 95 Much of the existing
RAM-based literature on preventative war would indicate that it is “rational” for a
dominant state to be tempted into preventative warfare to stop the rise of a potential
competitor. Yet this reduction of state motive to an assumed unitary actor exercising
rational utility-maximizing behavior ignores the crucial intra-state dynamics that have
determined real outcomes in the case of the United States after the introduction of nuclear
weapons, and in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War. Normative
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beliefs and cultural conceptions matter if we want to examine the link between significant
foreign policy “constituencies” and foreign policy behavior.
A bureaucratic politics model, while offering compelling insights into forms of
bureaucratic self-preservation in the face of strong budgetary threat, also falls short in
offering a convincing explanation of DOD actions during this period. The strategic
conceptions emerging from the DOD during this period go far beyond merely seeing
military solutions for potentially non-military problems and the advocacy of increased
resources as a support for bureaucratic independence and continued budgetary
prominence. Taken together, these conceptions represent a broader worldview oriented
towards the fulfillment of a military mission, one with a predictable and relatively static
tendency to treat forms of environmental ambiguity in unambiguous ways.
Distinguishing long-term organizational biases and preferences from short-term
bureaucratic wrangling allows an explanation of organizational learning and threat
articulation that carries beyond the immediate political upheavals of the early post-Cold
War period, informing the long term study of policy evolution rather than simply the
short term explanation of policy response. Taking an organizational perspective with a
focus on culturally derived biases, preferences and practices, allows a connection to be
made between the early strategic conceptions addressed in this section, and the broader
process of policy institutionalization examined in later chapters.
The military biases and doctrinal preferences by scholars such as Kier, Sagan and Posen,
combined with the perspectives on organizational learning and path dependence by
scholars such as Eden, help make sense of the DOD’s response to a newly complicated
environment. This response involved a collective process of cognitive simplification
aimed at giving a known shape to an unknown threat. This collective simplification
largely involved matching the unknown elements of the new strategic environment with
expected assumptions drawn from a military worldview. The first assessment of the
security environment confronted unknown motives for potential “third country”
adversaries, so the unknown motives were effectively discarded by the military
organization in favor of suspected capabilities, mapped forward from the evolving
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processes of modernization within the U.S. military itself. Maintaining an unmatched
advantage in these capabilities became of paramount importance to the DOD, as only
such unmatched military superiority could reduce uncertainty to organizationally
manageable levels. Thus a series of unknowns were transformed via independent internal
processes and cultural assumptions into ‘known’ elements of the emerging security
environment.
Proliferation of high technology and unconventional weapons attained prominence in this
strategic reassessment, not because of the actual balance of forces in the post-Cold War,
but because of the potential environmental uncertainty such capabilities engendered.
Managing this source of uncertainty placed the DOD at odds with other specialist
bureaucracies, as the formal system of normative restraints embodied by the NP regime
were viewed by the DOD as far less effective than military capabilities in limiting
uncertainty. This process of environmental simplification entailed developing proactive
approaches to solving potential problems, rather than depending on the reactive
management of problems assumed to be inherent to existing normative approaches to
proliferation. Overall, such tendencies reflect a military cultural assumption that
responding to the international security environment in unambiguous ways, especially
during periods of perceived change, itself reduces environmental ambiguity. Such a shift,
though intended to promote a more peaceful emerging security environment, would
ultimately place the U.S. military in a position of developing and advocating a doctrine
that held a much greater potential for the use of military force in order to prevent the
usage or development of unconventional capabilities by certain states.
Though the form counterproliferation would take had not been laid out in any specific
detail during this period, the basic organizational frame of countering capabilities with
capabilities had been established and consolidated throughout the organization, strongly
supported by the organizational lessons of the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath.
Organizational learning spurred by conflict with an unconventionally armed adversary
clarified many of the criticisms of non-military approaches to proliferation long discussed
within the organization. Thus documents such as the 1992 DPG can be seen not merely as
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the aberrant product of powerful individual policymakers, but as partially reflecting
organizational self-preservation in the face of budgetary threat assumed by bureaucratic
models, and broadly representative of the more specific forms of cultural bias, policy
preference and learning expected by the organizational theory model. In essence, an
organizational perspective takes the analysis of DOD behavior farther into the specific
forms and implications for later policy institutionalization than the competing
explanations.
Ultimately, while the organization had drawn important lessons from the experience of
the Gulf War, these lessons were merely the first phase in the process of reshaping larger
shared understandings of the problems of proliferation. As such, they were far from being
institutionalized into meaningful new practices or capabilities during this period, but were
still highly significant in informing the eventual process of institutionalization that would
later emerge.
Though the actions and perceptions of the DOD during this period are highly significant
for the development and later evolution of CP policy, organizational perspectives alone
cannot fully explain the form and underlying conceptions of this new response to
proliferation. The more broadly political aspects of U.S. strategic culture that competed
to frame emerging strategic conceptions during this same period will be the focus of the
next chapter. Taken together, these political and organizational inputs can provide a more
substantial and satisfying explanation of the meaning, orientation and future implication
of this formative period of U.S. policy responses to proliferation.
126
Chapter 3
Strategic Culture: 1989-1993
The end of the Cold War, initiated by the change of Soviet military doctrine from
offensive to defensive, the introduction of “new thinking” of Soviet reformers and the
continued signs of economic crisis in the Soviet Union, meant the end of containment as
a central organizing principle of American national security strategy.1 Containment had
been a strategy of not only physically restraining an adversarial military power in the
form of the Soviet Union, but also restraining the ideational power of international
communism. This was in essence a national security strategy associated with the “logic of
identity”, and thus the rapid and unexpected end to 40 years of American strategic
planning forced decision-makers and policy elites to question the nature and role of
American identity in the emerging security environment of the post-Cold War.2
This chapter argues that ideational concerns were central to answering these larger
questions about the role of American post-Cold War power as they pertained to
reformulating U.S. NP policy. A focus on the Executive and Legislative elite members as
the bearers of strategic culture in the United States will be utilized to explain that
delegitimizing normative challenges to traditional NP conceptions and practices occurred
once contrary conceptions and practices were identified. Furthermore the chapter argues
that systemic changes did not provide a priori policy responses or clear alternatives for
rational value maximizing choices to be made, but rather posed challenges requiring
cultural interpretation before policy alternatives could be specified. Though interpretation
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often occurred at the individual level, interpretations were grouped into ideationally
defined clusters in ways that challenge cognitive explanations of policy outcomes.
This chapter additionally argues that the U.S. Congress often serves a larger function in
the foreign policy making process than simply its instrumental role in providing foreign
policy legislation. Much has been written on the relative weakness of the U.S. Congress
in “determining” foreign policy outcomes as it has progressively abrogated significant
legal authority to the Executive branch.3 While certainly a valid focus for analysis, such
arguments tend to overemphasize qualitative factors of tangible power such as legal
precedents for decisionmaking authority, and minimize the often intangible ideational
function such an institution plays. A central challenge of this thesis to such instrumental
accounts of legislative influence is by repositioning analytic focus on the ways in which
influential members, often loosely clustered into identifiable strategic cultures, can
establish and maintain “legitimate” policy conceptions. It is such normative
legitimization functions embedded in political argumentation that allow the U.S.
Congress to control appropriate forms of discourse that can limit the range of appropriate
responses to strategic challenges, and steer policymaking away from the “rational”
decisionmaking conditions assumed in much of the literature.
The first significant discursive trend supporting such normative challenges was the
identification of a proliferation threat as emanating from state identity rather than
technological capability. This conception was bundled into the language of states as
divided into classes of responsible and irresponsible. As such, regional maneuvering and
power politics were reclassified as the actions of either those that supported the status quo
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of a US-led international system, or those who sought to challenge such status quo. The
second significant discursive trend of delegitimization was in the transformation of the
relatively obscure Cold War term for unconventional weapons, “weapons of mass
destruction” (WMD) into a potent political phrase loaded with associations of imminent
threat and irresponsible behavior. While not apparently part of an organized drive for
reframing of the threat of proliferation during these early post-Cold War years, both of
these argumentative trends would have important implications for the more overt
delegitimization of existing NP conceptions and practices that would largely define the
strategic cultural divide over proliferation in the years to follow.
As the Gulf War held many organizationally specific lessons for the DOD, it also held
many lessons for policy elites concerned with NP policy. While many of these
interpretations of the emerging security environment were based on existing cultural
biases and policy preferences, the experience of the Gulf War helped shape and
consolidate emergent interpretations of appropriate policy response for policymakers, and
provided clearly differentiated interpretations of the meaning of the conflict for the
relevance of the NP regime. The most significant cultural interpretation for this study was
the conservative argumentative reframing of the term WMD as denoting irresponsible
adversarial identity, which gained both coherence and broader legitimacy in the aftermath
of the Gulf War.
The chapter concludes with an examination of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
(DCI), publicly unveiled in December of 1993. Although often interpreted as the unique
cognitive product of then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, analysis of the content and
orientation of the DCI will demonstrate the initiative as the emergent product of the
organizational and cultural reframing of the problem of post-Cold War proliferation
described in both this and the previous chapter. Posing challenges to both traditional
conceptions of deterrence and the utility of non-military normative approaches to address
proliferation, counterproliferation emerges through the DCI as the first policy product of
both strategic cultural argumentative practices and emerging capabilities-based responses
to proliferation favored by the DOD.
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Non-proliferation leadership and the challenge of “renegade regimes”
The self-identification of a leadership role in promoting an international system friendly
to democracy and free markets had long been articulated in formal U.S. policy and
strategy documents.4 However, the question central to the end of the Cold War was what
did this leadership role mean in the sudden absence of a major military and ideological
adversary, combined with the apparent dramatic spread of both democracy and free
market capitalism? What form would “American leadership” take when not framed in
opposition to an adversarial superpower? Would the policies that guided the United
States through the Cold War be suitable to meet whatever strategic challenges might
emerge from the demise of the Soviet Union?
Early to emerge from this period of questioning was the potential challenge to U.S.
leadership and interests posed by unconventional weapons proliferation.5 Although the
United States was facing an uncertain strategic environment, there was a widespread
consensus that the United States still played an important leadership role regarding
nonproliferation norms in their traditional disarmament orientation which focused on the
destabilizing potential of the weapons themselves. A definitive Congressional review of
U.S. NP policy at the time clearly referenced such self-identification of policy leadership,
“U.S. policy towards critical proliferation issues will strongly influence the direction of
global responses to the spread of nuclear weapons.”6
Before analyzing conceptual debates of the proper form for American post-Cold War
leadership on proliferation issues, a brief examination should be made of traditional Cold
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War approaches collectively known as nonproliferation policy. Though it is outside the
scope of this thesis to give full historical treatment to this material, some basic overview
can provide context for both post-Cold War policy debates over proliferation issues, and
the broader strategic cultural assumptions on which they were based.
Illustrative of the existing strategic conceptions by the Bush Administration at the end of
the Cold War were the 1989 Review of National Defense Strategy, and 1989 Review of
United States Non-Proliferation Policy.7 Consisting largely of questions about the
military capabilities of “regional powers” and their capacity to “threaten or attack U.S.
interests, U.S. friends and Allies” and “changing regional balances of power or in shaping
regional conflicts,” the documents were intended as a request for policy guidance from
the Pentagon and State Department to spur any necessary rethinking of NP policy,
military strategy, and force posture responses to the likely end of the Cold War. Though
there are few indications in these documents of the Administration’s own strategic
conceptions, a significant clue to early Bush Administration thinking on proliferation
threats in normative disarmament terms comes near the end of the document. In a section
identifying a traditional nondiscriminatory view of nonproliferation that placed the
emphasis of threat on weapons themselves, rather than who possesses them, “The review
should address security considerations that bear on… restraining the proliferation of
destabilizing technologies (nuclear and chemical/biological weapons and ballistic
missiles).”8
Supporting an NP perspective focused on the threat of unconventional weapons as rooted
in destabilizing technologies, this traditional conception was also dominant among
legislative policy elites during this period. The problem of proliferation was often framed
in terms of indirect threats to U.S. national interests, such as potential arms races in
regions with strategic tensions that had been previously dominated by superpower
influences. As remarked in 1989 by Senator John McCain in sponsoring early post-Cold
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War NP legislation aimed at preventing proliferation in developing countries, “I have
cosponsored these bills because they are a vital start toward the kind of fight against
proliferation that I feel is absolutely vital if we are to avoid having a new arms race in the
Third World replace the current arms race between East and West.”9 The threat identified
in these terms is one with clear regional, rather than global orientation, and yet also
clearly within the familiar framework of arms races and difficult deterrent relationships
that had defined proliferation concerns during the Cold War. Thus early proposed
legislative responses to proliferation largely centered on measures intended to strengthen
existing NP norms, within a framework of U.S. leadership, rather than present any overt
challenges to the conceptions and practices underpinning the NP regime.10
Such early restatements of traditional NP concerns are important to note, as they
immediately followed the first DOD reformulation of proliferation threats originating
from the potential advanced capabilities of specific states. The first indication of
Administration level change came in a 1989 foreign policy address to graduates of the
United States Coast Guard Academy by President Bush, who took the opportunity to
articulate a vision of U.S. security strategy for the 1990’s:
There’s an opportunity before us to shape a new world. What is it that we want to
see? It is a growing community of democracies anchoring international peace and
stability, and a dynamic free market system generating prosperity and progress on
a global scale… The emergence of regional powers is rapidly changing the
strategic landscape… a growing number of nations are acquiring advanced and
highly destructive capabilities, in some cases, weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them. Our task is clear: We must curb the proliferation of
advanced weaponry. We must check the aggressive ambitions of renegade
regimes… And we’re also researching, and we’re committed to deploy when
ready, a more comprehensive defensive system, known as S.D.I. Our premise is
straightforward: Defense against incoming missiles endangers no person,
endangers no country. (emphasis added)11
                                                 
9 Senator John McCain, ‘India Takes New Steps Towards the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction’, Congressional Record, (April 4, 1989), p. S3280
10 Such as Hon. Fortney Pete Stark making a direct link between the willingness of the United States to sign
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and decisions by states such as India and Pakistan to pursue nuclear
weapons. See Hon. Fortney Pete Stark, ‘Comprehensive Test Ban Vital for Nonproliferation’,
Congressional Record, (September 25, 1990), p. E2987
11 ‘Excerpts from the President’s Address’ New York Times, May 25, 1989, sec. A, p. 8
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The speech was the first by the Bush Administration to directly address post-Cold War
proliferation concerns, and is significant in revealing a number of emerging conceptions.
Aside from reiterating a familiar position of continuing American leadership in
promoting democratization efforts in the third world, the speech gave an early signal in
its emphasis on, ‘the aggressive ambitions of renegade regimes’ of a potential NP policy
transition from merely supporting the nondiscriminatory norms of NP regime to a post-
Cold War conception of proliferation that linked the problem to both state identity and
military capability. The speech also called into question the principle of mutual
deterrence in the absence of an adversarial superpower, as now deterrence relationships
with regional powers were assumed to flow in one direction. Such monopoly on deterrent
capabilities served to further consolidate the legitimate possession of nuclear weapons,
targeting states that might challenge the status quo of American leadership of the
emerging security environment, or oppose the more democratic orientation of the
emerging system.
Also expressive of strategic cultural preference and bias in the intervening months were
the emergence of voices from civilian leadership in the DOD and conservative members
of Congress responding to Democratic calls for large cuts in post-Cold War defense
spending.12 These conservative voices, fearing a weakened military capability as a result
of the expected demand for a “peace dividend” in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
military threat, pursued a rhetorical campaign aimed at undermining liberal budget plans
coupled with threats to undermine domestic support for the Administration were it not to
follow suit. Representative of these growing conservative voices was the response by
former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to the first post-Cold War Democratic-led
Congressional budget plans,
[Congress] calls upon us to reduce our strength and lower our vigilance at the
very moment when events could take us either towards a more peaceful world or
in more worrisome directions, at a time when our strength is required to help
shape that better world… In the years ahead, despite the best efforts of the United
States and its allies, the likelihood will grow that regional rivals and renegade
                                                 
12 Interviews with Larry Seaquist, Rebecca Hersman
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regimes will possess weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them.” (emphasis added)13
Unsurprisingly, a conservative strategic cultural conception of American leadership
placed strong emphasis on the military means to shape the emerging strategic
environment, and placed overwhelming emphasis on the potential military threats to such
American leadership. The inevitability of conflict and zero-sum nature of the
international system, coupled with an assumed high utility of military force, offered a
conceptual lens that made interpretation of a highly uncertain strategic environment
possible. The issue of post-Cold War defense budgets provided the impetus for
supporters of ideationally defined positions to express themselves, and develop
argumentative strategies to rationalize their implicit biases and policy preferences.
Substantive changes in attitudes towards the problem of proliferation in the post-Cold
War period were in some ways inevitable. The nonproliferation regime was in part the
response to unstable superpower competition during the Cold War, with proliferation in
smaller states assumed to be largely a supply-side problem of acquiring nuclear materials
and expertise. Post-Cold War threat assessments often framed the issue in terms of a
demand issue, as technologies and materials had begun to proliferate beyond the reach of
the regime. However, this potential change in material capabilities did not correspond to
objective changes in state motivation, and thus potential adversarial motivations were
filtered through the biases of respective strategic cultural lenses. Thus the strategic threats
stemming from proliferation were neither “invented” nor “inherent”, rather changes in
material capability were subject to cultural interpretation.
The tensions over discriminatory and non-discriminatory views of proliferation threats
were put into stark relief by the emergent post-Cold War revitalization of the term
“weapons of mass destruction”. Some history of the term and its traditional Cold War
usage will serve to clarify the implications of its post-Cold War redefinition. This history
                                                 
13 Former Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, ‘No Time to Change U.S. Defense Policy’, New York
Times, January 27, 1989, sec. A, p. 31; Defense spending cuts proposed by Congress were also criticized by
then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, though he argued that a possible continued Soviet military threat
justified spending on certain projects such as the B-2 bomber. See Richard Halloran, ‘Cheney Criticizes
Cuts in Military’, New York Times, sec. A, p. 20
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may also shed light on its central argumentative function in later conservative strategic
cultural efforts at delegitimizing existing NP norms and practices in favor of a more
military-oriented, discriminatory approach to proliferation. The following section will
briefly examine the argumentative evolution of WMD, and its links to state identity,
particularly that of “renegade regimes.”
The political transformation of WMD
Analysis of political discourse and policy documents concerning WMD reveal a dramatic
shift in both the context and consequence of the term for competing domestic political
actors. WMD from its earliest usage until the end of the Cold War was an instrumentally
descriptive term largely supportive of arms control efforts, and portrayed the weapons
themselves as destabilizing objects of attention. In the post-Cold War, the term was
transformed into an overtly political phrase symbolizing “inappropriate” behavior
implicitly tied to accusations of deviant state identity. This unitary shift in political
conception was achieved through series of efforts to gain short-term political leverage on
a number of different issues. Some policy makers hoped to pressure the President to
apply economic sanctions to specific countries, some represented long standing
philosophical positions, some sought symbolic recognition of specific interest groups,
and others simply attempted to further their own interpretations of sound nonproliferation
legislation. The unifying factor for these disparate motives were the argumentative
strategies employed and historical analogies drawn from common conceptions of
American strategic culture. It was in this way that, from a range of different individuals, a
new and accepted symbolic meaning of WMD emerged.
The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ has gone through different phases of usage in the
context of U.S. strategic culture.14 The original Cold War usage was as a general term
largely focused on U.S. and Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals, and was
simply descriptive. The term was useful in allowing for the development of different
                                                 
14 The term “weapons of mass destruction” was coined by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the Times of
London in 1937, describing the German aerial bombardment of Spain. ‘Archbishop’s Appeal: Individual
Will and Action; Guarding Personality’ The Times (London), December 28, 1937, p. 9
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types of powerful weapons (atomic, thermonuclear, neutron, etc) that all fit under the
rubric of WMD.15 An example of this Cold War usage is provided by Henry Kissinger,
who commented in the 1970’s, “I was convinced that a democratic society would never
be able to brave the hazards of the nuclear age unless its people were convinced that its
leaders responded rationally and soberly to the unprecedented existence of weapons of
mass destruction.”16
In this formulation, WMD was a term simply denoting technical capacity, and was
conceptualized within the framework of nondiscriminatory NP norms oriented towards
disarmament policies that held that technologies were the source of the strategic threat.
Thus it was the mechanism of destruction, balanced against the forces of rationality that
held the key to the destabilizing element of WMD. It is important to note that due to the
widely divergent capabilities and delivery methods of the three major categories of
unconventional weapons – nuclear, biological and chemical – the U.S. military generally
preferred to avoid using the term WMD, opting more often than not during the Cold War
to use the individual labels, nuclear, chemical and biological, or when combined, as
“NBC” weapons.17
At the end of the Cold War, the implicit meaning of the term WMD entered a transitional
phase. It is during this phase (1989-1991) that WMD was still widely used as a
descriptive phrase, denoting a non-discriminatory technological capability,18 although
some began to identify WMD as a unique threat to international security focused on a
select number of states.19 WMD emerges in this period as central to a new strategic
                                                 
15 For usage in this context, see Senate Resolution on SALT II TREATY, NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
(EX. Y, 96-1) - (introduced 06/25/79); 1985 bill to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration for research and development, space flight, control and data communications,
construction of facilities, and research and program management, and for other purposes; Biological
Weapons Act of 1986
16 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (New York: The Little Brown & Co., 1979), p. 203
17 W. Seth Carus, ‘Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”’, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Occasional Paper No. 4, (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2006) pp. 7, 8
18 Senator John Glenn, ‘Supercomputers and Super Bombs’, Congressional Record, (October 31, 1989), p.
S14382;
19 Senator Alfonse D’Amato, ‘Leaping From Madman to Madman’, Congressional Record, (October 3,
1990), p. S14467; See also Senator John McCain identifying the WMD threat as coming not only from the
American and Soviet arsenals but also the weapons programs of India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and
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conception in which the threat from proliferation is not the merely the destructive
technologies themselves, but rather the coupling of destructive technologies with
international actors whose actions or identities are in conflict with the type of
international order supported by the United States. This strategic conception is by no
means one with self-evident implications for policy response.
Regardless of the outcome of debates over appropriate policy responses to proliferation,
an aggregate shift in strategic conception occurred that ultimately reformulated the
perceived nature of the threat from proliferation. Tellingly, in a matter of years, the term
WMD had shifted exclusively to a descriptor of what other countries were engaged in.
Never again would the term WMD be used in elite level discourse in conjunction with the
United States or its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (or ballistic missile)
possessing allies. For the United States and its allies, the different classes of
unconventional weapons were disaggregated and framed well within the boundaries of
traditional disarmament discourse, distinguished from the discourse of WMD by nothing
more than the identity of the states that possessed them. The term WMD thus was
centrally integrated into the discursive process of delegitimizing both certain actors and
certain classes of action. As former member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of
State, John Reichart stated:
The term consolidates nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons into one
category because, despite differences in their effects and use, they share enormous
lethality and symbolism. Thus, the concept of WMD is significant in a political
rather than a military sense. By using the term "WMD," policymakers convey the
message that the proliferation of these types of weapons is unacceptable and that
their use would be considered an extremely grave matter.20
How did this sudden shift in identification of the threat from unconventional weapons,
encapsulated in the language of WMD, shift from a utilitarian conception of technical
capacity to an overly political designation of irresponsible state behavior? Examining the
                                                                                                                                                  
Pakistan, ‘The Impact of the Summit Meeting on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’,
Congressional Record, (June 18, 1990), S8075
20 John F. Reichart, (current director of the WMD Center at the National Defense University) ‘Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Strategic Assessment 1996, Institute for Strategic Studies, National
Defense University, Chapter 16      
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different responses to the Gulf War, particularly the different implicit lessons the conflict
held for various groups, and the conceptual weight it offered those seeking to reframe the
threat posed by proliferation, will be key to understanding the evolution of the term and
its implications for American political discourse.
Gulf War ‘lessons’: WMD and the legitimacy of the NP Regime
This section will focus on the argumentative strategies and discursive practices employed
by the United States Congress in framing the interpretation of the threat to the
international security environment posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Due to its nature as a forum for political argumentation and source for
foreign policy legislation, the creation and active control of discursive space around
particular issues is an important, but under theorized informal function of the U.S.
Congress. Both the competitive and cooperative processes of establishing strategic
discourse may serve disparate domestic political goals in the short term. However, in the
long term, these arguments may deeply affect the range of ‘legitimate’ interpretations of
the international security environment that are the basis for threat identification and
policy response. Thus tracking the term WMD through Congressional arguments during
this period can serve as a reflection of the process whereby certain historical analogies,
metaphors and argumentative strategies gain discursive currency, becoming the standard
by which ‘valid’ forms of discourse on strategic issues can be maintained.
As argued in the previous chapter, the experience of the Gulf War provided different
lessons for different groups. For some including the central players in the Bush
Administration, the experience was a vindication of the perceived need to strengthen
traditional approaches to the strategic problem of proliferation. In this view, the political
failures of the Gulf War were in the weak enforcement of existing NP norms and
practices; a problem that could be addressed through U.S. leadership to reinvigorate the
NP regime and directly support the strengthening of NP norms. For others, particularly
conservative proliferation issue leaders in Congress, it seemed to expose irreparable
weakness in the NP regime and served as the catalyst for fundamental challenges to
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longstanding NP norms and practices. Though the options for threat response were
unclear, the arguments in Congress that fundamental changes were needed began almost
immediately following the end of hostilities.
The immediate impact of the Gulf War in Congress was a case of belated yet aggressive
oversight resulting in an attempt to assign blame for the crisis, followed by pressure to
reshuffle specialist bureaucratic responsibilities.21 It is important to point out that the
existence of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs was not a surprise
to the U.S. government. Rather, what shocked U.S. policy makers was the development
of the program far ahead of U.S. intelligence estimates, coupled with the relative
impotence of existing NP policy to halt the program.22 There was intense disagreement
between relevant departments and agencies within the U.S. government as to the extent,
nature and threat posed by Iraqi unconventional weapons programs, with the DOD
maintaining the most consistently critical assessments of the proliferation problems
presented by Iraq.23
Subsequent Congressional inquiries into handling of pre-war Iraq intelligence were
extremely critical of the role played by the Department of Energy, and to a lesser degree
the National Security Council.24 The end result of Congressional criticism being the
                                                 
21 William Safire identified in his April, 1990 editorial several of the issues of Congressional oversight,
inter and intra-agency conflict, dubious technology transfers and money laundering that would later surface
in the so-called “Iraqgate” investigations. See William Safire, ‘Country of Concern’, New York Times,
April 9, 1990, sec. A, p. 19
22 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments’, July
1990, NSArchives IG01025; see also Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Research Comment, ‘Iraq’s
European Procurement Network’, June 29, 1989, NSArchives IG00911
23 United States Department of State internal memo, ‘Computers for Iraq: DOD’s Proliferation Concerns’,
April 3, 1986, NSArchives IG00319; see also United States Department of State, Action Memorandum,
‘Response to Secretary of Defense Cheney Concerning Iraq and Nuclear Export Controls’, October 4,
1990, NSArchives IG015448.
24 U.S. House of Representatives, Representative John D. Dingell, memo to Members, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, ‘Closed Hearing on the Department of Energy’s Efforts to Prevent Iraq and
Other Countries from Getting a Nuclear Weapons Capability’, April 23, 1991, NSArchives IG01692; see
also Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, letter to
Representative Henry B. Gonzalez, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, May 28,
1992, NSArchives IG01810. This letter documents the investigations of the Subcommittee into pre-war
actions by the DOE to prevent “Iraq and other nuclear proliferant countries from acquiring a nuclear
weapons capability.” and its ongoing issues concerning cooperation by the DOE and NSC in Congressional
investigations.
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relative marginalization of the DOE by Congressional oversight committees on
proliferation intelligence and NP policy planning matters in favor of the DOD. In seeking
to find fault with policy representatives, the post-Gulf War investigations and general
Congressional activism provide a strong example of the way in which Congressional
oversight duties can shape policy outcomes by formally shifting responsibilities between
functional bureaucracies due to perceptions of incompetence or resistance to
Congressional sub-committee investigations.
In pursuing policy alternatives that focused on state identity rather than technical
capability, many members of Congress articulated positions that contrasted strongly with
the post-Gulf War policy positions of the Bush Administration. The Administration
maintained that the NP regime in general, and conventions such as the NPT and MTCR
in particular, were sufficient to effectively limit the spread of these weapons if adequate
political support for such multilateral measures was given.25 The reluctance of the Bush
Administration to stray from its stated leadership position with regards to NP norms and
NP regime enforcement mechanisms helped open the argumentative door for
conservative members of Congress to press their challenges aimed at delegitimizing such
longstanding NP norms and practices. Acting in informal coalitions, or “issue clusters”,
legislators impacted policy outcomes by constructing limiting discursive space around the
issue of unconventional weapons, reclaiming the agenda for threat articulation and policy
response in the process.26
Bush Administration policy responses to the Gulf War: maintenance of the status quo
In 1992 the Bush Administration produced a National Security Directive on
nonproliferation policy, answering the questions put forth in its 1989 policy reviews. The
                                                 
25 Bradley Gordon, Assistant Director, Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Statement on ‘Nonproliferation Issues’, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, July 11, 1990, NSArchives NP02632
26 Hersman argues that an important locus of legislative activity in Congress is not the political parties
themselves, but clusters of issue-oriented legislators cooperating on the crafting and passage of specific
interest legislation. See Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: how Congress and the president really
make foreign policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), Ch. 2
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document indirectly articulated the proliferation lessons of the Gulf War and was the
central document serving to focus and coordinate nonproliferation policy among the
relevant departments and agencies.27 As such, the document also serves as a window into
the shifting strategic cultural perspectives on approaches to proliferation in the immediate
post-Cold War. It recognizes a changed security environment, yet identifies a role for the
United States still bound by the norms of the NP regime, and a self-identified leadership
in promoting those norms:
In all of these areas, the problems are too difficult to be solved by generalized global
norms alone. Therefore, those norms have begun to be supplemented by tailor-made
approaches: the special inspection regime for Iraq, the Middle East Arms Control
Initiative, confidence-building measures such as those proposed for India and
Pakistan… The United States should also rely on its alliances to discourage
development of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.
The United States will propose that serious violations of international
nonproliferation norms – such as the transfer of a weapon of mass destruction,
detonation of a nuclear device, confirmed use of chemical or biological weapons, or
transfer of critical facilities for weapons of mass destruction – be subject to
appropriate international response. To implement this proposal, the United States will
consult in the first instance with its friends and allies on steps including agreements
on extradition, immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly
contributed to proliferation, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons,
inspections, United Nations Security Council embargoes and/or other sanctions.28
Aside from the strong normative focus on U.S. nonproliferation policy, the document
reveals a number of emerging assumptions about the nature of the post-Cold War security
environment. Though international conflict may have been assumed to be inevitable,
there is also a relatively clear assumption that the United States itself would not be the
direct target of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons attacks. The focus was rather on
the steps that should be taken in anticipation of the development, transfer or use in ways
that would perhaps threaten U.S. interests, though not the physical security of the United
States itself.
                                                 
27 The White House, National Security Directive 70, ‘United States Nonproliferation Policy’ July 10, 1992,
NSArchives PR01781
28 Ibid.
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Although the dynamics of the international system had altered with the end of the Cold
War, offering a potentially greater freedom of action for aspiring regional powers, the
threats posed by proliferation for the United States were largely anticipated by the Bush
Administration to be a continuation of those posed during the Cold War. If the source of
proliferation threats was identified as largely political or normative in nature, then the use
of military force to address proliferation threats was viewed with relatively low utility, as
the nature of those threats was conceptualized within a largely normative framework.
Such implicit acceptance of the normative framework of the NP regime is echoed in
statements articulating direct proposals for U.S. action and leadership in promoting NP
norms, “The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for
nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in the Middle
East and other regions of tension to take similar actions…”29
Such a normative focus continued concerning the range of potential U.S. responses to
proliferation crises:
We must be prepared as members of the international community to step in when
crises arise, e.g., by seeking inspections by a body like the UN Special Commission
or sanctions by the UN Security Council. That does not mean that the United States
will never take unilateral actions. Indeed, the record shows that United States
leadership has at times provided a beachhead from which to build multilateral
consensus, as in the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms
Control Initiative, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Unilateral action by the United States on proliferation threats was identified within the
context of unilaterally expanding and strengthening NP norms and multilateral legal,
economic and political mechanisms rather than as unilateral military action. The
‘consensus’ to emerge in this document was in many ways reiterating the case for the
U.S. as defending the Cold War normative status quo concerning the preferences for
action on proliferation issues. U.S. nonproliferation as directed by the Bush
Administration emerges as an attempt to strengthen what already exists, and was defined
by the notable absence of proposed fundamental changes to the NP regime or challenges
to NP norms.
                                                 
29 Ibid.
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Congressional policy responses to the Gulf War: irrational states and WMD
Where the NP norms were finding the most serious challenges were from issue advocates
in the U.S. Congress. Unsurprisingly, the lack of administration policy change in
response to the Gulf War served as an opening for issue advocates in Congress to press
their conceptions of alternative identities and responsibilities for the United States. 30 The
most important challenge to the broad legitimacy of traditional NP norms and practices
was in the Congressional discourse surrounding the symbolic transformation of the term
WMD, entailing as it did a subjective interpretation by a number of policy elites of the
Gulf War as both a failure of the NP regime and a potential failure of deterrence. In this
figuration, the historical analogy of appeasement figured centrally, used by both the Bush
Administration and its critics either supporting the use of force against Iraq31 or to attack
the policy approaches argued to allow Iraqi WMD armament,32 invite Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait,33 or allow continued Iraqi resistance to the United Nations mandate for
WMD disarmament.34 In the wake of the Gulf War, some policy makers carried away the
‘lesson’ that strengthening existing NP norms was the key to addressing post-Cold War
proliferation threats.35 Others argued that existing NP policy mechanisms must be
augmented with “regionally tailored responses”,36 while still others argued that the entire
                                                 
30 Hersman, Friends and Foes, p. 32
31 George H. W. Bush, ‘Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf Crisis’, Public Papers of the
Presidents (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 9, 1991)
32 Senator Claiborne Pell, ‘The Antics of a Misguided Despot’, Congressional Record, (April 20, 1990),
S4726
33 Senate Resolution 318, ‘Relative to Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait’, Congressional Record, (August 2, 1990),
p. S11961; see also Senator Tim Wirth, ‘Bush’s Failed Iraq Policy’, Congressional Record, (September 30,
1992), p. S15731
34 Hon. Les Aspin, remarks to the House of Representatives, ‘George Bush’s ‘Threat-And-Forget’
Approach is No Answer to Saddam Hussein’s ‘Cheat-And-Retreat Tactics’, Congressional Record, July 31,
1992, p. E2335; see also Les Aspin, ‘Saddam Is Winning’, Washington Post, August 11, 1992, sec. op/ed,
p. 17
35 Hon. Jim Leach, extension of remarks, ‘War Looms, Peace Beckons’, Congressional Record, (October
27, 1990), p. E3613; Senators Glenn and Boschwitz, ‘Senate Concurrent Resolution 113 – Relative to
Nuclear Sales to Southeast Asia’, Congressional Record, (March 30, 1990), p. S3634
36 R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, ‘Proliferation Threats of the 1990’s’, February 24, 1993, NSArchives IG01886
143
NP regime was ineffective at controlling the spread of WMD and that only unilateral
action by the United States could curb proliferation.37
Emblematic of the leveraging of the term WMD for political purposes were the
legislative arguments of Senator John McCain. From 1989 to 1991, Senator McCain
shifted from an argued perception of the nature of proliferation threats as one of
destabilizing technologies, to one of “belligerent” states. In the proposed Non-
Proliferation and Arms Transfer Control Act of 1991 (also known as the McCain Act),
the Senator sought to distinguish between “belligerent and nonbelligerent states” in
assessing the threat posed by WMD.38 This act served as legislative tool for shifting NP
policy emphasis by effectively pressuring the President to apply unilateral economic
sanctions, prohibiting most forms of trade and commerce with nations identified as
“threats to world peace.”39 It would also force the President to report to Congress
“countries of concern” according to criteria of the bill, which placed the onus on the
President to apply sanctions, and maintained the threat of public embarrassment if the
President chose not to sanction states that fit Congressionally identified criteria.
Partly this is a reflection of a Congressional habit of either creating overly broad
categories of sanction criteria for domestic political purposes, or piggybacking political
causes onto existing sanctions through broad interpretation of the sanctions criteria.
Similar attempts to politically manipulate the Export Administration Act, intended to
limit economic relations with state sponsors of terrorism, drew the pointed criticism of
members of Congress from State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Michael
Sheehan, “if you have a problem with Cuba on human rights, get your own sanctions,
don’t use mine.”40
                                                 
37 Senator John McCain, ‘Controlling the Transfer of Weapons to Countries That Threaten World Peace’,
Congressional Record, (July 15, 1991), p. S9917
38 S. 309, The Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfer Control Act, as listed in, Davis, ‘Nuclear
Nonproliferation Legislation and Policy’, p. 37
39 Ibid. p. 37
40 Quoted in Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2001), p. 172. For an excellent discussion of the political complications resulting from such a list that
actually served in some situations to inhibit effective counterterrorism policy, see Ibid, pp. 157-178
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The legislative method of focusing on WMD proliferation as a way to not only reduce
interpretations of state behavior to a single unmitigated, unambiguously negative
motivation (threatening world peace), but also to place states in relatively static
categories, became something of a trend in Congress in the years following the Gulf War.
A series of bills were proposed in the U.S. Senate attempting to link proliferation
behavior and state identity with trade relations or economic sanctions.41 The House of
Representatives weighed in with a number of its own resolutions, nearly all of which
sought to link U.S. economic or political relations to subjective criteria of WMD
proliferation and state behavior.42 By the end of the 102nd session of Congress in 1992,
the term WMD had found its way into 39 bills, amendments and public laws, up from its
inclusion in one bill during the 100th Congress that ended in 1988. 43
Combined, these legislative efforts amounted to a high level discursive assault on the
non-discriminatory norms of the NP regime that had been commonly accepted during the
Cold War. Legislative efforts informed by existing strategic cultural preference
                                                 
41 See Bills S.1020 and S. 1084 concerning trade relations with China in Davis, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation
Legislation and Policy’, pp. 39, 41; For economic sanctions, see S. 1128 The Omnibus Nuclear
Proliferation Control Act of 1991, Ibid, p. 41; See also Senator John Glenn, News Release, ‘Proliferation
Threats of the 1990’s’, Hearing of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, February
24, 1993, NSArchives IG01886
42 Another significant House resolution, H. Con Res. 97, sought official recognition that “the 1981 Israeli
preemptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was a legitimate and justifiable exercise of self-
defense, and that the United States should seek the repeal of U.N. Security Council Resolution 487 which
condemned that 1981 Israeli preemptive strike.” Davis, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Legislation and Policy’,
p. 28
43 Citations of term WMD in Bills, Amendments, or Public Laws, as listed in the U.S. Congressional
Records website at http://thomas.loc.gov, accessed January 3, 2006:
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effectively undermined the concept that the nature of the proliferation threat was
destabilizing technologies. In its place was an evolving conception on proliferation
threats that divided states into distinct and unequal classes of proliferators. Of primary
concern to a range of policy makers were those states argued to be belligerent, rogue,
outlaw, or threats to world peace. Thus not only was the non-discriminatory tradition of
NP policy strongly challenged, but the inherent threat mitigation provided by the
potential for deterrence relationships was argued as potentially irrelevant. How such a
conclusion was reached despite the fact that Iraq had refrained from WMD use
throughout the Gulf War was left unanswered.44 The net effect of this shift in political
discourse was that certain formulations gained a type of self-evident legitimization,
forcing a label like WMD to take on a specific interpretation that, as evidenced by the
almost complete lack of competing conceptions in subsequent Congressional usage, was
very difficult to challenge.
As David Campbell has argued, “The effective discourses of danger that have led to
‘successful’ instances of foreign policy are those that have been able to combine both
extensive and intensive forms of power, so that the social identity of the community has
been aligned with the political space of the state.”45 Regardless of our definitions of
‘success’ in policy, the effectiveness of discourse in altering established conceptions
often rests on the ability of policy makers to either appropriately mold policy to the
established identity of the community, or to reshape the identity of the community to the
form of the policy. Central to establishing perceptions of ‘appropriate’ policy responses is
the ability to control discourse in order to limit the range of possible perceptions of policy
responses by, “clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic
preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” in the words of Alasdair Johnston.46
That such a process of challenging existing threat perceptions and establishing new ‘self-
evident’ conceptions could be a highly disorganized one, with no clearly identified
                                                 
44 Such a conclusion had not been reached by the DOD, which succinctly argued, “Hussein had a large
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organizers, should come as a little surprise. If the process of establishing ‘legitimate’
threat perceptions is oriented towards domestic audiences as much as international ones,
a range of competing domestic political motives is not simply possible, but should be
expected.47
Though the discourse on WMD had not fully solidified into a consensus on ‘appropriate’
conceptions of the role and efficacy of military force in addressing proliferation threats,
by the time Bill Clinton assumed office, significant changes had occurred that would
have serious implications for the interpretation of proliferation threats and responses
throughout the 1990’s. The subjective ‘lessons’ of the Gulf War, coupled with a range of
domestic political motives had served to transform the term WMD from a largely
technical term denoting military capability, to a largely symbolic political term denoting
deviant identity. Thus, entirely through a prolonged process of political argument,
America and her allies had ceased to be possessors or developers of WMD. Responsible,
status quo maintaining states that supported the international order perhaps possessed
nuclear forces, or worked to limit the development of chemical weapons. WMD
possession or development now fell to belligerent states, rogue regimes and other
irresponsible, irrational actors opposed to the international order.
Though little had changed in terms of actual policy responses as a result of this discursive
transformation, the cognitive implications of such a shift in discourse would be far-
reaching. For although proliferation remained a complex dilemma, challengers of the NP
status quo were equipped with a simple formulae for threat identification that coupled
technical capability with political identity. For those working to shape proliferation
policy responses that went beyond the traditional mechanisms of the NP regime, this
formulae afforded a clear pathway for threat response – either the technical capacity or
the political identity of target states would have to be challenged if progress in mitigating
the threat from WMD was to be made.
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The final section in this chapter will examine the origins and organizing conceptions of
the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, which represented the first post-Cold War
attempt to establish a defense policy response to unconventional weapons threats beyond
existing methods of NP policy.
The politics of threat response: the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
Counterproliferation thinking that challenged central assumptions and practices of the NP
regime was already well established within the DOD and Legislative circles by the time
the Clinton Administration took office in early 1993. Up to this point, however, none of
the thinking about CP had crossed into actual policy prescriptions or military doctrine,
but rather was focused on particular groups rethinking the strategic implications of
proliferation in the post-Cold War, and processing of the lessons of the Gulf War. All of
that was to change with the announcement of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
(DCI) in late 1993, the first major defense initiative of the Clinton Administration.
A number of early accounts of the DCI explain the initiative as essentially the cognitive
product of the first Secretary of Defense under Clinton, Les Aspin. However, while the
former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee had placed proliferation as a
high priority immediately following his confirmation to the position of Secretary of
Defense, a closer examination of his developing thoughts on defense policy reveal an
initiative more closely modeled on the existing conceptual developments within the
DOD, as well as broadly accepting of the Legislative reformulation of the proliferation
threat as focused on state identity. Together these influences go farther in explaining the
particular orientation of the initiative than the cognitive biases and preferences of the
public figure associated with the announcement.
Challenging cognitive explanations for the origins of the DCI
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Though a longtime member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Aspin had no
track record of positions on the proliferation of unconventional weapons, or public
remarks about the strategic significance of proliferation to the United States. Prior to the
Gulf War, Aspin gave an interview to the Washington Post listing what he considered to
be the likely emerging issues of the post-Cold War.48 Neither nuclear weapons nor
proliferation of any sort received mention. Immediately following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, while voicing support for the Bush administration’s intention to use force to
expel the Iraqi military from Kuwait, Aspin also made no mention of unconventional
weapons, or the proliferation issues central to the crisis in the minds of other
policymakers.49 It was only after assuming the role of incoming Secretary of Defense in
the Clinton administration that proliferation concerns topped the list of his articulated
defense priorities.50
In seeking to explain Aspin’s sudden prioritization of proliferation, former members of
his Congressional staff identified many of his emerging positions at this time as those of
a politician consciously attempting to “refashion himself as a sort of defense
intellectual.”51 Aspin wished to be seen as a strong public challenger of the Bush
Administration and DOD. His sustained campaign of criticism was an attempt to gain
attention from an incoming Democratic Administration that was vetting cabinet level
appointees to shore up their candidate’s perceived weaknesses on defense issues.52
Throughout 1992, Aspin consistently challenged his own more conciliatory record in the
Senate on defense issues by publicly going on the offensive against the Bush
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Administration, both in Congress and in print, on a number of highly visible defense
issues.53
Aside from the intrigue of electoral politics, Aspin’s emergent positions on proliferation
are revealing largely for what was assumed to constitute “tough rhetoric” on defense. As
such, these positions do not reveal as much about individual cognitive biases as much
they do on the emerging conservative strategic cultural assumptions about the nature of
proliferation threats, and strategic cultural challenges to U.S. NP policy. While it is
highly questionable that Aspin could be considered a bearer of conservative strategic
culture during this period, the positions adopted from the conservative efforts in the
Legislature in the absence of Executive movement away from traditional NP conceptions,
reveal what ideas had been adopted as “legitimate” conservative terms of debate on the
issue since the end of the Cold War. What had agitated Bush Administration officials so
greatly about Aspin’s behavior was not simply the questioning of Administration policies
by a Democratic Senator, an otherwise unremarkable event in normal Executive-
Legislative relations, but rather the adoption by a leading Democratic figure of
conservative challenges to the defense positions of the Bush Administration – a maneuver
politically equivalent to outflanking the Administration with conceptual challenges from
the Right by a figure of the Left.54
In adopting tough conservative rhetoric on proliferation issues, Aspin revealed what
ground had been gained in the argumentative efforts of Congress in delegitimizing both
nonproliferation and deterrence as appropriate to meet post-Cold War strategic
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Interview with Rebecca Hersman
150
challenges. Consider this statement by Aspin in the months immediately preceding the
1992 elections,
…how we deal with Iraq has implications far beyond that country. We are
establishing the foundation of a post-Cold War era. How we deal with Iraq says a
lot about how we deal with the new nuclear dangers as well as authority of the
United Nations in the coming decades. Nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist
state is one of the principle threats facing the United States in the post-Cold War
era. Iraq remains a terrorist state, and its nuclear threat has not been eliminated…
Every potential proliferator is watching. Nukes in the hands of thugs like Saddam
Hussein won’t give rogue leaders the wherewithal to win a fight against the
United States, but they could be used as instruments of terror against American
forces and allies. Moreover, only mass destruction weapons, particularly nuclear
ones, can offset huge U.S. advantages in conventional power. We must
demonstrate to those who want weapons of mass destruction that the acquisition
of these weapons is not worth the effort… If we cannot succeed in Iraq – where
our international leverage is enormous – then the prospects for stopping
proliferation elsewhere are grim.”55
While it was hardly bold for a U.S. Senator in 1992 to label Saddam Hussein a “thug”,
the conceptions embedded within the comment are revealing in their reinterpretation of
both the nature of proliferation threats, and the range of credible responses. Aspin
positions the United States in a familiar leadership role on proliferation issues, but rather
than the traditional position of first among equals in a normative systems, Aspin
refashions the American role in paternalistic terms, with policy oriented towards setting
an example by taking a hard line in dealings with irresponsible, “rogue” regimes. Nuclear
weapons are removed from their strategic role in a military balance, and are now
instruments of “terror” in the hands of those who would reject the status quo. Allowing
proliferation to occur would not simply undermine the norm of nonproliferation, but
would embolden such rogue states to engage in irresponsible behavior. The appropriate
response to such a strategic threat is no longer framed as one of either maintaining
effective deterrence relationships or promoting disarmament, but rather through a
demonstration of American ability to deny those weapons to rogue regimes.
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Such reconceptualization of the strategic threat from proliferation and the appropriate
range of responses informed the earliest statements and policies to emerge from the
Clinton Administration. Though broadly articulating a position supportive of NP norms,
early policy documents indicate a nascent discrimination between states that accept these
norms and those who do not. 56 These discriminatory distinctions were themselves
supported, at least rhetorically, by the conceptualization of more activist approaches to
proliferation as articulated by President Clinton on the same day in his first speech to the
United Nations General Assembly:
If we do not stem the proliferation of the world’s deadliest weapons, no
democracy can feel secure… One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction whether they are nuclear,
chemical or biological, and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on
populations hundreds of miles away.57
Although not representing a sea change in U.S. nonproliferation policy, the early
conceptualizations of proliferation threats by Aspin should be situated within the larger
social context of challenges to the legitimacy of existing nonproliferation and deterrence
norms that brought a conservative strategic cultural pessimism about conflict together
with an equally conservative view of the efficacy of military force in meeting the threat
posed by proliferation. Though perhaps only crafted as a way to show toughness on
proliferation issues to skeptical conservative critics, these challenges, and the ones that
were soon to follow in the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative are illustrative of the
effectiveness of conservative argumentative strategies to shift the legitimate ground of
discourse on proliferation, reshaping what were considered legitimately “tough” positions
on security issues with strong foundations in nondiscriminatory diplomatic and economic
normative beliefs.
The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
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Still recovering from the political fallout generated by a leaked draft of its 1992 Defense
Planning Guidance, the DOD was further put on the bureaucratic defensive by the 1992
election of Bill Clinton. The Clinton Administration took office with different strategic
and budgetary priorities than the Bush Administration; most importantly a stated
intention to focus on domestic social spending over internationally defense spending.
Clinton’s commitment to $60 billion in defense spending cuts, supported by a
Democratic controlled Congress, put an end to the sweeping post-Cold War budgetary
aspirations of the DOD. However, sensitive to claims of weakness in foreign affairs and
defense issues that had been a focal point of attacks during the election campaign, and
concerned that early policy positions had alienated the Pentagon, the incoming
Administration and its top Pentagon appointees were eager to demonstrate their
commitment to national security issues.58 A manifestation of this commitment entailed
allowing the incoming Secretary of Defense Aspin to introduce several defense
‘initiatives’, including one focused on the threat posed by proliferation.
On December 7th, 1993, Aspin unveiled the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI)
in a speech made to the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International
Security and Arms Control. Presented on the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, the
speech garnered much national and international attention, as it marked the first major
defense initiative of the Clinton Administration. In it, Secretary Aspin detailed the
principle threats to U.S. national security since the end of the Cold War, first and
foremost among them being the “new nuclear danger”.59 Unlike the ‘old’ nuclear threat
from massive Soviet arsenals, the new threat was one that could come from “perhaps a
handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states or even terrorist groups”.60
Whereas the old threat had been met with a successful combination of deterrence, arms
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control, and a nonproliferation policy based on prevention, this approach was claimed to
be unable to meet the new nuclear threats for two principle reasons.
The first was that the nature of the proliferation threat was being dramatically altered by
the “democratization of technology”, an issue quite similar to that of the emerging RMA
as articulated by the DOD some years earlier. 61 The globalization of trade after the Cold
War and the attendant widespread availability of technology meant that more countries
could develop or import technologies to assist in weapons development outside the
jurisdiction of nonproliferation controls.62 Determined proliferators would be able to
develop or acquire unconventional weapons capabilities, and it would be outside the
capabilities of the nonproliferation regime to stop them. As Aspin concluded, “a policy of
prevention through denial won’t be enough to cope with the potential of tomorrow’s
proliferators”.63
The second underlying weakness of the ‘old’ approach of nonproliferation to the new
nuclear threat, as stated in Aspin’s DCI announcement, was that the nature of deterrence
as it now applied to the United States had changed dramatically. Now instead of relying
on a strong nuclear deterrence to equalize Soviet conventional superiority in Europe,
when faced with smaller unconventional weapons armed opponents in the new
proliferation environment, the U.S. risked “being the equalizee”.64 Potential adversaries
could use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to threaten U.S. forces in the field, or
when coupled with ballistic missiles, even threaten the U.S. homeland. Although the use
of such weapons was by no means certain, U.S. military commanders would have to
assume the threat was real, and be prepared to meet it.
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Although making it clear that a policy of nonproliferation would be inadequate to meet
the new nuclear threats posed by rogue regimes, Aspin emphasized the fact that the DCI
was simply an effort to couple the task of protection against unconventional weapons
armed opponents to that of the prevention of proliferation, and therefore was in no way
intended to replace traditional nonproliferation efforts. Military counterproliferation
capabilities would in fact strengthen nonproliferation efforts, serving to devalue the
acquisition of unconventional weapons by reducing their “military utility” in the hands of
an aggressor.65 Thus the logic of the DCI according to Aspin was that if an adversary
knew that such weapons would not deter the United States from action, and could not be
effectively applied in battle, they would be less likely to pursue their development.
Though clearly a retreat from the language of preemption and prevention in the 1992
DPG, the DCI still presented the United States in general, and the DOD in particular as
taking on a far more active role in addressing proliferation threats. Though defended by
DOD officials as a defensively oriented initiative aimed at protecting U.S. forces in
combat, the concept of “military preparedness” central to the DCI encompassed a broad
range of potential organizational responses.66 Key to any of these responses was the
promise of broadened political mandate for organizational involvement in areas
previously the domain of competing bureaucracies, and potential access to funding in a
period of budgetary downturn. As a former DOD official critical of the bureaucratically
limited nature of the DCI commented, “Like any label that comes into vogue in the
Pentagon, money is associated with that. So everyone is re-labeling programs to be
counterproliferation programs because they want to get funded for that.”
Ultimately, the concept of counterproliferation articulated in this initiative emerges as a
compromise solution to a mix of domestic and international political dilemmas. The
organizational role regarding proliferation had been pared down in the DCI to a highly
defensive-oriented program, but it still reflected many of the organizational priorities
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identified in the DOD’s early post-Cold War strategic reassessment, and the more activist
conceptions of appropriate responses to proliferation emerging from Congress. While
superficial “re-labeling” would occur as a result of the DCI announcement, certain
conceptual doors had been cracked open by the ‘lessons’ of the Gulf War and the
overlapping process of strategic reassessment that would prove critical to the ultimate
transformation of U.S. nonproliferation policy and challenge existing NP norms. As
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation, Mitchell Wallerstein
noted about the intended implications of the DCI,
As potential adversaries come to understand that the possession of and/or
blandishment of WMD is not sufficient to deter or dissuade the United States
from defending its interests – and those of its allies around the world, as we have
for decades – they will be compelled to reconsider the value of the huge
investment of time, money and international credibility they are making to
develop such weapons. This would be the optimal outcome of our efforts, since
our primary goal remains to stop proliferation from occurring in the first place.67
In pressuring for rollback, the idea that acquiring unconventional weapons capabilities
will lead to less security, not more would need to be backed up with actual targeted
military capability in addressing proliferation threats. Professional members of the
military are, by nature of their vocation, experts in the concept of credible threats. Thus
while the emphasis on domestic civil preparedness and the capability of U.S. forces to
don more effective protective gear in the field might have a negligible effect on the
tactical and strategic calculations of potential adversaries, the effective demonstration or
application of counterforce capabilities might not. The military logic implicit in
“compelled to reconsider” implies the threat not only of defeat on the battlefield, but the
threat of inviting preemptive action. Although the DOD imagined itself to be
conservative on the use of force, such policy formulations and conceptions played
directly into its most vulnerable areas in terms of avoiding the use of force, which
effectively lowered the bar for military action by addressing a problem in a way that
raised the potential for an ultimate shift towards preventative action absent external
political constraints.
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Conclusions
With the broad strategic reassessment of the emerging security environment as articulated
in the DCI at the end of this period, questions must now be asked of the utility of the
strategic culture approach in offering a compelling explanation of these responses and
trends. Strategic culture, much like the organizational theory approach examined in the
previous chapter, downplays individual choice and systemic factors such as structural
determinacy. Instead, it offers a broadly cultural and argumentative-oriented explanation
for policy preferences and conceptual development. How does such an explanation stack
up against alternatives such as the RAM and cognitive models?
A RAM explanation falls into many of the same pitfalls examined in the previous
chapter. RAM theories would predict that the United States would support the NP regime
as long as participation in the NP regime supported its own interests, but this leaves the
central question unanswered – what were U.S. interests, and how were they identified? A
central theoretical weakness in attempting to apply RAM-style analysis to the decisions
made during this period is that in ignoring the process of policy decisions, RAM analysis
assumes inherent state interest, and tends to place objective meaning on material changes.
As such, a number of conflicting policy prescriptions ranging from traditional
disarmament to newer forms of active denial potentially fulfill the conditions necessary
for rational value maximizing behavior. How should we make sense of the range of
different policy orientations and broader strategic conceptions forwarded during this time
by various political actors?
The RAM explanation posits state security as a central driver of value-maximizing
behavior, and an account of CP policy evolution can be made by claiming that more
assertive efforts at combating proliferation fulfill cost-benefit analysis criteria by
assuming high costs of future conflict with unconventionally armed adversaries. Thus a
convincing account of CP policy evolution can be made with such analysis, but
competing domestic discourses must also be assumed to exogenous, and subservient to
larger unitary, rational state motivations. A Strategic Culture explanation, however,
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claims that such competing discourses reveal a state without such unitary, value
maximizing behavior, and opens up the possibility that more important policy drivers lay
within the state and its competing political factions. Such an explanation goes further in
exploring the significance of divergent strategic discourses as representative of different
conceptions of both cost and benefit. Strategic Culture argues that examining political
and conceptual competition within the state is a fruitful areas of study in itself, as more
can be said about the policy impact of alternative assumptions about the international
threat environment than when competing discourses are discounted as ultimately serving
a unitary, value maximizing end.
When examining the available evidence, cognitive explanations, often forwarded by
scholars and participants in describing the genesis of the DCI, also exhibit weakness.
Cognitive focus has been placed on the figure of Les Aspin due to his proximity (and
claimed authorship) of the DCI, even though a closer reading of the development of his
thought shows little emphasis on the conceptions central to the DCI before being tapped
for the position of Secretary of Defense. This cognitive argument is further undermined
by the accounts of former staffers who traveled from his Congressional staff to the DOD
and participated in the formulation of the DCI. These participants noted his adoption of
the new conceptions of ideationally targeted proliferation threat that had been gaining
legitimacy within the Legislature. Also former DOD officials who briefed Aspin on their
own counterproliferation thinking during the transition observed he carried many of their
conceptions forward into the DCI, rather than entering office with a fully formed plan for
the defense initiative himself.68 The DCI then emerges as a broader articulation of the
conceptual trends emerging from strategic cultural debates and the organizational
reassessment of the post-Cold War strategic environment, rather than the expression of
individual cognitive bias on the part of a bureaucratically powerful individual.
A strategic culture perspective with its emphasis on both ideationally defined biases and
preferences, and its emphasis on argumentation as a causal pathway linking such
preferences to policy outcomes brings U.S. closer to a satisfying explanation of the
                                                 
68 Interviews with Larry Seaquist, Rebecca Hersman
158
shifting conceptions about proliferation that resulted in the DCI. Although this was a
formative period that was not defined by clear polarizing political divides, significant
discursive trends nonetheless emerged over this period that can be tied back to ideational
divides present in the U.S. Executive and Legislature. Those with strategic cultural
assumptions about opportunities for cooperation over conflict and a low utility for
military power to further nonproliferation policy advocated nondiscriminatory diplomatic
and economic approaches founded on the continuing legitimacy of traditional normative
beliefs about nonproliferation and deterrence strategies. Those with assumptions about
the inevitability of conflict and a high utility for military force in meeting the threat posed
by proliferation unsurprisingly advocated a rather different set of policy prescriptions.
It was this second group of nonproliferation skeptics that were instrumental in presenting
successful argumentative challenges to the legitimacy of nondiscriminatory NP and
deterrence norms through the introduction of the language of “rogue regimes” and the
political transformation of “WMD”. The experience of the Gulf War served as a strong
reinforcement of these conservative strategic cultural trends, placing the group at a
relative advantage in efforts to delegitimize, or at least fundamentally question the
efficacy of the NP regime and existing normative approaches to proliferation. This shift
in legitimacy allowed them to present their alternative conceptions as “uniquely realistic
and efficacious.” 69 If the development of WMD was removed from the broader context of
disarmament and closely tied to assumptions of irrational or irresponsible state identity,
and Saddam Hussein could be held up as a prime example of the assumed ability of such
states to operate outside of the reach of the NP regime, a simple and potent formula for
policy response could be bundled into the language, giving it increased utility as an
alternative set of policy prescriptions that could be legitimized through further political
action. The strategic cultural divide over the legitimacy of these two approaches will be
the subject of Chapter 5.
At the end of this period, the DCI emerged with many of the key concepts adopted as
representing a “tough new” approach to proliferation that would place more emphasis on
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military solutions to proliferation problems traditionally framed in political terms.
Though not intended as a broadly preemptive form of unilateralism feared by some
contemporary critics, the DCI nonetheless gave military planners an opportunity to
institutionalize new conceptions into organizational practices and capabilities that would
fundamentally alter the menu of choice for future policymakers. Absent civilian control
to the contrary, this further legitimized conceptions and practices of proliferation control
through the application of military force. The institutionalization of counterproliferation
within the DOD is the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Institutionalizing Counterproliferation: 1994-1998
The period immediately following the announcement of the DCI in December of 1993 is
widely seen as a period of immediate decline for the new initiative. Strong challenges to
the mandate from both inside and outside the DOD forced a retreat from public view that
led many to assume the DCI was dead on arrival, a casualty of threatened parochial
interests and bureaucratic turf wars. While it is true that counterproliferation shrank
quickly from the public spotlight, it is during these years of supposed hibernation that
counterproliferation policy was quietly institutionalized and transformed into a potent
military approach to the problems of proliferation. A reformulated budgetary mandate,
effective embedding of functional counterproliferation planning in regional combat
commands, and a continuing evolution of assumptions about the nature of the
proliferation threat combined to quietly transform the initiative into a central pillar of the
DOD response to proliferation. It was through this transformation that CP began to
constitute a fundamental challenge to the traditional policy and doctrinal approaches of
nonproliferation and deterrence.
The evolution of counterproliferation within the DOD during this period is both widely
misunderstood by outside observers, and poorly explained by bureaucratic politics
models. An organizational theory approach rectifies many of the sources of
misunderstanding by situating both the initial resistance to the DCI and the broad
institutionalization that followed, within the context of the organizational structure,
interests and learning processes of the DOD. Without an adequate account of the quiet
process of CP institutionalization within the DOD, and the resultant impact on policy,
little sense can be made of the particular forms of doctrinal assumptions underlying the
supposedly revolutionary preemptive strategy articulated by the Bush Administration in
the 2002 NSS.
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This chapter argues that the institutionalization of CP policy within the functional units of
the DOD resulted in a transformation of the organizational conception of the threat posed
by proliferation, and a transformation of the offensive capacity to meet identified threats.
Though this evolution did not in itself guarantee any specific resultant military actions,
the institutionalization of a more offensively oriented CP significantly altered the options
available to future policymakers, and shifted the central emphasis of CP policy. No
longer limited to modest defensive measures intended to protect US forces, CP steadily
progressed towards a comprehensive set of operational capabilities intended to allow
policymakers to decisively alter the strategic threat posed by unconventional weapons
proliferation. By ostensibly offering policymakers the potential to unilaterally prevent or
roll back existing proliferation with military force, CP now represented a decisive break
from traditional NP norms and deterrent practices, further opening the door for the
preventative or preemptive application of such force.
The chapter begins with an examination of the period of strong organizational and intra-
bureaucratic resistance to the DCI, and explains the sources of resistance and clarifying
the confusion over this period in CP evolution that has led some scholars to conclude that
bureaucratic politics explains the supposed “demise” of CP at this time. Although the
DCI was met with strong initial resistance within the DOD, such resistance was largely
over the organizationally inappropriate attempts by DOD civilian appointees such as
Secretary Aspin to attempt a top-down institutionalization of the initiative, rather than
resistance to the substance of the initiative itself.
The chapter continues with an examination of the efforts at embedding CP into the
regional warfighting commands by Aspin’s successors. The effects of independent
budgeting and mission reorientation resulting from this institutionalization are examined
through the offensive capabilities funded and fielded during this time. Coupled with a
paradoxical reconceptualization of unconventional weapons proliferation as necessitated
by America’s growing military might, CP began to emerge as a far more offensively
oriented policy than assumed by many observers at the time of the DCI. The doctrinal
outcome of CP institutionalization was a comprehensive set of organizational
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capabilities, practices and conceptions that placed far more offensive bias on possible
responses to proliferation than had been originally envisioned by the DCI mandate, or
supposedly imposed by bureaucratic bargaining.
Early resistance to the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
The previous two chapters examined how new conceptions of the problem posed by
proliferation gained consensus within the DOD after the Gulf War, and were eventually
translated into policy through the DCI. However, an important puzzle encountered by
analysts of CP policy is the immediate and strong resistance encountered from within the
ranks of the DOD to implementation of the DCI. This strong and substantive resistance to
the initiative from within, coupled with debilitating bureaucratic resistance from outside
the organization led a number of scholars to discount CP as a “dead initiative.”1 In these
analyses, CP did not evolve, but was merely revived in an offensive form by the second
Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11 as central to its doctrine of preemption. This
accounting of CP failure leaves a number of puzzles to be addressed in this chapter. First
is why the initiative encountered such strong resistance, especially from within the DOD
itself, when it appeared largely representative of the emerging consensus on the nature of
proliferation threats and appropriate responses. Second, how to account for the significant
institutionalization that occurred quietly within the DOD shortly after Aspin’s early
departure from the position of Secretary of Defense? What explains both the resistance to
the DCI and its later adoption and evolution?
This section argues that it was not simply external bureaucratic resistance to the scope of
the initiative and internal resistance to the perceived budgetary threat of the initiative that
caused the new initiative to flounder. More significantly, top-down implementation
efforts failed to take into account the organizational design, cultural biases and political
environment in which the US military operated. This failure wasn’t merely attempting to
include too much within the initiative, threatening bureaucratic turf, or failing to provide
                                                 
1 Jason D. Ellis and Geoffrey D. Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security
Policy, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 14; Interview with Henry Sokolski
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independent funding, but more importantly, a failure to account for how the military itself
viewed its own mission boundaries and a failure to include the functional units of the
organization in the decisionmaking process. By examining both the reasons why CP
initially failed to become embedded throughout the functional units of the organization,
and the reasons for the successful institutionalization that was to soon follow, it will be
easier to explain how this processes escaped the notice of many external observers.
Budgetary challenges and organizational response
Secretary Aspin’s strong advocacy of the DCI represented the consensus of the DOD on
appropriate responses to post-Cold War proliferation that would give it a more prominent
role in denying and devaluing unconventional weapons in the hands of potential
adversaries. However, functional implementation of the core mission objectives would
prove to be far more difficult than simple announcement of the intentions of the initiative.
The first major stumbling block encountered by the DCI was the failure to provide
adequate funding for the mission areas identified as priorities in the first year. While the
DCI was announced with a first year budget of $400 million, none of this budget was
independently appropriated through the Legislature or provided by the Executive Order
covering CP efforts within the DOD. Keeping with overall Administration efforts at
reducing the Defense budget, funding to cover the $400 million price tag for the DCI was
to be created by the services themselves by identifying areas where cutbacks on other
expenditures could be realized.
Unsurprisingly, there was strong internal resistance by the individual services to the DCI
on the issue of funding. The central issue being that services already facing potentially
serious budget cuts were highly critical of an initiative that placed additional, vaguely
articulated responsibilities on their shoulders, while simultaneously expecting them to
bear the budgetary burden for implementation of the DCI at a time when very hard
choices about future spending were already being made.2 Influential members of the
                                                 
2 Michael R. Gordon, with Stephen Engelberg, ‘Military to Draft Plan for a 6% Cut in 1992-94 Spending’,
New York Times, November 18, 1989, sec 1, p. 1; David E. Rosenbaum, ‘Sizing Up Cuts to the Military
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military went so far as to successfully argue before Congressional appropriations
committees for paring the first year’s DOD counterproliferation budget from the $400
million originally requested, to a far more modest $70 million.3
That the DCI was announced with such fanfare by a fresh group of civilian appointees
without substantive consultation with the functional units of the organization did little to
further a sense of organizational cohesion or mission within the individual services.4
Many professional members of the military viewed the DCI as an ill-defined, poorly
managed, and inadequately funded initiative imposed on them from above without
special funding prerogative. Thus the services saw it as a threat to existing missions and
programs in a time of declining defense budgets, and subsequently resisted substantive
implementation through direct or indirect forms of bureaucratic resistance.5
The immediate organizational response to these budgetary issues was widespread re-
labeling or re-justifying of existing programs in the early period following the
announcement of the DCI. This phenomenon of organizational sub-units responding
superficially to new mission mandates imposed from above in a climate of budgetary
constraint, was described by a former assistant to Secretary Aspin:
With any organization, anytime there’s a new initiative, they just re-describe what
they were already doing as fitting the new requirements. So you take existing
things and just ‘re-label’ them or ‘re-justify’ them under the new requirement, and
it’s very hard to figure out how much of that constitutes any actual change, or new
program, or new activity, and how much is just re-labeling… So the challenge
was that you want to have an embedded program, but you want to have one that is
                                                                                                                                                  
Budget’, New York Times, January 1, 1990, Sec. 1, p. 12; also Patrick E. Tyler, ‘U.S. Could Cut Defense
Spending By More Than 33%, Report Says’, New York Times, September 24, 1991, Sec. A, p. 29
3 Chris Williams, ‘DOD’s Counterproliferation Initiative: A Critical Assessment’, in Henry Sokolski (ed.),
Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University
Press, 1996), http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch14.htm (Accessed - 10 June, 2003), see also
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, ‘Report on Activities and Programs for Countering
Proliferation’, May 1995, p. 18, DOD OFOISR 00018-CDR-1/766.PDF
4 Interview with Larry Seaquest
5 This resistance to civilian CP initiatives based on funding concerns by the services is documented in
Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventative Defense: A New Security Strategy for America,
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999)
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meaningful – one that constitutes some genuine change in your posture or
capability, but you’ve got this renaming, re-justifying going on. 6
Re-labeling of mission responsibilities and capabilities reflected fears of political
uncertainty within the functional units of the organization and provided a pathway for
resisting change and innovation. The phenomena of re-labeling did nothing to improve
military readiness, further undermining confidence that the DCI would do anything to
address the environmental uncertainty posed by post-Cold War proliferation. Resistant to
the possibility that mandated spending would potentially threaten existing programs, the
services retreated to an ineffective but predictable position of claiming compliance with
the loosely articulated initiative without making any substantive force posture or
capabilities changes. If this were not enough to pose a quagmire for the nascent initiative,
counterproliferation also faced an extremely hostile response from within the DOD and
rival organizations such the State Department, which saw the DCI as one of a host of
overly ambitious defense initiatives to emerging from the Office of Secretary of Defense.
“Mission overreach”: cultural and bureaucratic resistance to the DCI
Secretary Aspin believed that proactive DOD involvement in a wider range of foreign
policy areas was crucial to shaping the emerging security environment. He felt it was the
only organization with the material resources at its disposal to provide meaningful
physical involvement in areas of potential instability that had traditionally been dealt with
through diplomatic pressure, economic incentives or disincentives, or active participation
of multilateral institutions.7 The Bush Administration’s civilian Pentagon leadership
vision for the future of the US military, and Secretary of Defense Aspin’s particular
vision of the core missions of the US military in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet
Union, was in essence a vision of the US military playing a central role in a wide range of
activities intended to promote a peaceful post-Cold War security environment. While the
                                                 
6 Interview with Rebecca Hersman, July 21, 2005. This assessment of the early response by the military
services to the DCI is also supported by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nonproliferation, Henry Sokolski (interview, June 20, 2005).
7 Interview with Rebecca Hersman; Hon. Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United
States House Armed Services Committee, Letter to President George Bush, April 30, 1991, Congressional
Record, February 7, 1992, p. E238
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vast military capabilities of the Soviet Union were no longer the focus of US military
planning, the post-Cold War still presented threats as well as opportunities for the US
military to play a central role in shaping the emerging security environment, partly by
redefining the role and mandate of US military forces. This was articulated in the 1993
Bottom-Up Review of US Military Forces, a major DOD planning document guided by
Aspin and intended to lay out a broad doctrine for US military forces in the post-Cold
War:
This new world we are living in is distinctive because of the new opportunities it
presents for us to advance our interests – by preventing or defusing dangers
before they arise. Accordingly, we have focused a lot of attention on finding ways
to work pro-actively in this new environment to take advantage of such
opportunities. Chief among these initiatives are:
o Cooperative Threat Reduction
o Counterproliferation
o FSU Defense/Military Partnership
o Promotion of Democracy through Military-to-Military Contacts
o Peacekeeping
o Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster/Famine Relief8
All of these wide-ranging initiatives and policy announcements converged into what was
described by senior Defense officials involved at the time as a “huge overreach” in terms
of what constituted new military missions for the DOD. Counterproliferation was
perceived as one more of a number of such overreaches that contributed to a climate of
suspicion within the individual military services and severe hostility from the State
Department concerned that counterproliferation was intended to undermine their
traditional nonproliferation policy mandate.9 Such overreach in organizational missions
led to a significant bureaucratic infighting between the State Department and Department
of Defense. It was reportedly so severe that then Secretary of State Warren Christopher
met with President Clinton and threatened to resign if the scope of the DOD initiatives
was not curtailed.10 As former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation,
                                                 
8 Department of Defense, ‘1993 Bottom Up Review – Talking Points’, October 1993, NS Archives
CH01621, p. 18
9 Interviews with John P. Caves and Henry Sokolski. The peacekeeping initiative was another area of
intense bureaucratic conflict between the State Department and DOD; see Hersman, Friends and Foes, pp.
39, 40
10 Interview with Rebecca Hersman, July 21, 2005
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John P. Caves, commented on this period of bureaucratic turf wars, “You can’t
understand the hostility about the CP initiative without understanding all of these other
things that created a profoundly hostile climate, and that everything was being perceived
in the most hostile terms possible.”11
Resistance to meaningful implementation of the DCI from within the DOD wasn’t simply
a response to budgetary threats, but also reflected a more fundamentally perceived
challenge to the documented civil-military divide over the appropriate nature of military
missions.12 Expansion of the military mission beyond the traditional focus on direct
national security threats into areas such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
drew criticism of the DCI as failing to address weaknesses in substantive military
capabilities. Despite the argued “consensus” within the DOD on the lessons of the Gulf
War in terms of preparedness for conflicts that involved unconventional weapons usage
by adversaries, the individual military services argued that counterproliferation, as
presented in the DCI, was not in fact a distinct mission from what they were already
responsible for. Though the Gulf War had exposed certain weaknesses in mission areas
like force protection, some said it was difficult to argue that the US military was
completely unprepared to operate in a unconventional weapons environment after more
than 40 years of preparations to fight the Soviet Union, which possessed well-known
stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Though contradicting many of
the arguments forwarded after the Gulf War, such resistance should be placed within a
framework of widespread perceptions of external meddling with the missions and
budgets of the military services, rather than a substantive backtracking on the consensus
about proliferation threats.
Limiting CP by definition: The Poneman Memo
In was in this climate of internal resistance and bureaucratic infighting that the scope of
the counterproliferation mandate and mission was ‘resolved’ by the National Security
                                                 
11 Interview with John P. Caves, July 21, 2005
12 Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, p. 25
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Council in a set of official definitions of counterproliferation and nonproliferation, known
informally as the Poneman Memo. Aggravated by the policy deadlock resulting from the
increasingly public battles over counterproliferation and nonproliferation “missions”,
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Robert Gallucci, informally requested
that the National Security Council exercise its policy coordination role by providing a set
of working definitions for proliferation, nonproliferation and counterproliferation. This
was ostensibly to harmonize proliferation policy between the State Department and
DOD.13
At this point it is worth quoting the Poneman memo at length:
We have agreed to the following definitions and will ask our staff to be consistent
in their usage.
Proliferation is the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities and
the missiles to deliver them.
Nonproliferation is the use of the full range of political, economic and military
tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or protect our interests
against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles, should
that prove necessary. Nonproliferation tools include: intelligence, global
nonproliferation norms and agreements, diplomacy, export controls, security
assurances, defenses and the application of military force.
Counterproliferation refers to the activities of the Department of Defense across
the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms
control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular
responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected should
they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles.14
The “agreed definitions” served to place overall policy responsibility for proliferation
issues with the Department of State and to reinforce traditional nonproliferation norms
and practices. Thus the intention was that the DOD “counterproliferation” efforts would
be strictly limited to their existing nonproliferation regime support role and the passive
                                                 
13 Interview with Lewis A. Dunn, July 12 2006
14 Daniel Poneman, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export
Controls, Memorandum for Robert Gallucci (Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Department
of State) and Ashton Carter, (Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation,
Department of Defense), “Agreed Definitions”, February 18, 1994, collection of author.
169
defenses identified as crucial shortcomings in the Gulf War. The definitions also limited
the scope of what would actually be considered proliferation. Gone were the references to
technologies and materials that could be considered to offer potential strategic advantage.
Thus the memo forced a narrowing of the mandate to eliminate the broad array of
activities, proposed by some in the DOD, to deal with the consequences of the Revolution
in Military Affairs.
For some, the Poneman Memo definitions signaled the end of a short-lived attempt by the
DOD to portray counterproliferation as a healthy, integrated and well supported
organizational mission, exposing instead an initiative that lacked significant
organizational, political and budgetary support. In the accounts of CP evolution by many
outside observers, counterproliferation after the Poneman Memo existed in name only.
As such, it did not represent any significant policy shifts or capabilities development
beyond rather modest enhancement of protective measures for US troops operating
against unconventionally armed opponents.15
Explaining resistance to the DCI
The bureaucratic politics model attributes “failure” of the initiative to both the
bureaucratic hostility engendered by the encroachment of the DCI into the bureaucratic
turf of other powerful bureaucracies, and from the threat the DCI posed to the existing
budgets and missions of the functional units of the DOD. As such, a bureaucratic politics
model would see the outcome as the result of “pulling and hauling” between bureaucratic
actors, and failure of Aspin to properly exploit institutional procedures for implementing
decisions. Credit has to be given to a bureaucratic politics explanation of the early
problems encountered by the DCI. Resistance by the State Department, mediated and
resolved by the National Security Council, is difficult to explain outside of a framework
of the defense of parochial interests and bureaucratic bargaining. Bureaucratic politics
                                                 
15 Peter D. Feaver and Emerson N. S. Niou, ‘Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike or Assist?’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (June, 1996), pp. 209-233; also Sokolski, Best of
Intentions, pp. 95-97
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also performs well in providing an explanation of internal resistance to the DCI, with the
parochial interests of the DOD offering expected resistance to budgetary threats.
Organizational theory and associated civil-military relations literature points to cultural
factors within the military, such as biases about the nature of the international security
environment and preferences for certain types of military missions, as important to
understanding how organizations both interpret their external environments and
formulate responses to perceived threats. Here the problem of widespread perception of
CP as bundled into a host of non-traditional mission areas explains the source of some
internal resistance to the initiative. However, while more weight is given to cultural
variables such as military perceptions of appropriate mission orientation by organization
theory, little within the documentary evidence points to primacy of such cultural factors
over the ostensibly bureaucratic issues of budgeting already discussed. These cultural
factors played a role in the early failure of CP and its associated conceptions and
practices to become institutionalized within the DOD, but it is difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether these cultural factors were decisive in preventing a rapid
institutionalization.
A significant area of organizational theory relevant to explaining the early failure of the
DCI is the failure of Secretary Aspin to take into account the structures of
decisionmaking and learning processes within the DOD. Although policy conceptions are
ostensibly promulgated in a top-down form representative of the formal hierarchy of the
military, functional implementation of meaningful change in the military rarely follows
such a rigid top-down process. Institutionalization that affects the practices and
capabilities of the military is a time-intensive process involving a number of feedback
loops. Organizational learning, capabilities development, mission planning and consensus
on emerging strategic conceptions all follow a more broadly distributed pattern within the
organization that involves all layers of the hierarchy in the process of institutionalization.
Far from being an automatic mechanism set in motion by civilian leaders, meaningful
change requires active involvement at all levels of the organization in decisionmaking,
learning, adaptation and functional capabilities development.
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Organizational theory posits that successful institutionalization not only appeals to basic
parochial interests through funding and turf protection, but also to cultural interests
through appropriate mission orientation and involvement of organizational professionals
in defining how new conceptions mesh with organizational practices and capabilities. It
could be argued that Secretary Aspin failed a political test by expanding on turf of the
DOD, and also failed an organizational test by attempting to impose change from above
rather than involve the professional within the organization in development of the
initiative.
The larger utility of organizational theory over bureaucratic politics is in the integration
of these three issues to predict where successful or unsuccessful institutionalization is
likely to occur. Without an appeal to the political realities of bureaucratic coordination of
policy approaches and budgeting, a cultural appreciation of traditional mission areas
embraced by the military services, or sensitivity to the organizational design of the DOD
relevant to effective institutionalization of new conceptions and practices, the DCI stood
little chance of gaining any meaningful penetration within the DOD. Absent such
penetration, there was little chance the DCI would effectively shape military doctrine or
larger policy outcomes. Awareness of such failings, and the outspoken resistance these
failings engendered led many observers to dismiss CP as just one of many ideas about
military reform and modernization, promoted with fanfare by the Clinton Administration,
that had little effect outside the expenditure of political capital.16 However, if such a
combination of factors can be used to explain the failure of early institutionalization, they
may also provide an explanation for the successful institutionalization of CP that was
soon to follow and its effects on larger policy outcomes.
The following section examines the efforts of Aspin’s successors to overcome such
shortcomings in the implementation of CP and render the initiative a meaningful change
to military capabilities, force posture and operating conceptions in addressing
                                                 
16 David, Halberstam, War in a time of peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals, (New York, NY: Scribner,
2001), pp. 209-211
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proliferation threats. The key areas of institutionalization examined in this section include
shaping CP implementation efforts to fit within the actual organizational learning and
decisionmaking structure of the DOD, addressing the fears of budgetary starvation,
developing meaningful CP capabilities, and the conceptual transformation that allowed
CP to evolve into a unique mission area for the military services. In the process of such
transformation, it will be argued that the assumption of adversarial use of unconventional
weapons in future conflicts was transformed by the organization from uncertainty into
fact, with broad ramifications for the challenge CP ultimately presented to NP and
deterrence norms.
The institutionalization of CP policy
While it is true that counterproliferation policy in this period cannot be understood
outside of the context of the early organizational battles between the DOD and
Department of State, an overemphasis on such issues led many observers to judge CP as a
critically constrained and unsupported initiative, thus largely ignoring the measures being
taken within the DOD to integrate counterproliferation into its core mission and develop
the capabilities that would represent a significant challenge to nonproliferation norms and
activities in later years. The dilemma for leading DOD officials was multifaceted: how to
(1) formally create a new military mission in response to this threat, (2) acquire hardware
appropriate to the threat, and (3) develop necessary new war-fighting doctrine while
remaining within the accepted definitions which appeared to significantly restrict the
scope of the DOD response. The Poneman Memo definitions left limited room for
military planning oriented towards force protection, but seemed to shut the door firmly on
offensive operations, such as the possible preemptive or preventative actions feared by
critics of the initiative.17
Although the Poneman Memo definitions seemed to indicate that counterproliferation
                                                 
17 See Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, ‘Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles’, in
Brad Roberts (ed.), Weapons Proliferation in the 1990’s, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 139-150,
also David Fischer, ‘Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald
Müller (eds.) International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
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would be little more than a minor adjunct to US nonproliferation policy, DOD officials
responsible for overseeing CP implementation exploited two loopholes in the memo’s
definition of CP. Firstly, the DOD still had a great deal of leeway in determining
precisely how to assure that “U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they
confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles.”18 As
protection of US forces was argued to be a weakness of the Gulf War, new military
capabilities would need to be developed to meet a range of threat scenarios involving
unconventional weapons. Secondly, if the State Department was responsible for military
responses to proliferation threats, surely this did not entail the actual application of force.
If the role allocated for the State Department was that of shaping policy guiding the
possible use of force on issues of proliferation, then the Department of Defense still had
the responsibility to develop and present military options to future decisionmakers faced
with potential threat scenarios. Thus, although the Poneman Memo apparently restricted
CP to a minor NP support role, in actuality it left open the opportunity for significant
development of new capabilities and practices with transformative potential.
Placing CP policy responsibilities within regional warfighting commands
Formulating a strategy to overcome such strong and well-founded organizational
resistance fell in large part to the senior DOD official responsible for implementing CP
policy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation, Ashton Carter.19 A top-
down approach to the DCI that threatened existing organizational policy implementation
by imposing counterproliferation spending on the services from above had been the
source of much resistance, rather than a lack of merit for the policy itself. Realizing this,
Carter instituted a bottom-up approach to CP policy that focused on placing greater
responsibility for identification of CP mission requirements, and thus funding priorities,
                                                 
18 Poneman Memo
19 Carter is widely recognized as one of the most important assistant secretaries of defense during the
Clinton Administration, second only in policy influence at that level to Joseph Nye, who at the time headed
the Office of International Affairs. See James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process,
(Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), p. 393
174
with the integrated regional combatant commands.20 This bottom-up approach leveraged
the power of operational concepts, “the means of applying military forces by a senior
commander to prosecute a war and the mechanism for implementing a theater campaign
strategy,” to the process of institutionalizing CP.21 Carter believed that if the actual war-
fighting subunits had a hand in directing the implementation of the initiative, much of the
organizational resistance could be mitigated.
An important template for future conflicts provided by the Gulf War was of a central
regional commander orchestrating the joint operation of U.S. forces in possession of
highly mobile precision weaponry.22 A series of comprehensive post-Cold War reviews
of military structuring had all promoted visions of American forces as lighter, smaller,
more technologically advanced, operating jointly and regionally commanded.23 The issue
of joint command of regional forces was, in effect, a continuation of the defense
reorganization begun in the 1980’s. It placed increasing power in the JCS and CINC’s
over individual services both in terms of developing region specific defense plans and
coordinating budgeting for unified forces.24 This was a trend recognized by DOD officials
responsible for the institutionalization of CP policy as a potential pathway for finding
policy support and constructive input at the operational level, as regional commanders
could adapt CP capabilities to the missions and force posture of the unified troops under
their command.25
                                                 
20 ‘Jane’s Interview: Ashton Carter’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 30, 1994, p. 40
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Integrating the regional commands in the decisionmaking process also served to
constructively address an organizational problem of inter-service rivalry faced by the
DOD from its earliest days. As the post-Cold War U.S. military shifted more heavily
towards a regionally oriented defense posture, the CINC’s assumed the responsibility for
shaping a young, technologically focused initiative such as the DCI. Regional combat
commanders tasked with determining the counterproliferation capabilities shortfalls in
their regions were faced with the responsibility to best utilize all the assets under their
command. As the name “unified commands” implies, the CINC’s commanded unified
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine forces focused in specific regional theaters.
Developing the full range of force capabilities would ensure that all the armed services
would have a stake in the successful development of the policy and deployment of
capabilities.
Concepts, capabilities and threat conceptions face greater chances of broad acceptance by
the functional units of the DOD by incorporating relevant planning responsibilities from
the bottom-up than if simply dictated from the civilian leadership.26 As a former DOD
official commented, “Ashton Carter should be credited with realizing that a substantive
CP policy could be institutionalized by embedding CP within the services.”27 That is, by
giving the Joint Staff and regional combatant commands a direct role in formulating CP
policy and budget planning, the concept would be much more likely to gain general
acceptance, as military officers valued the autonomy of directing the CP mission as they
saw fit. Effectively embedding the new initiative in the services would be a crucial way
in which CP issues and specific capabilities would work their way into actual mission
planning and SOP’s by the theater CINC’s, and not simply remain vague strategic
doctrine at higher levels of planning with marginal relevance to operational planning.28
Rather than simply directing that CP policy be carried out at lower levels and mandating
spending by the services, DOD directives on CP policy challenged regional commanders
                                                 
26 This was also a reflection of the overall shift in policymaking power to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set in
motion by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.
27 Interview with Rebecca Hersman
28 Ibid.
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to play an active role in both the assessment of threat and the allocation of funds,
establishing a process of integrated identification of proliferation threats and regional
force posture responses.29
Mitigating budgetary uncertainty
All of the forward thinking placement of CP policy responsibilities with the functional
units tasked with actually undertaking a hypothetical future CP mission would have been
a moot point were it not for a concurrent reorganization of the budgeting mandate for CP
capabilities and missions that removed the fiscal burdens of CP funding from the services
themselves.
Established by a newly Republican-controlled Congress, a Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee (CPRC) chaired by the Secretary of Defense was established with a
mandate to coordinate the technological and scientific aspects of “support for NP policy”,
and to provide funding for projects identified and prioritized by the joint commands.30
Neatly circumventing much of the internal resistance to CP policy by establishing
budgeting for new military capabilities outside the existing services budgets, the CPRC
offered both a budgetary incentive to institutionalization and supported ongoing efforts
within the regional commands to identify mission requirements by providing the
resources necessary to develop new capabilities to fulfill those requirements.
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Providing adequate independent budgeting provided incentives for meaningful adoption
of CP concepts and practices rather than the superficial adoption or open resistance
encountered in the first year of the initiative. The services and regional commands
responsible for prioritizing and institutionalizing CP capabilities were quick to develop
requirements to meet newly identified CP mission objectives. While the first year funding
was limited in relative terms to the overall defense budget, the first year figure for CP
programs, totaling approximately $1 billion in FY 1995, rapidly grew to nearly $4 billion
for FY 1996 and $4.3 billion in FY 1997.31
Substantive funding for CP also built in a feedback loop of sorts, as once general
missions had been established and funded, organizational benchmarks for performance
could be established and compared. The quantitative question of whether or not CP
capabilities were being developed and fielded with appropriate cost effectiveness quickly
supplanted the qualitative questions of encroachment on existing NP norms and practices,
or potential “mission creep” into the functional bureaucratic territory of other
bureaucracies.32 Additionally, the provision of adequate funding and organizational
mandate for substantive implementation of the initiative created what Richard Rhodes
termed a “technological imperative” common to military organizations – a process of
incremental, self-sustaining justifications for developing and employing improved
technologies.33 Once a military capability is developed, there are strong incentives to
justify both the original investment of time and resources and the continued advancement
                                                 
31 DOD counterproliferation spending would continue to steadily rise, reaching an all-time high of $12.65
billion in FY 2004. See Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation
and Chemical and Biological Defense, ‘Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to
Congress Executive Summaries’, (1994-2003), http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/reports.html, (Accessed – 20
August, 2005)
32 Establishment of a regularized system of budgetary appropriations eventually placed the DOD CP
programs under the scrutiny of the GAO in assessing compliance with the “outcome-oriented principles of
the Government Performance and Results Act” – see United States General Accounting Office, Statement
of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International
Affairs Division, ‘Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken to Protect Military
Forces’ (Testimony before the Subcommittees on Military Procurement and on Military Research and
Development, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 10/20/1999, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-
49); also addressed in 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), section I
33 Richard Rhodes, The Making of The Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 562
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of underlying technologies, regardless of whether or not such capabilities are employed
in conflict. Continued investments in capabilities assist military organizations in
“transforming uncertainty into fact” in the words of Elizabeth Eden, by adding perceived
utility in meeting identified threats, and in justifying threat conceptions through
improving or supplanting existing capabilities regardless of continued ambiguity in the
international security environment.34 Such self-sustaining rationale for conceptual and
capabilities development predicted by organizational theory are illustrated by the shift to
capabilities based defense planning by the DOD. This transformed the perception of
unconventional weapons usage threat by adversaries from a minor possibility to an
inevitable feature of future conflict.
The paradox of military dominance
Identifying the need in the early 90’s to redefine not only the command structure, but also
the threat orientation of U.S. forces, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell,
commented, “Because of the need to accomplish a wide range of missions, our new
armed forces will be capabilities oriented as well as threat oriented.”35 This signaled an
era in which U.S. forces would be transitioning from defense against a single large, well
known global adversary to a security environment featuring a number of smaller, regional
powers much less well understood by the U.S. This meant that rather than focus on the
“threat” posed by a single adversary, U.S. forces should be prepared to cope with the
“capabilities” of any number of smaller regional powers. The emergence of the US
military dominance in the post-Cold War period, combined with a shifting emphasis
towards potential adversarial capabilities rather than motives, created a paradoxical
uncertainty about regional or terrorist threats to American military forces.
A telling example of this type of military logic was illustrated in a meeting of senior
DOD officials during a conference on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, when the
                                                 
34 Eden, Whole World on Fire, pp. 55-60
35 Colin Powell, ‘U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead’, Foreign Affairs (Winter, 1992), vol. 71, no. 5, p. 40
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threat posed by Iraq to U.S. military forces in a hypothetical attempt to recapture Kuwait
and Saudi oil fields was considered:
As long as U.S. aircraft are able to kill approximately one combat vehicle per
sortie (which advanced weapons should be able to achieve against exposed,
attacking Iraqi forces), Iraq would have to suppress 50 percent or more of the U.S.
and allied sorties to reach the Saudi coast, and would have to suppress 80 percent
or more of the sorties to reach Dhahran or beyond. Conventional attacks on
airfields and other measures that Iraq might apply are unlikely to disrupt U.S. and
allied sorties by more than 10 to 20 percent--well short of the 80 percent needed
for a successful seizure. Thus, for Iraq to take on the United States and its allies in
a conventional battle would be a losing proposition… If Iraq cannot afford to
create the military forces required to confront the United States directly, neither
can other would-be adversaries of the United States in regional conflicts. Those
foes must reach for asymmetric responses. NBC weapons--and especially
chemical or biological ones (CBW)—would be candidates in such an
asymmetrical confrontation with America's military might (emphasis added).36
Thus in the event of a future conflict with Iraq, Iraqi use of unconventional weapons
became not simply a possible or even likely condition based on historical experience or
psychological insights into Iraqi leadership, but rather a necessity stemming from the
asymmetries of military power. While this is certainly the logic that would be employed
by the U. S. military if called upon to create battle plans from a position of weakness, it is
uncertain if other states would exhibit a similar frame of reasoning. Such is the logic of
capabilities based defense – since uncertainty prevents knowing why an adversary might
act, threat assessments and military plans must be formulated in an environment
dependent on calculations of capabilities. Within this organizational framework,
conservative estimates of what an adversary could use determine defense posture, not
more liberal and potentially disastrous judgments about why capabilities might be used.
American military thinking on the issue of unconventional weapons and asymmetric
threats thus began to demonstrate a type of self-sustaining logic, separated from historical
or political calculations of adversarial motivation.37
                                                 
36 Gregory F. Treverton and Bruce W. Bennett, ‘Integrating Counterproliferation into Defense Planning’,
QDR Conference Proceedings, RAND Defense Issues, CF-132 (1997)
37 DOD documents show a similar logic applied to scenarios involving conflict with North Korea. Defense
Intelligence Agency estimates of North Korean military WMD potential are quickly correlated into
battlefield plans assuming use of these weapons. For examples, see Defense Intelligence Agency, North
Korea Handbook, Washington, D.C., PC-2600-6421-94, 1994, p. 3-16; Department of Defense, 1995
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It should not be surprising that a military organizational subunit responsible for
warfighting plans would marginalize the norms of non-use of unconventional weapons 38,
or even of the restraining power of deterrence. This type of logic is in many ways a
simple demonstration of organizational responsibility – the cautious coupling of
perceived threats with planned responses to protect U.S. forces and national interests.
What is troubling for the issue of norms and practices of nonproliferation or deterrence is
that a relative increase in U.S. military strength, by the logic of the military itself, would
predict a weakening of precisely these norms. Thus, although the military was required to
support these norms through its position within the larger foreign policy framework of
the Clinton Administration, it simultaneously assumed that in certain highly asymmetric
power relationships such norms would hold little binding value. Even such optimistic
aims as “full spectrum dominance” or “total battlespace dominance” only served to
further embed the perceived value of asymmetrical weapons and tactics by a ‘logical’
adversary.
Ironically, as the logic of military dominance and the resulting conceptual implication for
proliferation threat construction became institutionalized, it fed into a form of cyclical
logic directly opposite the original rationale of building capabilities that would dissuade
potential adversaries from even developing such unconventional capabilities – the logic
that the overwhelming and growing US military power would leave potential adversaries
with no choice but to employ unconventional weapons in future conflict, as they would
have no hopes of defeating the US military under normal conditions. Thus the original
conception of CP as dissuading proliferation was ultimately transformed by
organizational logic into rationale for why US military capabilities would now necessitate
                                                                                                                                                  
Annual Report, Ch. 6 1995 CPRC pp. 11, 15 This sort of weakness by military strategists is not unique to
the period in question. As Lawrence Freedman comments about many military strategists during the Cold
War, “The scenarios they devised often managed to combine the most sophisticated technical analysis with
the crudest psychological and political presumptions…” Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, p. 16
38 An excellent study of the evolution of the norm of non-use regarding nuclear and chemical weapons is
Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, ‘Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo’,
in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114-152
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proliferation, thus requiring further investment in CP capabilities and the development of
associated doctrine.
Developing CP capabilities
If CP was indeed following a transformative and self-sustaining course of policy
evolution, was it developing into the actual practices and capabilities argued by
organizational scholars to represent meaningful institutionalization?39 An examination of
the first four years of CP funding reveals important functional development across the
spectrum of identified CP mission areas, but especially in the areas of active defenses and
counterforce capabilities. It was these two mission areas that were central to both altering
available military force options for future policymakers, and presenting challenges to
deterrence and NP norms and practices.
Active defenses
Active defenses are class of military capabilities designed to stop unconventional
weapons delivered by ballistic or cruise missile once those weapons have been launched.
Throughout the mid-90’s, billions of dollars in defense appropriations were poured into
active defense capabilities such as theater missile defense and advanced Patriot missiles.40
Placing missile defenses forward in the field not only served the purpose of avoiding
restrictions on the deployment of more comprehensive missile defensive systems
imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), but also reflected embedding of
the counterproliferation mission through the theater CINC’s.41 It is not merely by nature
                                                 
39 Ibid, p. 45-48; for supporting arguments about the need for penetration of capabilities in support of newly
legitimized conceptions in order for change to be lasting and meaningful, see Crawford, Argument and
Change in World Politics, p. 7
40 Of the $3.8 billion in DOD CP spending for FY 1996, nearly $2.4 billion was spent on research and
development for active missile defenses. See 1995 CPRC, p. 16; for later totals, see also CPRC Report to
Congress, 1998, p. E-8
41 The policy guidelines for ensuring theater missile defense complied with the ABMT is set forth in, The
White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-17, ‘U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the
Future of the ABM Treaty’, December 11, 1993, NSArchives, PD01805; An analyst critical of early DOD
thinking about theater missile defenses and the complications posed by the restrictions of the ABMT is
Henry F. Cooper, ‘Active Defenses to Help Counter Proliferation’, in Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and
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of the perceived physical threat that the development of theater based missile defense was
soon spread across land (Patriot-3)42, sea (Aegis cruiser)43 and air (airborne laser)44 based
systems. By giving a piece of the now independently budgeted pie to all of the services,
inter-service challenges to CP were largely circumvented and the fielding of actual
capabilities enhancements was allowed to move forward.
The significant investment in missiles defenses across all operational platforms of the
military marked a dramatic shift from earlier strategy of mutual deterrence, which had
been a central response to the “underlying symmetry” of Cold War military capabilities
between the superpowers.45 The US military conception of deterrence in the post-Cold
War was quickly evolving from this framework of mutual deterrence with a strong
normative foundation in non-use, to a one-war deterrence relationship of overwhelming
military might. More than purely reflective of the material capabilities of the US, this
shift reflected a perception that the military stability of the Cold War had passed, and that
the new threat environment faced by the United States required far greater freedom of
action for American military forces. The lesson drawn by the DOD from the Gulf War
and institutionalized in active defense capabilities was that of an unchallenged “total
battlespace dominance” whereby the United States would remain the deterring power,
and never the deterred.46
                                                                                                                                                  
Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, United
States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 193-215
42 Advocates of theater missile defense began pushing for forward deployed advanced Patriot systems in the
immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, see Malcolm Wallop (Member of Senate Armed Services
Committee), ‘’Patriots’ Point the Way’, New York Times, January 31, 1991, Sec. A, p. 23. See also
Treverton and Bennett, ‘Integrating Counterproliferation into Defense Planning’
43 Early naval anti-ballistic missile defense was conceptualized as the Navy Wide Area System – see
Secretary of Defense, William J Perry, ‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’, DoD News Briefing,
Thursday, April 11, 1996
44 Reuters, ‘Boeing Group Wins Contract for Anti-Missile Laser, New York Times, Nov 13, 1996; On the
controversy over cost and potential violations of the ABMT, see William J. Broad, ‘Plan for Airborne Laser
Is Attacked’, New York Times, Sept 30, 1997, sec. F, p. 1
45 Freedman, Deterrence, p. 76
46 The concept of “total battlespace dominance” is articulated in many defense documents that emerged in
the 1990’s. See particularly, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the
Battlefield’, May-July 1996; Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Defense Science Board 1996 Summer
Study Task Force on Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority – Final Report’, October
1996; The White House, ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century’, October 1998; and Joint Chiefs
of Staff, ‘Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 19 October 1999
183
Though not reflecting a threat environment with significantly altered adversarial ballistic
missile capabilities from that faced at the end of the Cold War, significant investment in
active defense capabilities development and deployment reflected a military organization
translating its very natural suspicion of normative barriers to weapons usage into
something approaching a comprehensive new strategy of deterrence. Earlier principles of
mutual restraint were being replaced by the principle of preparing to counter a far greater
range of potential adversarial capabilities in order to ensure American military
dominance into the foreseeable future. This new approach by the DOD indicated a
functional mission plan of overlapping safeguards and redundant systems engineered to
ensure a technological solution to the problem of proliferation, rather than the traditional
reliance on deterrence strategies founded on mutual restraint and the strong norm of non-
use.
Counterforce capabilities
Counterforce capabilities are designed to place high-value adversarial military assets at
risk by enabling the destruction of such capabilities on the ground prior to use.
Counterforce options incorporate both the identification and defeat of unconventional
weapons, delivery systems, and production and storage facilities. As adversarial
unconventional weapons systems and facilities are often hardened and / or deeply buried
for survivability, counterforce capabilities include: the ability to track, identify and
produce timely intelligence on unconventional targets; the ability to strike deep within
adversarial territory with highly precise weaponry; and the ability to mitigate collateral
damage by neutralizing or containing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons after target
destruction. The application of counterforce capabilities can be through so-called standoff
weapons such as cruise missiles or other long distance, precision weaponry, or through
the utilization of special operations forces directly neutralizing threats or providing close-
in actionable intelligence in support of deep strike capabilities.
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Though representing a smaller budgetary allocation than active defenses, throughout the
1990’s counterforce capabilities were highly prioritized by the joint combatant
commands through the CPRC and given significant new funding. 47 Over the period from
1994-1998, counterforce capabilities such as “underground facilities defeat and collateral
effects mitigation” were funded on the order of several hundred million dollars per year,
while special operations capabilities, training exercises and readiness brought in close to
$100 M per year.48 Combined with a number of other operations, training and mission
planning outlays, CP counterforce capabilities received significant budgeting and
doctrinal attention even immediately following the supposed sidelining of CP policy
within the DOD.
The original rationale for counterforce capabilities as articulated in the DCI was to
“devalue” unconventional weapons development and deployment by potential adversaries
by creating the capability to identify and defeat such weapons or weapons programs.
Supposedly, potential adversaries would recognize overwhelming American military
superiority and choose not to waste the significant time and resources in pursuing such
programs that could be easily destroyed by the US military. In practice, such high-
minded assumptions of adversarial acquiescence to American military superiority failed
to generate the intended outcomes. Although American intelligence on the status of likely
adversarial unconventional capabilities and production was incomplete at best, the little
intelligence that did emerge indicated heightened efforts by states like North Korea to
direct more resources toward concealment and facilities hardening.49
Not incidentally, the same counterforce capabilities that were assumed to hold the highest
value in dissuading states from developing unconventional weapons were also the
                                                 
47 For a detailed discussion of initial funding outlays for counterforce capabilities, see Office of the
Secretary of Defense, ‘Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs’, May
1994, DOD OFOISR 00018-CDR-1/752.PDF, see also Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense,
‘Counterproliferation Support Program: FY95 Project Overview’, 10 December 1994, DOD OFOISR
00018-CDR-1/754.PDF
48 See CPRC reports, 1994-1998
49 For a detailed account of North Korean efforts at nuclear weapons development and concealment efforts,
see William M. Drennan, ‘Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?’ in Robert J. Art
and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington DC: The Untied
States Institute of Peace, 2003), pp. 157-223
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capabilities that held the highest military utility for potential “roll back” of adversarial
capabilities. Any credible offensive operations targeting unconventional weapons
facilities or delivery vehicles would require the same combination of actionable
intelligence and powerful precision strike capabilities now receiving extensive annual
funding. Improving offensive capabilities targeted at unconventional weapons would be a
potent doctrinal tool in addressing proliferation threats, but one whose utility might be
perceived as higher were action to be taken preventatively, rather than in response to
adversarial initiation of conflict. For military professionals socialized into a culture
assuming the inevitability of conflict, and valuing the greater predictability of offensive
operations, the development of effective counterforce capabilities would place
counterforce options at the top of any decisions to use force to limit the spread or military
utility of unconventional weapons.50
The funding priorities of active defenses and counterforce capabilities from 1994
onwards marked an important shift in DOD CP policy goals away from direct support for
NP policy through such capabilities as intelligence collection, to those providing
enhanced capabilities for U.S. forces in combat. The ordering of funding priorities for
DOD CP programs that remained remarkably consistent throughout the 1990’s
represented the active involvement of the commanders in chief of the unified commands
(CINC’s) in the process of prioritizing the likely roles and missions their forces would
undertake in future warfare scenarios. The doorway for the offensive application of force
was reopened through the devolution of CP planning from the civilian leadership to the
combat commands. Then the military preference for the overwhelming application of
force, as well as focus on the issues involved in the application of force, rather than the
political ramifications of military force, defined the institutionalization and subsequent
evolution of CP policy within the DOD.
Although CP capabilities were justified as an extension of the stated goal of providing
implicit support for NP regimes by demonstrating unconventional weapons possession or
                                                 
50 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive; and Sagan, ‘The
Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,’ pp. 18-23
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usage by regional powers would not deter U.S. military action, the funding priorities
clearly indicate that whatever support CP policy might provide to nonproliferation policy
was secondary to the organizational necessity to equip and prepare U.S. forces to fight in
conditions anticipated on future battlefields.51
If the core of new CP capabilities held strong offensive potential, did this translate into
corresponding doctrinal or conceptual decisions to support such an offensive
reorientation of CP policy? In other words, if organizational theory would posit that the
embedding of policy planning and development of CP within the functional units of the
military would result in offensive transformation of the policy, can support for such a
proposition be found in the resulting doctrine to emerge from the DOD?
Emergence of an offensive CP Policy from the DOD
A number of CP policy documents from this period remain classified, however, an
important directive on CP implementation, declassified as a result of research efforts for
this thesis, strongly supports the proposition that embedding of planning and
development of CP within the functional units of the military resulted in offensive
transformation of the policy. 52 The document also sheds light on the evolution of CP in
the hands of the military resulting from bottom-up institutionalization.  Issued less than
three years after the formal bureaucratic limitations placed on CP by the Poneman Memo,
the CP Implementation Directive of July 1996 shows important changes in CP’s
relationship to NP, the expansion of the scope of CP responsibilities, and the important
introduction of new offensively oriented military elements to the policy.
                                                 
51 The DOD succinctly justified the funding priorities in the 1996 CPRC report, “Considering the
complexities of facing an adversary armed with WMD, the CPRC places a high priority on proliferation
prevention activities. Realizing, however, that efforts to halt the proliferation of NBC weapons and their
means of delivery may not be entirely successful, DoD must prepare U.S. armed forces to fight, survive,
and prevail in any conflict involving the use of NBC weapons by an adversary.” CPRC 96, p. 2
52 Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP), Department of Defense Directive Number 2060.2, ‘Department of
Defense Counterproliferation (CP) Implementation’, July 9, 1996, personal collection of author; it is
worthwhile to note that even in 1996, the DOD directive refers only to NBC (nuclear, chemical and
biological) weapons, and includes no reference to the term “WMD”.
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Although retaining essential elements of the NSC definition of CP, in the implementation
directive special emphasis is placed on the activities of the DOD, “across the full range of
U.S. Government efforts to COMBAT proliferation, including the application of military
power to protect U.S. Forces and interests” 53 Here the role of combat as commonly
understood in the military is given first priority over the diplomacy, arms control, export
controls, and intelligence collection and analysis roles emphasized by the Poneman
Memo. Special emphasis is placed on DOD efforts to expand beyond mere assistance in
preventing proliferation from occurring, but to “roll back proliferation where it has
occurred.” Though the nature of such roll back operations are not directly elaborated in
the document, in addition to tasking the individual services and regional combat
commands to develop their own CP plans, particular mention is made of authorizing the
U.S. Commander-in-Chief for Special Operations to prepare U.S. special operations
forces to “conduct missions in support of U.S. Government CP objectives.”54
On balance, the directive on CP implementation is largely reflective of the concerns of
warfighting commands in dealing with the effective application of military force against
unconventional weapons targets, and in proactive efforts to combat proliferation with
military force. This document does not concern itself with maintaining conceptual
consistency with existing policy or normative beliefs about appropriate responses to
proliferation. Much of this seems to confirm critics’ fears about the challenge CP would
present to NP norms and practices, with a strong redefinition of CP as a military
alternative to NP focused on the application of military force.55 The concept of “roll
back” harkened back to the early days of the Cold War with preemptive and preventative
thinking as old as nuclear weapons themselves.56 Combined, these factors indicate a drift
of CP policy once in hands of the warfighting commands towards a distinct class of
military action directed at the ability of the DOD to exercise the proactive, potentially
offensive (not to mention preventative or preemptive) application of military force
outside of the multilateral framework of the NP regime.
                                                 
53 Ibid, p. 3
54 Ibid, p. 7
55 Müller and Reiss, ‘Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles’, pp. 139-150; Leonard S.
Spector, ‘Neo-Nonproliferation’, Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85
56 Sagan, ‘Perils of Proliferation’, p. 74
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The following illustration sets out the interlocking levels of the first comprehensive DOD
counterproliferation “policy” as envisioned by DOD planners:
Fig. 1 – The “multi-tiered” DOD counterproliferation plan as presented in the 1995 CRPC report57
This multi-tiered approach should not be interpreted as a prioritization of approaches, or
even ordering of approaches encountered through the course of conflict. Though
presented as a type of timeline of DOD CP capabilities employed in a hypothetical
conflict, there is no reason why any particular stage would, by necessity, follow another.
The necessity of utilizing active defense capabilities in the event of a surprise attack by
unconventionally armed ballistic missiles or cruise missiles could be the trigger for
conflict. Alternately, the decision to use counterforce capabilities such as precision deep-
strike attacks on hard or deeply buried targets could be made preemptively in an effort to
prevent unconventional weapons being used by a potential adversary as the initiator of
conflict, or preventatively outside the context of imminent conflict to forcibly “roll back”
                                                 
57 CPRC 95, p. 5
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emerging adversarial capabilities. Such decisions would not be made by combat
commanders, but rather by policy makers seeking solutions to future strategic dilemmas.
Developing effective capabilities in these areas, or even the perception of effective
capabilities in these areas could dramatically alter the menu of choice for future
policymakers.
The capabilities driven evolution of CP within the DOD served to quietly raise the
potential for significant challenges to the norms and practices of NP policy in a number
of areas. Firstly, the development of a CP doctrine expressed a very public lack of
confidence in the norm of nonproliferation and the enforcement mechanisms of the NP
regime to stop proliferation where it counted most. Though perfectly reasonable from a
pragmatic military planning perspective, the emphasis on active defense and counterforce
capabilities did not support broader US policy statements expressing confidence in the
enforcement mechanisms of the NP regime and US leadership in strengthening the norm
of nonproliferation.58
Secondly, substantial counterforce capability held the potential to shift the mandate for
acting against proliferators from multilateral institutions wielding political and economic
leverage, to the United States government wielding unilateral military force.
Furthermore, in such a scenario the United States would be placed in the position of
choosing which proliferators to counter. Certainly from the US perspective, states like
India raised far fewer proliferation concerns than states like Iraq and North Korea, thus
presenting the United States as unilaterally selecting between good and bad proliferators
contrary to the longstanding non-discriminatory norm of NP. Leveraging active defense
and counterforce capabilities for such purposes would effectively place the United States
in the position long feared by critics of CP as “global judge, jury and executioner” on
unconventional weapons.59
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59 For the best collection of such critiques, see the collected volume in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller
(eds.), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for
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Finally, if the United States actively pursued a preemptive or preventative CP policy of
proliferation “roll back” by means of counterforce capabilities, such actions would run
the substantial risk of military escalation. Once such capabilities were integrated into the
force posture and practices of the US military, decisions on the use of such force would
be in the hands of future policymakers who might be emboldened to take greater risks in
pursuing the goal of roll back.
The significant conclusion to be drawn from this period of policy evolution is that the
institutionalization of CP policy within the functional units of the organization had
resulted in a transformation of the DOD conception of the threat posed by proliferation,
and a transformation in the organizational capacity to meet the threats it had identified.
Though this policy evolution did not in itself guarantee any specific resultant military
actions, the institutionalization of CP into organizational capabilities, threat conceptions,
training and learning processes significantly altered the options available to future
policymakers, and shifted the central emphasis of CP policy. No longer limited to modest
defensive measures intended to protect US forces, CP was now steadily progressing
towards a comprehensive set of operational capabilities intended to allow policymakers
to decisively alter the strategic threat posed by unconventional weapons proliferation. By
ostensibly offering policymakers the potential to unilaterally prevent or roll back existing
proliferation with military force, CP now represented a decisive break from traditional
NP norms and deterrent practices, further opening the door for the preventative or
preemptive application of force.
Conclusions
How does organizational theory serve to offer the best explanation of CP policy evolution
during this period? Again, the most likely alternative approach would be to explain both
the demise and resurgence of CP through the lens of a bureaucratic politics model. As
discussed earlier in the chapter, bureaucratic politics serves as a rather compelling
framework through which to explain the initial resistance and apparent demise of the
DCI, as powerful competing bureaucratic interests constrained the initiative from
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without, while threatened parochial interests constrained the initiative from within. The
lack of skill displayed by then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, in navigating turbulent
bureaucratic waters largely resulted in an initiative at the mercy of the competing
bureaucratic forces intent on constraining or doing away with it.
As for the resurgence of CP within the DOD through the 1990’s, a bureaucratic politics
model would likely explain renewed interest and strength largely through the mechanism
of budgetary incentive. In this explanation, the ability of later Defense officials in
securing funding for areas such as missile defense mitigated constraining parochial
interests within the DOD, while a heightened skill in negotiating compromises on issues
of policy “turf encroachment” with competing bureaucracies accounts for diminished
resistance from outside the DOD. In this bureaucratic politics account, CP serves largely
as a vehicle for increased defense spending, but without any significant challenge to
existing NP policy or the interests associated with the execution of such policy.
Compelling though such an explanation might be on the surface, it presents a number of
dilemmas to the analyst seeking to reconcile the claims of such an explanation with the
documentary evidence available. Firstly, are the numerous policy planning, budgeting
and implementation documents assumed to be part of some elaborate shell game of
disguising limited parochial interests, rather than representative of meaningful
institutionalization? Second, if CP capabilities were only intended to allay parochial
interests, then how to account for the particular capabilities funded and integrated into the
training and operational preparedness of functional units of the military? Also, how to
account for the capabilities development priorities identified by joint regional warfighting
commands, rather than by the individual services themselves? Finally, should it be
assumed that the challenge CP ultimately presented to NP and deterrence was the
accidental by-product of the promotion of parochial interests through broad-based
defense spending, rather than representative of serious attempts to prepare US military
forces to face organizationally identified strategic threats?
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An organizational theory perspective with a focus on culturally derived biases,
preferences and practices, allows a connection to be made between the documentary
evidence and the broader process of policy institutionalization revealed by significant
investments in new capabilities, practices and conceptions. Institutionalization was
important in changing organizational practices and capabilities, but also in accounting for
why such efforts proved successful. Such efforts escaped external resistance because they
did not present immediate public challenges to other bureaucracies, but turned quietly
inward, leveraging the decisionmaking structure of the functional units of the
organization itself to promote shaping and adoption of the initiative. This bottom-up
approach, focused on the needs of warfighters, also drove significant capabilities
development and changes to organizational practices like training and force posturing
that both altered the menu of choice for future policymakers, but also presented
unintended normative challenges to NP and deterrence.
The institutionalization of doctrine does not occur as an automatic rational response by
the organization to external stimuli, but rather as the result of ideas operationalized by
organizational leaders. However, as the response to the DCI demonstrates, the
transformation of ideas to doctrine is not a function of the will of organizational leaders,
but rather of the skill of organizational leaders in tailoring ideas to fit within the structure,
culture and political interests of the organization. Doctrine can be imposed on military
organizations, but institutionalization is unlikely to occur unless doctrine compliments
existing organizational preferences and significant organizational members perceive the
doctrine to reduce political and environmental uncertainty. If a new doctrine fulfils these
conditions, then absent strong civilian influence to the contrary, it will likely displace
existing normative practices that are not perceived to fulfill these conditions.
The institutionalization of CP required far more than the announcement of policy
objectives, and the acceptance of those objectives by functional units of the organization.
The strategy-doctrine cycle by its very nature, and especially high tech capabilities
development or employment, leads to delayed institutionalization of doctrine to match
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strategic conceptions. 60 Even attempting to assimilate a new piece of high tech equipment
“off the shelf” often leads to long organizational delays between decision and
deployment, as such adoption involves coordination with force posturing plans, training,
logistical support and any number of other complex issues which routinely set time
delays on capabilities adoption.61 In the case of CP, acknowledgement in the directive
that CP would be “established as a mainstream DOD mission area” by 2001, presented
both a realistic time-frame for institutionalization, and also raised the issue that an
initiative well on its way to implementation would be difficult for civilian policymakers
to stop without strong cause and the expenditure of considerable political capital.
The following chapter will examine the political conditions and strategic cultural debates
that resulted in weak civilian control of the military in restraining its tendency to develop
an offensive CP doctrine. The security discourse in the US Congress will be of particular
interest, as it was such process of sustained argumentation and political communications
that conferred a broad legitimacy on CP conceptions emerging from the DOD, ultimately
elevating them from military contingency plans to national policy.
                                                 
60 Chris C. Demchak, ‘Complexity and a Midrange Theory of Networked Militaries’, In Theo Farrell and
Terry Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, (New York: Lynne
Rienner Publisher, 2002), p. 128
61 Interview with Ronald M. Sega, July 10, 2005
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Chapter 5
Strategic Culture: 1993-99
“Intellectual tendencies, like broad social movements, are often made possible by the
existence of a common enemy.”
- James Q. Wilson1
The Clinton Administration arrived in office clearly voicing its support of the
nonproliferation regime, and indicating an unprecedented willingness to position America
as a global leader in the promotion of NP norms. From the stated goal of supporting an
indefinite extension of the NPT to a desire to take a leadership role in pressing for
ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Administration’s response to
proliferation threats was founded on a policy supportive of global nonproliferation norms
exercised through multilateral institutions. Even the announcement of the Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative was followed by reassurances to international critics that
the initiative was intended only to provide protection to US forces on the battlefield, and
was a secondary supporting measure to a broader diplomatic, political and economic
based nonproliferation policy.
Yet by 1999, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had failed to garner sufficient votes in
the Senate for ratification, sinking hopes for further expansion of global nonproliferation
norms and raising suspicions that the United States was preparing to contradict its NPT
agreements by developing new classes of nuclear weapons. In a further setback for
supporters of NP norms, the Clinton Administration affected a turnaround in its long held
support for the ABM Treaty by signing into law the 1999 National Missile Defense Act.
In six short years, the Clinton Administration had borne witness to a dramatic expansion
of counterproliferation capabilities, especially in the controversial areas of active
                                                 
1 Forward comments by James Q. Wilson, in Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson (eds.), The Essential
Neoconservative Reader, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), p. x
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defenses and counterforce capabilities, while a concurrent erosion of nonproliferation
norms and multilateral institutions had taken place.
Why did attitudes towards proliferation threats and policy responses shift so dramatically
during this time period? This chapter argues that a crucial determinate of policy outcomes
were conservative strategic culture assumptions and preferences informed by
neoconservative strategic thought and empowered by a highly coordinated and focused
Republican Party machinery of policy promotion. Conservatives in power were highly
effective at promoting their strategic culture preferences, forcing compromises from an
Administration struggling to defend its domestic agenda. When later proliferation events
occurred, such as the testing of North Korean ballistic missiles over Japan, and the
nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, ‘solutions’ were already in place for the strategic
problems that presented themselves in dramatic public fashion, further weakening
opposition to conservative strategic cultural policy preferences. By the end of 1999, the
political defeats and compromises made by the Clinton Administration left
counterproliferation considerably strengthened in both material capability and policy
prominence, while nonproliferation norms and practices were significantly weakened.
This chapter examines the discursive currency of proliferation threats in the form of
“WMD” and “rogue regimes” that was effectively adopted by a Republican Party seeking
to establish a cohesive party platform before the 1994 mid-term elections. The
transformation of political conceptions of the threats posed by proliferation had begun
with an uncoordinated, nonpartisan series of efforts to achieve short-term political
leverage. They continued under the Clinton Administration with a series of highly
coordinated, partisan efforts to achieve long-term political advantage in order to
transform conservative strategic culture assumptions and preferences into policy
outcomes. This newly reformulated Party platform constituted a strong challenge to the
bearers of liberal strategic culture for establishing ‘legitimate’ interpretations of the
international security environment and maintaining ‘valid’ forms of discourse on policy
responses to strategic threats. Such highly limiting construction of discursive space
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presented a fundamental challenge for legitimate representation of American foreign
policy approaches to the problem of proliferation.
Liberal strategic culture during the Clinton Administration
Bill Clinton was elected President with not only an uncertain political mandate, but also
little in the way of a honeymoon period for his Administration. Although Clinton
comfortably defeated incumbent George Bush, an unusually strong showing by third
party candidate Ross Perot with 19% of the popular vote left Clinton winning with only
43%. Exit polls showed that although there was strong dissatisfaction with President
Bush, there was also a lack of voter confidence in the other candidates, including
Clinton.2 Even more politically troubling was that long before the election, Clinton had
engendered a more ferocious and personal level of political attacks than was traditional in
American politics.3 Once in office, a series of early turnarounds on campaign issues and
administration nominations underscored the uncertain mandate that brought him to
victory, but more importantly, gave the impression to a more cohesively activist
Republican Party that the Administration might fold on issues when met with stiff
resistance.4 This perception would lead to a troubling number of political stalemates, and
ultimately to a number of significant policy compromises made by an administration
seeking to keep key policies from its domestic agenda alive.
The Clinton Administration’s initial approach to foreign policy focused on a liberal
internationalism that posited ‘democratic enlargement’ for a goal and ‘assertive
multilateralism’ as a successor to the Cold War strategy of containment.5 The nascent
                                                 
2 Robin Toner, ‘The 1992 Elections: President – The Overview; Clinton Captures Presidency With Huge
Electoral Margin; Wins a Democratic Congress’, New York Times, November 4, 1992, sec. A, p. 1; see also
R.W. Apple, ‘The 1992 Elections: President-Elect – The Overview; Clinton, Savoring Victory, Starts
Sizing Up Job Ahead’, New York Times, November 5, 1992, sec. A, p. 1
3 For an insightful analysis of the domestic political and cultural factors that coalesced to form an unusually
strong, widespread and personal antipathy from conservatives against Clinton and his wife, see David
Halberstam, War in a time of peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2001), pp.
209-211
4 Ibid, p. 211
5 James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process, (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wasdworth,
2005), p. 186
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strategy, with its emphasis on economic engagement, envisioned an international security
environment potentially much less prone to conflict, assumed variable-sum relations as
the norm, and imagined a reduced centrality of military force in addressing threats.6 The
strong emphasis placed on economic engagement led to an unexpected amount of early
political capital being expended on keystone policy priorities such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the negotiation and approval of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.7
The Clinton Administration’s initial approach to nonproliferation and
counterproliferation policy also reflected liberal strategic cultural assumptions about the
nature of the international security environment and preferences regarding appropriate
policy instruments and approaches to address potential security threats. Many of these
assumptions and preferences, particularly in the area of proliferation concerns, were
continuations of longstanding U.S. policy that placed a strong emphasis on support for
the NP regime and NP norms, yet with liberal strategic culture assumptions even more
explicitly stated in policy documents than in previous administrations. 8 How such
strategic culture assumptions were translated into policy preferences can be illustrated
through a brief examination of the administration’s early documents and public
statements on nonproliferation policy, ballistic missile defenses, the 1995 extension of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and efforts to establish a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Nonproliferation Policy
The earliest Clinton Administration document detailing U.S. nonproliferation policy
advocated continued reliance on export control strategies and measures intended to
                                                 
6 Facing strong domestic political resistance and a complex series of international crises and conflicts, the
approach was quickly abandoned in favor of ‘selective engagement’ that sought to use limited American
military force to alleviate international humanitarian crises and address ethnic conflict. See Richard N.
Haass, ‘The Squandered Presidency: Demanding More from the Commander in Chief, Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2000
7 McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process, pp. 182-184
8 For more on the institutionalization of such policy approaches prior to the Clinton Administration, see
Emanuel Adler, ‘Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security: A Thirty-Year Retrospective and a
New Set of Anticipations’, Daedalus 120, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 1-20
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bolster the legitimacy of nonproliferation norms. 9 Central emphasis was placed on
confidence-building measures to encourage restraint at the regional level, and the
strengthening of existing NP regime enforcement mechanisms such as IAEA safeguards
and inspections. The document called for US leadership in ratifying the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) despite domestic conservative opposition that such a role
would not require other nations (primarily Russia) to first abandon their chemical
weapons programs before US ratification.10 The document reveals an NP policy position
that reflected an Administration with no desire to challenge the institutionalization of
Cold War arms control mechanisms, and overwhelmingly accepting of the concept of
mutually engendered restraint through support for multilateral institutions and negotiated
normative agreements.
Supporting this institutional, norm-based approach to nonproliferation was a minimized
military role in supporting nonproliferation policy that predicted the eventual NSC
resolution of the counterproliferation definition controversy in the Poneman Memo.11
Despite the publicity given to the later unveiling of the Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative (DCI), administration thinking at this point clearly envisioned military force as
a minor subservient support to existing NP policy, rather than a competing set of
militarily oriented policy options.12 Finally, the document attempted to integrate NP
policy with the larger administration strategy of economic engagement, ‘To strengthen
U.S. economic growth, democratization abroad and international stability, we actively
seek expanded trade and technology exchange with nations, including former adversaries,
that abide by global nonproliferation norms.’13
                                                 
9 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control
Policy’, September 27, 1993, NSArchives PR01804
10 This particular issue was an early point of contention with conservatives opposed to the Clinton
Administration’s nonproliferation policy, though one that was eventually passed by U.S. Senate in 1997.
Interview with Frank Gaffney, President, Center for Security Policy and founding member of the Project
for the New American Century, (former Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy 1988-89), July 7, 2005.
See also, Center for Security Policy Congressional Scorecards:
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Home.aspx?SID=56&CategoryID=56&SubCategoryID=88&NewsI
D=11576, (Accessed July 10, 2005)
11 See previous chapter
12 The White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy’, September 27, 1993
13 Ibid.
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Ballistic Missile Defenses
The Clinton Administration was eager to give limited support to theater missile defenses
(TMD); battlefield defenses against medium-range weapons such as the Iraqi SCUD
missiles faced by the United States in the Gulf War. However, the Administration was
also clearly dedicated to what it saw as the leadership role of the US in promoting and
defending NP norms, confidence-building measures and mutual restraint. Hence, a
position emerged in which TMD would eventually be fielded, but the technology
required for national missile defense (NMD) was given a distant second priority14, and
maintained “as a technology research and development program” so as to adhere to the
traditional, or ‘narrow’, interpretation of the ABM Treaty.15 Such a ‘narrow’ definition of
the ABM Treaty was intended to work as a confidence-building measure in support of
U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations by precluding either party from developing
effective defenses against the type of long-range ballistic missiles both states had
developed as the backbone for mutual deterrence.16 Furthermore, the administration
sought to expand its self-identified leadership role in promoting NP norms by attempting
to ‘multilateralize’ the ABM Treaty by giving former Soviet states the option to become
parties to the treaty.17
                                                 
14 Such ‘TMD first’ priority was set forth in the1993 Bottom-Up Review under Les Aspin. See also, Russ
Shaver, ‘Priorities For Ballistic Missile Defense’, in Paul K. Davis (ed.), New Challenges For Defense
Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), pp. 251-300
15 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-17, ‘U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses
and the Future of the ABM Treaty’, December 11, 1993, NSArchives PR01805
16 The ABM Treaty had allowed for the US and Russia to establish one ballistic missile defense site with a
maximum of 100 interceptors. The interception limits argued by Clinton Administration officials seeking to
clarify the ABM Treaty were on missiles with a maximum range of 3,500km and reentry speeds of
5km/sec, compared with long-range ballistic missiles with ranges of approximately 10,000km and reentry
speeds of 7km/sec. See Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Thoedore A. Postol, and David Wright,
‘Highly Capable Theater Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty’, Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 3,
(April, 1994), pp. 3-8; see also Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National
Security, (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1990); Dean Wilkening, ‘Amending the ABM
Treaty’, Survival, Vol. 42, No, 1, (January 2000), pp. 29-45; and John Deutch, Harold Brown and John P.
White, ‘National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?’, Foreign Policy, No. 119, (Summer 2000), pp.
91-100
17 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control
Policy’, September 27, 1993, NSArchives PR01804; see also, William J. Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, ‘Joint
Statement on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security’, Public Papers of the Presidents, September 29,
1994, p. 1660
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Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference
Most explicit in supporting a liberal strategic culture position on proliferation issues was
the Clinton Administration’s stated intention to support indefinite extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995.18 Despite the continued proliferation problems
presented by North Korea and Iraq, the Clinton Administration remained committed to a
relatively traditional nonproliferation policy approach that focused on strengthening the
enforcement mechanisms of the NP regime, and placed continuing emphasis on NP norm
promotion and leadership. CP was seen as a public demonstration of focus on the threats
posed by the proliferation of unconventional weapons, but largely a symbolic one that
initially allowed for little more than military force protection measures in a poorly
defined (and bureaucratically contested) NP policy support role.
To underline the importance of multilateral cooperation as the best approach to the
problem of proliferation, the Clinton Administration strove to publicly downplay the
importance of counterproliferation, and voice public support for the NPT and
nonproliferation regime in advance of the 1995 NPT extension conference. In a 1995
article in the Nonproliferation Review, assistant to President Clinton for National
Security Affairs, Anthony Lake, clearly and emphatically laid out the administration’s
support for the institutional framework of the NPT when he claimed that, “…the NPT is
not only the cornerstone of our strategy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation but also
the foundation of our efforts to prevent proliferation of all other weapons of mass
destruction. Remove it and the architecture collapses.”19 In further distancing the
administration from charges that the Administration had sought to unilaterally undermine
the NPT through the establishment counterproliferation20, Lake concluded that, “…we
                                                 
18 William J. Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, ‘Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery’, Public Papers of the Presidents, January 14, 1994, pp. 71-73
19 Anthony Lake, ‘A Year of Decision: arms control and nonproliferation in 1995’, The
Nonproliferation Review, (Winter, 1995), p. 58
20 For academic criticism of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, see Leonard S. Spector, ‘Neo-
Nonproliferation’, Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85, and Harald Müller and Mitchell
Reiss, ‘Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Weapons
Proliferation in the 1990’s, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 139-150; David Fischer, ‘Forcible
Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (ed.), International
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can work to create a world where nations depend on commitments – to each other and to
their own people – no less than on arms.”21
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Central to successful negotiation of the indefinite extension of the NPT, was ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Continuing its leadership in promoting
the norms of the NP regime, the Clinton Administration dropped the long-standing U.S.
position that the CTBT must include an automatic escape clause permitting states to
withdraw from the treaty after 10 years. Despite the arguments made by Pentagon
officials and Republican lawmakers that such a clause was necessary to ensure the
reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, the administration accepted the possibility of a
permanent CTBT because, “senior decision-makers became convinced that the U.S.
position was considered illegitimate by non-nuclear NPT members, due to the Article IV
commitment to eventual disarmament, and might thereby jeopardize the effort to
negotiate a permanent extension of the NPT treaty.”22
The Administration sought to clearly link the issue of leadership on NP norms and the
legitimacy of NP enforcement mechanisms in public statements, such as one made by
President Clinton to West Point graduates in 1993, ‘We will soon begin negotiations on a
comprehensive test ban treaty which will increase our political leverage to combat this
                                                                                                                                                  
Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), p. 21;
and Benjamin Sanders, ‘Counterproliferation: How Does it Play on the International Stage?’, in Mitchell
Reiss and Harald Muller (ed.), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 1-10. Such strong initial resistance promoted Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Ashton B. Carter to state, “Let me also be clear that
our counterproliferation capabilities are being devised for winning MRC’s (Major Regional
Contingencies), not for pre-emptive attack on proliferators, as some academics have speculated.” See
Ashton B. Carter, ‘Counterproliferation Initiative: Managing Three Crises’, Defense Issues, Vol. 11, No. 63
(June, 1996), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1996/s19960523-carter.html (Accessed - 15 July, 2003)
21 Anthony Lake, ‘A Year of Decision’, p. 59
22 Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’,
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Winter, 1996-1997), p. 80. See also, Douglas Jehl, ‘U.S. in New
Pledge on Atom Bomb Test Ban’, New York Times, January 31, 1995, p. 1; Dunbar Lockwood, ‘U.S. Drops
‘Early Out’ Plan; Test Moratorium May Be Permanent,’ Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2, (March
1995), p. 27
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proliferation.’23 Two years later, Clinton sought to move from rhetoric on NP norm
leadership to action, moving to end deadlock in CTBT negotiations by becoming the first
U.S. president to call for a total ban on U.S. nuclear weapons testing of all sizes before a
CTBT entered into force.24
Unfortunately for the Clinton Administration, not all high level policy makers and
influential commentators agreed that leadership in promoting NP norms was the
appropriate pathway to addressing proliferation threats. Many opposition figures began to
argue that some of the supposed norms central to the legitimacy of the NP regime were in
fact little more than Cold War constructs that had not merely lost their relevance in the
post-Cold War security environment, but actually served to undermine US national
security. Thus the Administration experienced a strong resistance in some quarters to its
positions supporting traditional NP policy.
The Clinton Administration’s strategic culture derived preferences for proliferation
policy were very clear from the outset, but its policies in support of such preferences
were ultimately short lived. The administration faced strong opposition from the
emergence of a politically cohesive strategic culture force in the Republican Party, a
group that would challenge not merely individual policy prescriptions, but the underlying
assumptions that drove policy preferences as well. This opposition would serve to force
policy compromises, hand the Administration stinging policy defeats, and by directly
manipulating organizational oversight in the form of budgets, weaken the
Administration’s control over future military capabilities. Driven first by intellectuals
grappling with a conservative position that could serve to generate strategic preferences
in the absence of a major adversary, the movement would serve to inform policy makers
brought into power by a revitalized and highly organized Republican Party. Republicans
would arrive into power with an unprecedented understanding of the importance of
                                                 
23 William J. Clinton, ‘Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in West
Point, New York’, Public Papers of the Presidents, May 29, 1993, p. 782
24 Steven Greenhouse, ‘President Urges a Permanent Ban on All Atom Tests’, New York Times, August 12,
1995, sec. 1, p. 1
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language in shaping the terms of the discourse, and a newfound appreciation for the
centrality of ideas and culture in both identifying threats and generating policy responses.
Before examining in detail the conservative legislative challenges to Clinton
Administration nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy, some ideational and
cultural background for the conservative movement at the time will need to be examined.
Conservative strategic culture, its assumptions and subsequent policy preferences did not
arise in a vacuum. The following section argues for the relevance of neoconservatives not
simply because they represent the extreme end of conservative strategic culture, but more
importantly because they played an important role in informing and influencing the
broader conservative movement through their philosophical emphasis on culture and
general ideological determinism. It is these sets of assumptions about the international
security environment and the utility of force that helped the larger conservative
movement navigate a post-Cold War strategic culture between a conservative realism
robbed of its relevance by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a conservative
isolationism bereft of an ability to provide meaningful alternatives to a conception of the
purpose of American power as provided by liberal activist foreign policy. Into the
vacuum of orienting ideas and assumptions about the nature of the post-Cold War
security environment stepped the neoconservatives, revitalizing a conservative movement
grappling with a paralyzing dissatisfaction and loss of faith in established organizing
principles.
Neoconservatism
“American foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the
understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost
always in harmony.”
- Robert Kagan25
Although the direct influence of neoconservatives on US FP has been generally
overstated26, neoconservative arguments have undoubtedly informed and at times
                                                 
25 Robert Kagan, ‘Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996
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supported those made by high-level policy makers. The relevance of neoconservatism
was not necessarily in its direct impact in determining policy outcomes, but rather on
how its concepts and proponents informed the terms of debate for a certain section of
conservative, high-level policy makers at the extreme end of a conservative strategic
culture. 27 Examining the boundaries of strategic culture as imagined by this group
exposes an alternative conception of the international security environment and
America’s place within that environment. Neoconservatives presented a set of foreign
policy conceptions at odds with those held by the leading policy makers of the Clinton
Administration and many Democratic legislators, and also articulated the outer limits of a
conservative vision of American foreign policy as advocated by many Republican
lawmakers and future Bush Administration policy makers. Though all Republicans were
certainly not neoconservatives, there was ultimately far more overlap and cross-
pollination of ideas between neoconservatives and the broader conservative movement
than fundamental divergence and philosophical opposition.
This section will examine an alternate conception of identity, responsibility and power
that generates assumptions about the international security environment and the use of
force that in turn generates preferences about policy responses. These self-supporting
preference sets have implications for civilian control of military organizations that can
strongly impact the development of military capabilities and hence the organizational
policy options created by the development of such capabilities. Furthermore, the degree
of civilian direction over the development of military doctrine strongly impacts the
subsequent understanding of a military organization’s ‘mission’, and leads to policy
                                                                                                                                                  
26 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); see also Joshua Muravchik, ‘The Neoconservative
Cabal’, Commentary, September 2003, pp. 26-34
27 An excellent history of the development of neoconservative thought is Mark Gerson, The
Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars, (New York, NY: Madison, 1996). For
neoconservatives in their own words, see Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson (eds.), The Essential
Neoconservative Reader, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), and Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism:
Autobiography of an Idea, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); An important journalistic account of
some prominent neoconservatives in power (and their policy differences with other conservatives) can be
found in James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, (New York, NY: Penguin
Group, 2004).
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options that may deviate from existing normative practices through the pursuit of
organizational efficiency and uncertainty avoidance.
Neoconservative history and identity
The neoconservatives began as a small group of liberal intellectuals who later, through
their disenchantment with the American Left, adopted many positions on foreign and
domestic issues that were traditionally identified with conservatives.28 The label
‘neoconservative’ was not one of their own making, but one placed on them by their
liberal critics in the 60’s and 70’s. The label itself was initially rather misleading, as most
‘neoconservatives’ would have preferred the term liberals, had the label not been. in their
view, thoroughly co-opted and distorted by the American left’s accepting stance towards
Communism and neglect of traditional Judeo-Christian morality from discussions of the
common good.29
Many later neoconservatives would come to argue that, although a neoconservative credo
was difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively articulate, there are a number of
philosophical assumptions that nonetheless roughly unite its adherents. Neoconservative
thought springs in large part from a Judeo-Christian morality, with the identification of
both social order and personal liberty as flowing from the ‘politics of liberty and the
sociology of virtue.’30 Such a ‘sociology of virtue’, alternately known as the ‘republican
virtue tradition’, is an intellectual tradition dating back to the colonial origins of the
United States. It stresses that “political liberty requires the moral foundation of a virtuous
citizenry; that political virtue includes both the capacity for association and an active
concern for the common good; and that these virtues are, in turn, nurtured by
                                                 
28 Such as their general support of free market capitalism, opposition to affirmative action and views on the
importance of religious morality for ensuring social order. The claim that neoconservatives are or were
largely comprised of Jewish-American former Trotskyites has been refuted by a number of leading
neoconservatives who state that the only significant neoconservative to ever embrace Trotskyism was
Irving Kristol, albeit during his student years in the late 1930’s. See Muravchik, ‘The Neoconservative
Cabal’, p. 28
29 Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision, pp. 8, 9
30 William Kristol, ‘The Politics of Liberty, the Sociology of Virtue’, in Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson
(eds.), The Essential Neoconservative Reader, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), pp. 434-443
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participation in a free community.”31 Furthermore, as neoconservative commentator
James Q. Wilson stated, “…perhaps most important of all, neoconservatives embrace the
American conviction that many of the central problems of our society arise out of a want
of good character and human virtue.”32
This emphasis on the moderation of individual interests by an appeal to the greater good
by neoconservatives is intertwined with a cautious view of man as inherently imperfect
and capable of evil. Neoconservatives maintain deep skepticism of liberal assumptions
about the inherent good of man, and argue that such thinking can lead to an unwise
excess of tolerance, a weakness that ultimately blinds liberals to the cynical motivations
of domestic or foreign enemies who would seek to undermine or corrupt the social order.
Such a view was strongly influenced by the ‘Christian realism’ of Reinhold Niebuhr,
whose famous aphorism from The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness
perfectly captured the neoconservative conception of the potential mediating force of
political virtue on the nature of man, ‘Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy
possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.’33
It was this conception of the interrelationship between liberty and virtue, as much as their
personal experiences that led to vehemently anti-Communist and anti-Soviet positions
during the Cold War. The philosophical and political assumptions of neoconservatives
led to a form of ideological determinism concerning the motives of states – one that
placed the United States and the Soviet Union in their view on an unavoidable collision
course due to their inherently opposed identities as a democracy and authoritarian regime
respectively. Soviet political and military policies were interpreted not as the actions of a
‘normal’ state, but rather of an irrepressibly revolutionary and expansionist state akin to
                                                 
31 Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision, p. 9
32 Forward comments by James Q. Wilson, in Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson (eds.), The Essential
Neoconservative Reader, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), p. ix
33 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, (New York, NY: Scribner,
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Germany under Hitler.34 Neoconservatives aligned themselves in vehement opposition to
the policy of détente35 and ‘the correlative delusions of arms control’, identifying them as
both moral and political mistakes of the highest order.36
This ideological determinism espoused by its proponents utilized the unambiguous
language of moral certitude in an attempt to reshape the focus of the Ford
Administration’s foreign policy at the 1976 Republican National Convention. A
“Morality in Foreign Policy” plank was introduced to the Republican Party platform,
much to the consternation of more moderate conservatives such as Ford and Kissinger.37
As ideological determinists, neoconservatives placed a premium on the defense of
democratic discourse and ideas, as much as on democratic institutions and public virtue.
As ideology was the independent variable driving divisions or alliances abroad, ideas also
were central to the defense of social order at home. Neoconservatives clearly realized the
importance of working to control the terms of domestic discourse, as articulated by
neoconservative scholar Mark Gerson,
Words have meaning. Words signify ideas, and ideas determine reality. A
democratic society must not allow the key signifiers of its civil religion – words
like democracy, freedom, liberty, virtue – to be misappropriated. Those who want
to drastically change a society will often do so by expropriating its language; this
possibility must be watched vigilantly at all times.38
Neoconservative strategic culture
In a strict sense, there is no such thing as a fully defined neoconservative foreign policy,
but rather in the words of the ‘godfather’ of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, ‘a set of
attitudes derived from historical experience.’39 Still, a number of these attitudes can be
identified and illuminate the assumptions central to neoconservative strategic culture.
Though such assumptions are an incomplete guide to determining neoconservative
                                                 
34 Norman Podhoretz, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, Commentary, (March 1996), p. 22
35 Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 235-238
36 Podheretz, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, p. 22
37 For a discussion of this intra-Party platform challenge, see Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 72-79
38 Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision, p. 19
39 Irving Kristol, ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’, The Weekly Standard, vol. 8, no. 47 (August 25, 2003)
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positions on the range of complex foreign policy dilemmas faced by the United States
during the 1990’s, they do serve particularly well in determining neoconservative policy
preferences in situations concerning U.S. relations with authoritarian adversaries. Thus,
they function as a rough guide for understanding neoconservative beliefs about the nature
of the international security environment, the zero-sum nature of U.S. relations with
authoritarian regimes, and general neoconservative bias regarding the efficacy of the use
of military force in addressing security threats.
As previously stated, the ideological determinism of neoconservatives plays a central role
in conditioning assumptions about the nature of the international security environment.
This ideological determinism shaped a neoconservative focus on liberal democracy vs.
authoritarian regimes as the defining divide in the modern world. For neocons as long as
authoritarian regimes exist, conflict is inevitable in the international system. This is not to
say that neoconservatives assume non-democratic actors to be the source of all conflict,
merely that these actors are bound by their nature to seek military advantage against less
powerful neighbors and weak willed global powers. This assumption, strongly
conditioned by the experience of WWII and interpretation of Soviet behavior during the
Cold War, provides not only a guide for predicting where conflict will arise, but also for
determining the proper orientation of U.S. foreign policy as a whole. As Irving Kristol
claimed,
Large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear
and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to
more material concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the United States will
always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from
nondemocratic forces, external or internal... No complicated geopolitical
calculations of national interest are necessary.40
From this central ideological assumption, it follows for neoconservatives that while the
nature of relations between the Untied States and its democratic allies can be at best
positive or at worst ambiguous, the nature of relations between the United States and its
non-democratic adversaries is clearly zero-sum. Gains by authoritarian and totalitarian
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regimes automatically undermine U.S. national security interests. This also leads
neoconservatives to view non-material variables such as U.S. ‘resolve’ or ‘will’ as a key
determinate of the outcome of zero-sum relations with authoritarian adversaries. The
willingness of authoritarian actors to seek advantage or to give expression to their
inherent aggression and savagery is a matter of capacity. Limiting that capacity is largely
a matter of American willingness to meet force with force. Any perceptions of American
weakness, ‘emboldens enemies’.41
Unsurprisingly, assumptions like these lead neoconservatives to view the exercise of hard
power as uniquely effective in addressing identified threats, ‘the belief that military
strength is irreplaceable and that pacifism is folly.’ 42 The willingness to flex military
muscle is valuable not simply for its immediate physical impact, but as importantly for
the message it sends about American resolve. In the neocon view, advances by enemies,
whether by terrorist organizations, the USSR or revolutionary Iran, have been the direct
result of perceived declines in American power or American willingness to utilize its
overwhelming military might. Hard power is supreme, and bad policies rather than
historical forces cause declines in American power – a view certainly at odds with liberal
strategic culture that focuses on the moderating influence of institutions, the necessity of
restraints on power and the centrality of ‘soft power’.
Neocons and ‘Rogue’ states
Neoconsevatives as a group were no more likely than any others to have ready collective
answers to many of the thorny post-Cold War security issues such as ethnic conflict in
the Balkans, or tribal conflagrations in Africa.43 Many of the post-Cold War sources of
conflict did not respond well to the clear philosophical formulations that had provided
                                                 
41 Norman Podhoretz, ‘World War IV: How it Started, What it Means, and Why We Have to Win’,
Commentary, September 2004, pp. 23, 24
42 Muravchik, ‘The Neoconservative Cabal’, p. 33
43 In the words of Norman Podheretz circa 1996, “Once upon a time, I could foresee with reasonable
assurance where any neoconservative would stand on almost any serious issue in world affairs. Today I am
hard put to predict where even some of my closest friends will come out when a contentious issue like
Bosnia arises…” Podheretz, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, p. 24
210
them with an unwavering roadmap during their anti-Communist struggles of the Cold
War. They did, however, have a ready policy response for situations involving
adversaries who appeared to them ideologically similar to the familiar enemy that was the
Soviet Union – non-democratic regimes bucking the status quo on proliferation such as
North Korea and Iraq. Here were adversaries clearly defined by their identity, their
motivations seemingly as immutable to neoconservatives as had been the fascist regimes
of World War II, or the Communist dictatorships of the Cold War. In the eyes of
neoconservatives, totalitarian regimes in ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea and Iraq
were the clear heirs to the international mantle of Neihbur’s ‘children of darkness’. Any
attempt to treat them as rational, economically motivated actors responsive to incentive
or negotiation was an invitation to disaster. The post-Gulf War revelations of Iraqi
deception of the international community regarding its unconventional weapons
programs came as no surprise to the neoconservatives, nor did the continuing pattern of
brinksmanship and nuclear crisis by North Korea. Rather they were expected patterns of
deception by which illiberal regimes would always play on the naïveté and hesitancy of
the liberal international community for their own nefarious ends.
In terms of translating strategic culture assumptions into ranked preferences for policy,
the formulation for such rogue regimes was relatively straightforward. The
neoconservative policy recommendations for dealing with North Korea were neatly
encapsulated by Nicholas Eberstadt in the neoconservative policy advocacy group, The
Project For the New American Century’s book Present Dangers:
The quintessence of Pyongyang’s foreign policy – its enthusiastically
confrontational, usually ferocious, and at times plainly savage posture towards its
many designated enemies abroad – had placed North Korea in more-or-less
permanent conflict with what is now called “the international community.”… The
longer the DPRK as we know it manages to survive, the greater its peril to the
international community will likely be. In the final analysis, prolonging the tenure
of this regime will not – indeed, cannot – serve the interests of the United States
and her allies.44
                                                 
44 Nicholas Eberstadt, ‘North Korea: Beyond Appeasement’, in Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds.)
Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, (San Francisco:
Encounter Books, 2000), pp. 145, 174
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On Iraq the policy preference for neoconservatives was even more clearly spelled out:
Saddam Hussein must go. This imperative may seem too simple for some experts
and too daunting for the Clinton Administration. But if the United States is
committed, as the President said in his State of the Union Message, to insuring
that the Iraqi leader never again uses weapons of mass destruction, the only way
to achieve that goal is to remove Mr. Hussein and his regime from power. Any
policy short of that will fail… It is clear that Mr. Hussein wants his weapons of
mass destruction more than he wants oil revenue or relief for hungry Iraqi
children.45
This opposition based largely on the perceived determinism stemming from adversarial
state identity became a particularly important view when coupled with the issue of
proliferation of unconventional weapons. In this combination, there was little need to
parse state motivation for acquiring unconventional weapons capabilities, no requirement
to come to terms with the historical and sociological particulars of a totalitarian adversary
like North Korea. While it was one thing for liberals to debate the implications of the
unique North Korean “juche” (self-reliance) philosophy and the potential long term
strategic maneuvering underlying North Korean calls for bilateral over multilateral
negotiations, neoconservatives argued that none of these debates took seriously the
implications of North Korean identity as a totalitarian regime. It was this identity that
would inevitably drive them towards violent, adventurist conflict when it felt conditions
were favorable.46 Most importantly, nothing had the potential to bring this sense of
advantage in the minds of North Koreans like the possession of unconventional weapons.
In the neoconservative formulation, the combination of WMD’s and totalitarian regimes
                                                 
45 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, ‘Bombing Iraq Isn’t Enough’, New York Times, January 30, 1998.
Such sentiments had been recently made by the group in an open letter to President Clinton, part of which
read, “The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or
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regime from power.” See, Project for the New American Century, ‘Letter to President Clinton’, January 26,
1998, http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm, (Accessed August 7, 2007)
46 For further arguments on “unstable actors” with “unlimited ambitions”, see Robert G. Joseph, ‘WMD: A
Proliferation Overview’, in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction:
New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p.
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would bring other nations to ruin. Assuming otherwise was at best wishful thinking and
at worst moral and political self-delusion that imperiled the lives of millions.
Summarizing a common neoconservative understanding of the rationale for
unconventional weapons acquisition, “they want these weapons to threaten or strike
ancestral enemies, or to make war more efficiently, or to hold at bay their victim’s
potential rescuers.”47
The ‘death’ of Neoconservatism
By the mid-1990’s, neoconservatism was seen as being subsumed as a distinct cultural
and intellectual force, losing much of its purpose and distinctiveness within the larger
conservative movement after the end of the Cold War.48 Neoconservative thought, though
perhaps issued a premature death certificate by its father figures, nonetheless ultimately
helped illuminate a path for the conservative movement between a traditional
isolationism that was left wanting for its lack of a vision for the uses of American power,
and a non-ideational realism that lacked a sense of moral purpose to guide calculations of
national interest.49 Both seemed unsatisfactory responses to the security challenges of the
post-Cold War for many conservatives, who were equally dissatisfied with the liberal
internationalist foreign policy approach of economic engagement advocated by the
Clinton Administration.50
Neoconservative ideas continued to infuse the conservative movement with an emphasis
on identity and ideas, informing argumentative strategies and discursive practices,
helping to replace uncertain conceptions of systemically derived national interest with a
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greatly simplified conception of interests as guided by ideational determinism. How such
guidance informed policy preferences and distinguished them from those advocated by
the Clinton Administration can be seen in the diverging strategic cultural positions on the
appropriate policy responses to proliferation that emerged in the 1990’s.
Liberal and Conservative strategic cultural policy preferences
Although discussed earlier in this chapter, the policy preferences of the bearers of liberal
strategic culture for addressing proliferation threats are worth briefly revisiting in order to
contrast those positions with a distinct and mutually exclusive conservative set of policy
preferences that emerged during the 1990’s.51 The competing sets of policy preferences
revolved around the weighting of three central policy approaches utilized to address the
threat posed by proliferation - denial, deterrence and disarmament.52
- Denial: A strategy generally represented by some combination of active defenses
such as ballistic missile interception capabilities and counterforce options such as
ground destruction of weapons systems or production and storage facilities.
Denial limits the utility of offensive weapons by degrading the ability of an
adversary to attack the United States, placing their offensive weapons at risk by
the capacity to identify and destroy them on the ground before use, or by
disrupting or destroying an adversarial state’s capacity to produce offensive
weapons.53 Denial in this formulation is most directly connected to military
methods of proliferation control in the form of counterproliferation.
- Deterrence: Forces based on retaliatory threat are referred to as deterrent forces,
as opposed to defensive forces, which only promise to make gains in warfare
                                                 
51 Though it should be acknowledged that conservative strategic culture had unique preference sets during
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52 A similar set of simplifications can be found in Shaver, ‘Priorities For Ballistic Missile Defense’, pp.
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difficult to achieve.54 Both types of forces are intended to dissuade states from
attacking one another, but deterrence is particularly relevant to the offensive
dilemma posed by the devastating power of nuclear weapons. Successful
deterrence, however, depends on the rationality of adversaries to calculate that
nothing gained by the use of force will outweigh the costs borne by retaliation.
Traditionally the United States has depended on both conventional and nuclear
deterrence capabilities to dissuade states or groups from offensive action that
would directly threaten US national security interests.
- Disarmament: A strategy broadly intended to deny access to unconventional
weapons capabilities through diplomatic and political means such as export
controls, normative agreements and consensual, non-discriminatory enforcement
mechanisms overseen by multilateral institutions. Disarmament intends to limit
both horizontal (spread between states) and vertical (spread within states)
proliferation. The framework for such an approach of nonproliferation has been
formally established through such agreements as the NPT, the AMB Treaty, the
CTBT and others.
Clinton Administration officials and many Democratic lawmakers argued that although
the threat posed by the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union was greatly diminished,
nuclear deterrence and assumptions of rationality still played the same role as they had
during the Cold War, albeit oriented towards major regional powers rather than a single
global adversary – an “occasional stratagem rather than a constant, all-purpose stance.”55
In this group were senior defense officials under Clinton such as Jan Lodal, principle
deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, who stated the Administration’s assumptions
about the inherent rationality of adversaries when faced with the overwhelming
superiority of U.S. nuclear forces, “Nuclear deterrence worked throughout the Cold War,
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it continues to work now, it will continue to work into the future… the exact same kinds
of nuclear deterrence calculations that have always worked will continue to work.”56
If attempting to model a weighted set of preferences, those generated by liberal strategic
assumptions could be visualized as follows, with the shaded area representing general
policy preferences:
Figure 5.1 – Liberal Strategic Culture Preferences for Addressing Proliferation Threats
Representatives of liberal strategic culture fundamentally believed that the nature of the
proliferation threat was one of destabilizing technologies falling into the hands of
unfriendly, though potentially deterrable nations. The mechanisms to address the threat
from this perspective focused on combining a traditional deterrence posture with a
strengthening of the traditional mechanisms and norms of the NP regime. Strategies of
denial such as active defenses and counterforce options as envisioned in the Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative were seen as minor military support measures limited to
forward deployed capabilities for defending American forces in the battlefield and
                                                 
56 Jan Lodal (P)DUSD, Ashton Carter ASD (ISP), with selected reporters, 31 July 1995, Washington, D.C.,
Press Conference Transcript, pp. 9-10, as quoted in Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), p. 87
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serving to reinforce the existing NP regime through dissuasion. Developing limited
counterproliferation capabilities was not intended to be a method for applying direct
military pressure on potential proliferators, but rather would serve to indirectly
undermine the rationale for acquiring unconventional weapons capabilities by raising the
defensive barrier such weapons would need to overcome in the event of armed conflict.
Therefore, such measures as envisioned in the DCI would deny the enemy an offensive
advantage, rather than deny them the ability to acquire unconventional weapons
capabilities. Such instruments of defense would under no circumstances challenge or
replace disarmament mechanisms in the form of global institutionalized NP norms and
arms control measures.57
For many groups of conservatives, the Clinton Administration’s dedication to NP norms,
arms control and institutionalized restraints on military power such as the ABM Treaty
was not merely misguided policy, but actually constituted a threat to U.S. national
security interests.58 Conservative oppositional sentiment held that not only did the
regional powers, who were repositioning themselves in the power vacuum left by the
Soviet Union, pose a significant potential nuclear threat, but that the nature of this threat
was one unresponsive to traditional methods of deterrence or disarmament due to the lack
of ability to sway such regimes with normative appeals, and voluntary multilateral
institutionalized enforcement mechanisms. As these regimes were inherently unstable,
irrational, aggressive, thuggish, etc., there was little the United States could hope to do to
deter them from using unconventional weapons against US forces abroad, or even the US
mainland. Thus active defenses and robust counterforce capabilities were imperative to
protect the United States from the eventual unconventional weapons use by rogue
regimes or terrorists.
                                                 
57 The Clinton Administration executive order declaring a ‘national emergency’ on WMD was essentially
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If attempting to model a weighted set of preferences, those generated by conservative
strategic assumptions could be visualized as follows, with the shaded area representing
general policy preferences:
Figure 5.2 – Conservative Strategic Culture Preferences for Addressing Proliferation Threats
For conservatives, the mechanisms to address the threat could not be those of the NP
regime, as these were seen as directly abetting the problem. Rather, the solution was in a
very aggressive and comprehensive system of counterproliferation that covered the entire
spectrum of threats – from robust counterforce capabilities and active forward defenses,
to national missile defense and strengthened civil preparedness at home. Such a view was
founded on a far more pessimistic view of the nature of the international security
environment that assumed the inevitable use of unconventional weapons against the
United States, and one that also assumed a more effective role for the use of military
force in addressing the threat. Ultimately, this approach would need to be coupled to
coercive diplomacy measures oriented towards regime change, as the problem was both
of capability and identity. Confronting the technical capacity was likely to prove an
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ultimately futile exercise in delay tactics if the underlying identity issue driving the
capabilities were not addressed.
Conservatives arguing that the vulnerability of the United States to attack from ballistic
missiles was a critical shortcoming of Clinton Administration’s national defense priorities
sought to increase the policy prominence of national missile defenses and robust
counterforce capabilities once in power. If support for nonproliferation norms and
institutions could not be immediately overturned, then perhaps it could, in the mid-term,
be challenged by an active campaign to fund and bring to policy prominence a potential
capabilities-driven challenger in the form of counterproliferation. These issues became a
focus of Republican Congressional legislation by a Party leadership who saw both an
opportunity to actively support the modernization and rebuilding of the American
military while simultaneously undermining the President’s credibility on national security
issues, and forcing political concessions that would ultimately serve to undermine NP
norms and institutions.
The following section will examine how policy preferences were transformed into policy
outcomes, largely through the a Republican Party newly empowered and determined to
exercise its newfound political power through a carefully managed, cohesive policy
approach.
Republicans in power
“You know, there is an old saying in law school… that if the facts are not with you, you
argue the law; if the law is not with you, you argue the facts; and if neither are with you,
you just argue.”
- Former Republican Senator Trent Lott59
Significant policy changes regarding US approaches to the security threats posed by
proliferation arrived in earnest with the so-called Republican ‘revolution’ of 1994. In the
‘94 mid-term election, Republicans gained control of both the US House and Senate for
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the first time in 40 years, winning more than 50 seats in a tremendous shift of legislative
power. The Republican Party that won the landslide majority was also one of the most
cohesive in terms of working for legislation due to its strong leadership and
unprecedented communications strategy focused on presenting a consistent and carefully
crafted party message on major issues.
Unusually strong Party leadership came thanks to majority leader Newt Gingrich and the
man considered to be the most effective majority whip in modern times, Tom DeLay,
who together oversaw nearly unprecedented party uniformity of voting in the early years
of the majority.60 Their aggressive leadership style of enforcing party cohesion was
further emboldened by the overtly partisan, divisive form of politics brought to Congress
by the new leadership that sought to revitalize by conflict a Republican Party with little
experience over the past four decades of determining legislative priorities.61 As
Democratic Representative Harry A. Johnston remarked, “the minority party does not
legislate – it is that simple.” Although the minority party can play a role in obstructing or
‘fine tuning’ a bill, “it never plays an activist role in shaping the laws of the country.”62
Although highly partisan, Gingrich’s leadership was marked by a sort of ideological
pragmatism towards uniting disparate wings of the Republican Party. The years of
Legislative isolation had helped bridge traditional divides within the Party, a process
Gingrich had identified during an interview in 1989, “There is almost a new synthesis
evolving with the classic moderate wing of the party where, as a former Rockefeller state
chairman, I've spent most of my life, and the conservative / activist right wing.”63 This
“new synthesis” allowed Gingrich as Party leader to recognize the power of
neoconservative strategic concepts to clarify differences between Republicans and
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Democrats and frame ambiguous foreign policy issues such as proliferation in
unambiguous terms, regardless whether such conceptualizations were representative of
his own personal ideological predisposition, or of the majority of his Party. 64 As Gingrich
himself admitted when questioned about the inconsistency of his personal political
positions, “…the first duty of a political coalition is to sustain its majority. I can tell you
with a straight face I am pragmatic, and as a result I am driven to conservatism. But I am
not dogmatic. I think if non-conservatism works, I'll look at it, too.”65
A view on the newfound cohesiveness of the Republican Party especially regarding
foreign and defense issues can be seen from the ‘Congressional Scorecard’ issued by the
extremely conservative policy advocacy organization the Center for Security Policy
(CSP) in 1995.66 The CSP Congressional Scorecard tracks the voting of all members on
the 20 votes in both the House and Senate deemed by the CSP to be, “the most critical
national security votes” facing Congress each year. 67 The CSP gives their opinion on the
‘correct’ vote for each measure, tracks the voting of all members on those measures, and
assigns each member of Congress a score depending on their tally of ‘pro’ or ‘anti-
National Security’ votes. In the year that preceded the Republican victory, 43 legislators
were given perfect scores of 100 points according to CSP criteria, while 93 legislators
were given perfect scores in the year following the Republican victory.68 Having the total
number of legislators who ‘achieved’ perfect scores by the measure of the CSP increase
by 50 was quite a feat of cohesion considering the total number of seats lost by
Democrats was 52.
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The second factor critical to policy cohesiveness by the new Republican majority was the
communications strategy brought into office by Gingrich and other Party leaders.69 This
new communications strategy sought to reorganize the party around a carefully
coordinated platform of language dependent identity. Some sense of the strength of
leadership arrived long before the election in the form of the Newt Gingrich organized
“Contract With America”, a methodically constructed and promoted combination of party
solidarity politics and public relations coup promising a 10-point legislative plan of
action for the first 100 days of Republican majority. The Contract With America was
notable not only for its bold challenge to the legislative priorities of the existing
Democratic Administration and Congress, but also for its implied message of Republican
Party solidarity – all but two Republican incumbents signed the policy ‘pledge’ five
weeks before the election.
The Importance of ‘message’ creation and linguistic framing
Republicans arrived in office with not only a strongly centralized and effective
leadership, but also the most highly coordinated communications management team that
had been seen in American political history.70 This team employed a communications
strategy based on the cognitive linguistic art of systematic framing that was no longer
focused merely on shaping public perceptions of the identity and positions of candidates
for political campaigns, but rather on shaping perceptions of the identity and positions of
an entire political party throughout the cycle of governance. 71 The continuous, party-wide
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communications management reflected a relatively new type of politics that one
academic observer remarked was akin to “campaigns without candidates.”72
The Republican party had come to power with an unprecedented understanding at the
leadership level of the importance of language in shaping the terms of the discourse, and
a newfound appreciation for the centrality of ideas and culture in shaping a party
platform, identifying threats and generating policy responses. Party leaders met regularly
with polling firms and communications consultants such as Frank Luntz to craft effective
language and Party talking points around significant domestic and foreign policy issues.73
More than at any time in modern US history, the battle for political dominance was one
that was carefully waged with almost scientific precision towards a domestic audience,
reflecting a newfound perception of what Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh call, “the
imperatives of the professionalization of political publicity”74 This imperative was due
partly to significant changes in the way information was being received by the public in
an age of increasingly diverse, populist and fast paced media, and partly to the realization
by the Republican Party leadership of the value of the consistent application of proven
techniques to effectively communicate ideas and messages to the public in a new era of
mass media.75
The new generation of Republican communication management consultants moved far
beyond simple polling and focus groups to examine the impact of political
communication on target audiences. Their preferred method was the long, complex and
expensive process of ’Instant Response Dial Sessions’.76 Such sessions utilize handheld
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76 The complexities of organizing and running such sessions mean costs (in 2006) of up to $40,000 per
session, compared with maximum costs for focus groups in the area of $12,000. A fascinating examination
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technology that allows participants to instantly and continuously register their positive or
negative emotional reactions to individual words, phrases or visuals from a variety of
communications media. Dial sessions revealed the dramatic difference that specific
linguistic framing can make on perceptions of identical policies, for example:
While 68% of Americans feel an Inheritance / Estate Tax is unfair, 78% feel a
‘Death Tax’ is unfair.77
INTERNATIONAL trade is favored over FOREIGN trade by 68% of
Americans.78
Americans are still evenly split on whether they support “school choice” in
America’s schools. But they are heavily in favor of “giving parents the right to
choose the schools that are right for their children”, and there is almost universal
support for “equal opportunity in education.” So frame the issue right and you get
the support you need.79
The previous three examples illuminate the powerful concept of linguistic framing, as
defined by communications scholar Robert Entman, “to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating… in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation.”80 The focus is on an active process of selection from within
a larger set of potential perceptions or interpretations, consisting of a selector attempting
to shape the perceptions of an audience.81 Thus in the act of political communication, the
                                                                                                                                                  
of the details and advantages of dial sessions over focus groups can be found in Luntz, Words That Work,
pp. 78-80
77 Frank Luntz, ‘The Frank Luntz 2006 Republican Playbook’, The Luntz Research Companies, p. 166,
available from www.politicalstrategy.org, (accessed August 19, 2007)
78 Ibid, p. 41
79 Luntz, Words That Work. pp. 168, 169
80 Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, pp. 51-58; see also David A. Snow,
E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, ‘Frame Alignment Processes,
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 4. (August,
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Leadership’, Leadership, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2005) pp. 165-185
81 The focus in media studies, political communications and management studies on an active process of
audience manipulation departs from the more general sociological focus on ‘collective action frames’. See
Robert D. Bedford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 611-639; see also Sidney Tarrow, Power in
Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
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choice of language is vital because it has the potential to evoke moral and conceptual
associations that condition perceptions of efficacy and legitimacy.82
What Republican communications strategists understood following the 1994 elections
was that effectively framed political messages, sufficiently reinforced through cohesive
repetition had greater ability to create an emotional resonance with the American
electorate than rational explanations of policy details. Such emotional resonance
increased the potential that messages and frames would be perceived as ‘common sense’;
uniquely realistic and efficacious. The ultimate goal of such a communications strategy
being the bridging of public perceptions of ‘common sense’ policy with the preexisting
assumptions and preferences of conservative strategic culture. As Republican
communications strategist Frank Luntz commented on the efficacy of this process when
successfully employed:
“Common sense” doesn’t require any fancy theories; it is self-evidently correct…
“Common sense” is not just the best argument for almost any policy prescription
you might propose – it’s essential. If you win and occupy the rhetorical territory
owned by “common sense,” your position will be virtually unassailable.83
Utilizing such communications strategies, Republicans attempted to shift policy discourse
on effective methods of addressing proliferation threats from the abstract realms of liberal
institutionalist theory, to visceral, emotive concerns that might resonate with the
American public and prove difficult for Democrats to effectively counter. Republican
foreign policy positions were consciously and meticulously crafted for a domestic
audience – not that the American electorate were the deciders of individual foreign policy
approaches, but that voters were leverage in a longer-term struggle for political
legitimacy and party majority. By following the simple rules dictated by their
communications management team, the real-world complication of shaping a working
and effective long-term strategy for addressing proliferation threats was unnecessary for
the Republican Party to communicate. What was necessary to communicate was that the
                                                 
82 George Lakoff, ‘Simple Framing: An introduction to framing and its uses in politics’, Rockridge
Institute, February 14 2006, http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/simple_framing, (accessed
August 15, 2007)
83 Luntz, Words That Work, p. 211
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nonproliferation strategies of the Clinton Administration did not work, would not work,
and could not work. As a replacement, the party would communicate a simplified
strategy that proposed to fix the problem, rather than simply manage the problem.
In identifying which specific policy prescriptions for proliferation threats reflected
general conservative strategic cultural preferences and highlighted differences with the
Administration, Republicans focused on preexisting policy approaches provided by the
DOD in the 1994 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee report. Republican
legislators looked beyond the general statements about support for nonproliferation
diplomacy and agreements, and with particular interest at two particular capability
priorities listed in the 1994 CPRC report, “Being able to seize, disable or destroy
weapons of mass destruction in time of conflict if necessary…” and “Employing active or
passive defenses that will mitigate the effects of those agents if necessary…”84 Funding
and prioritizing CP programs for active defenses and counterforce capabilities previously
marginalized by the Clinton Administration became an essential way to address the
conservative strategic culture distaste for what was seen as a dangerous norm-dependent
approach to the problem of proliferation.
At this point it is worth examining in detail one of the CP policy areas targeted by
Republicans for such a focused campaign of delegitimizing existing strategic conceptions
and policy approaches, and applying concentrated public discourse efforts at legitimizing
competing conceptions and policy prescriptions. The debates over National Missile
Defense (NMD) stand as an important case study in such a process of competing
discourse and legislation. NMD represented an important division between the
assumptions and biases of liberal and conservative strategic cultures concerning the
nature of both the international security environment and the basic assumptions of
adversarial rationality that underpin the doctrine of deterrence. Republican efforts to push
NMD forward held many consequences for the overall US approach to proliferation
issues, and represented an important turning point in legitimizing conceptions of
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proliferation threats as originating primarily in irrational state identity, rather than the
destructive potential of unconventional weapons themselves.
Legislating National Missile Defense: policy strategies and discursive practices
Incoming Republican committee chairs used their new powers to play a strong agenda
setting function, utilizing House and Senate Armed Services and National Security
Committee hearings to gather intelligence community representatives to highlight
perceived missile defense threats. 85 Although in many cases the threats discussed in the
hearings were not new, placing renewed focus on existing assessments had the effect of
presenting them as novel, highlighting the various threat perceptions and supporting new
legislation.86
Following committee hearings, a flurry of new legislation was proposed in both the
House and Senate on the issue of national missile defense.87 From the Republican side of
the aisle came bills and amendments to increase funding for NMD programs,88 motions to
table Democratic limitations on NMD funding89, and amendments requiring NMD
compliance with the ABM Treaty,90 as well as appropriations bills requiring set deadlines
for NMD system deployment.91 Democrats proposed their own legislation attempting to
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limit NMD spending outlays92 and the scope of NMD programs93, but to little effect. The
Republican majority in both houses of Congress ensured favorable outcomes for NMD in
an overwhelming number of cases. Maintaining their focus on ‘framing’ NMD programs,
Republicans ceased proposing legislation with titles such as ‘Ballistic Missile Defense
Act’, opting for the more emotional ‘Defend America Act.’94
The effect of Republican political discourse throughout the 1990’s was to both intensify
the nexus of WMD threats and irrational regime identity through highly controlled,
simplified, repetitive language, and to link that framing to the policy platform of the
Republican Party. The effect was control of ‘legitimate’ discourse by the end of the
1990’s. WMD could not be discussed without an implicit association to the supposedly
irrational behavior of certain adversarial states or non-state actors like terrorist groups,
and that discursive space proved very difficult for Democrats to effectively challenge.
This discourse control made it progressively more difficult to discuss proliferation in
terms of norms, rationality, multilateral institutions and restraints on power, as
conservative policy preferences were effectively framed as a uniquely ‘common sense’
approach to the American public than the traditional methods and norms of
nonproliferation. Thus the control of the discourse began to successfully link the strategic
cultural assumptions and preferences of conservatives with their policy prescriptions.
Especially relevant in policy terms was the expansion of the active defense and
counterforce aspects of counterproliferation.
A chorus repeated by the Republicans throughout the legislative debates was, “we have
no defense”, or “we have no protection”, lines whose close variations were repeated in
every debate on national missile defense by Republican legislators in the 12 months
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preceding the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act vote.95 Republican lawmakers
also tapped in, consciously or not, to the powerful “no loss” maxim of cognitive framing.
As explained by psychologist Nobel Prize winning behavioral psychologist Daniel
Kahneman, “Framing a decision in terms of possible loss should motivate more than
framing the same decision in terms of possible gain. When faced with potential gains or
losses, humans regularly choose outcomes perceived to avoid potential losses, even going
so far as to sacrifice potential gain.” 96 Kahneman continues, “A person is more likely to
follow conservative strategies when presented with a positively-framed dilemma and
choose risky strategies when presented with negatively-framed ones.”97
The following examples from the floors of the House and Senate convey a sense of the
tone and structure of arguments presented by the Republicans. Each employs samples of
crafted linguistic framing and consistent party messaging, intended to reframe NMD as a
‘common sense’ approach to missile threats with emotional appeal.
Senator Bob Dole (R-KS):
Most Americans do not know--let me underscore--most Americans do not know
that the United States has no defense against ballistic missiles. If you were to ask
the average American, in fact to ask anybody in this Chamber unless they are on
the Armed Services Committee, they might not know. If you were asked a
question, `If a missile, an incoming missile was headed toward Chicago, what
should the President of the United States do?' and the people will tell you in these
little focus groups, `Shoot it down'--we can't. We don't have a defense. So, if a
rogue state such as North Korea launched a single missile at the United States, we
could do nothing to stop its deadly flight towards an American town or city…So,
again, let me repeat the question: If you had an incoming ballistic missile and you
ask somebody in my State or any State, What should the President do, they would
say, `Shoot it down.' And your response would have to be, `We cannot. We have
no defense.’98
Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA):
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When I asked my constituents back in Pennsylvania if they think that we have a
system to protect us against one single missile coming into America fired
accidentally or deliberately, they cannot believe it when I say that we have no
system in place. They just cannot understand how a country with the assets that
we have, spending the money that we spend, does not yet have a ballistic missile
defense system to protect mainstream America...99
Representative Robert K. Dornan (R-CA):
…As things stand today, we have no capacity whatsoever to intercept ballistic
missiles that might be aimed at the United States. None. Zero. We are unable to
stop even a single missile, even a missile fired accidentally, even a missile fired
accidentally under circumstances in which the perpetrator of the accident did
everything he could to help us avert a calamity. We are totally, completely,
abjectly vulnerable.100
Republicans crafted the discursive presentation of WMD and state identity as a unified
conception, transforming it into a polarizing issue by nature of their very public challenge
to the Clinton Administration’s support for NP norms and traditional conception of
deterrence. The policy-dense language of leadership in promoting nonproliferation norms
and the strategic relevance of deterrence relationships meant very little to domestic
audiences, whereas the specifically worded claims for defending America against missile
attack from rogue regimes carried the potential for emotional resonance with otherwise
uninformed or indifferent audiences which lent political weight to the argument when
repeated often enough.
The flurry of legislative activity over national missile defenses culminated in the 1996
National Defense Authorization Act, which sought to fund NMD programs with
legislatively directed deadlines for fielding a working system. Citing congressional
amendments requiring a working national missile defense system in place by 2003,
potential ABM treaty violations stemming from the implementation of such a system, and
cost estimates ranging in the tens of billions of dollars, President Clinton took the rare
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decision to veto the defense spending bill,101 forcing Republican legislators to remove
deadlines for deployment of a working NMD system. 102 Though the legislative debate
was temporarily shelved by the veto, Republican legislators decided to shift their focus to
the intelligence on ballistic missile threats. Of particular interest were estimates
supporting President Clinton’s argument that national missile defenses were an
inappropriate response to the projected proliferation threat.
Competing interpretations of missile capabilities intelligence
The complex and inherently inconclusive process of developing intelligence estimates of
the unconventional weapons programs of already opaque states presented a number of
opportunities for advocates of competing strategic cultures. Much of the Clinton
Administration’s defense of vetoing the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, which
called for a national missile defense system, centered on a 1995 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) that stated, “No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers,
will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could
threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada.”103 Republican lawmakers strongly
challenged the conclusions of the 1995 NIE, and took the unusual step of requesting the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to examine the methodology of the report
immediately following Clinton’s veto, and held hearings further questioning the NIE
findings.104
Fundamentally, the disagreements over the 1995 NIE were a manifestation of the
respective strategic cultural assumptions of the opponents. Findings of the report were
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either embraced or rejected based on whether they supported or contradicted existing
assumptions and preferences. Highlighting such fundamentally conflicting interpretations
of the ‘facts’, an intelligence official tasked with briefing the White House and Congress
in 1998 on ballistic missile threats recalled the widely divergent conclusions that were
reached from the same briefing depending solely on the makeup of the audience. After
presenting his briefing at the White House, Clinton Administration officials concluded
the threats to be “modest but manageable” and would “certainly not call for the creation
of an expensive national missile defense.” A few days later after presenting an identical
briefing to Republicans in Congress, his audience concluded the ballistic missile
development constituted “a significant and growing” threat that “clearly warranted the
development of an effective ballistic missile defense system.”105
The issue of ballistic missile intelligence highlights the tensions inherent to the
relationship between the policymaking and intelligence communities concerning the use
of intelligence to support policy objectives.106 In attempting to justify divergent
interpretations of the intelligence presented, liberals tended to emphasize the estimates
expressed by the intelligence community, while conservatives tended to emphasize the
uncertainties expressed by the intelligence community.107 As the intelligence debate over
missile threats continued, liberal strategic cultural biases favored motive-dependent
intelligence, which analyzed likely threats, while conservative strategic cultural biases
sought to emphasize capabilities-dependent intelligence that placed analytical weight on
the broader category of potential threats.108 Such a divide over motives vs. capabilities
reflected basic assumptions about the rationality of adversarial regimes. If, as assumed by
a strategic culture informed by neoconservatism, the motives of states such as Iraq or
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North Korea were ideologically determined, then only knowledge of their potential
capabilities would be required to determine U.S. defense requirements.
Ultimately, Republican lawmakers, unsatisfied with the findings of the NIE, called for an
independent commission led by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to study
the ballistic missile threat to the United States. The final report of the commission arrived
at dramatically different conclusions than had the National Intelligence Estimate four
years prior, stating, “The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is
broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and
reports by the Intelligence Community.”109 A central methodological departure from the
1995 NIE was the shift in emphasis from likely to potential threats.110 This difference
between the Commission Report and the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community
echoed the emerging emphasis in the Department of Defense on capabilities-based
planning over threat-based planning.111 Such capabilities based planning appealed to
conservative strategic cultural biases for robust defense planning, as it counted a far
greater number of potential threats than would be considered than if complex calculations
of motive needed to be factored.
The discursive framing and eventual policy response of national missile defenses raises
the issue that serious domestic political contests for representational rights of a state’s
strategic culture open transformative opportunities for policies, allowing them to be
altered perhaps unrecognizably from their original intent by combinations of political
maneuvering and organizational processes. For counterproliferation policy, that meant a
transformation ultimately reflective of both the drive for uncertainty avoidance pursued
by DOD, and the stated pessimism about the international security environment,
likelihood of conflict and assumptions about the efficacy of military force assumed by
conservative strategic culture.
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Interpreting the proliferation events of 1998: solutions in search of problems
If the defenders of traditional nonproliferation norms and practices were already reeling
from the sustained political onslaught, very little of what occurred during 1998 gave them
cause to celebrate. On March 11, India conducted the first of 5 underground nuclear tests,
catching both US policymakers and the US intelligence community by surprise.112 Two
months later, Pakistan responded with 6 underground nuclear tests of it own, stoking
fears in the west of a new nuclear arms race in Asia. In the following months, Iran and
North Korea both tested new medium-range missiles capable of striking Israel and Japan
respectively. By December, years of Iraqi resistance to UN weapons inspections teams
resulted in Operation Desert Fox, with the US military striking Iraqi targets in order to
“demonstrate to Saddam Hussein the consequences of violating international
obligations”113 and effectively ending the UN disarmament mission.
The long argued conservative ‘solution’ of national missile defense seemed to have
finally found its tangible ‘problem’, echoing John Kingdon’s conclusion that more often
than not in the American political process, policy ‘solutions’ tend to precede problems. 114
Legislators often promote pet policy solutions over the long term, and generally
irrespective of tangible strategic threats, as opposed to the traditional rational model of
problem identification, proposal of alternatives, and choice of policy alternative to
achieve a specified goal. Events such as the proliferation shocks of 1998 open policy
windows for old solutions to be attached to new problems.115 The events of 1998 thus
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served as a tipping point, helping shift the balance of political momentum in favor of
conservative policy approaches to proliferation.
In a reversal of long held opposition to the fielding of an NMD system in the near-term,
President Clinton signed into law the National Missile Defense Act on July 22, 1999.116
By signing the National Missile Defense Act late in his administration, Clinton accepted
the premise of an NMD system, but essentially deferred difficult choices about ultimate
compliance with the ABM Treaty to his successor. Some political analysts identified this
as merely an attempt to deny Republicans an advantage in the coming 2000 election.117
Finally, in a stinging political defeat for the Clinton Administration, on October 14, 1999,
the U.S. Senate voted against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
effectively dooming the hopes that the treaty could serve to strengthen and expand
existing nonproliferation norms.118 Both the compromise and defeat served notice at the
end of the Clinton Administration that conservative strategic cultural preferences on
responses to proliferation threats were now presenting substantive challenges to the
foundations of traditional deterrence and nonproliferation policy. A more muscular
counterproliferation, militarily oriented towards a wide range of possible adversarial
capabilities, and politically oriented towards challenging adversarial identity had now
established itself as the most politically and organizationally powerful alternative.
Conclusions
The period examined by this chapter featured a number of important indications that
traditional policies of nonproliferation and deterrence were declining in prominence.
From the defeat of major nonproliferation policy legislation such as the Comprehensive
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Test Ban Treaty, to the broad funding for robust counterforce capabilities and active
forward defenses such as National Missile Defense, the norms and institutions of NP and
deterrence were being challenged by CP policy alternatives at every turn. CP as
envisioned by conservative supporters held a far more pessimistic view of the nature of
the international security environment. It assumed the inevitable use of unconventional
weapons against the United States by irrational, undeterrable actors such as “rougue
regimes” or terrorist organizations, and also assumed a more effective role for the use of
military force in addressing the threat of proliferation. By the end of the 1990’s, not only
was CP ascendant in the legitimacy of conceptual and policy terms, but as the previous
chapter addressed, an offensively transformed CP was well on its way to being
effectively institutionalized as the primary form of proliferation response by the US
military.
What accounts for this shift in US conceptions about the problems of proliferation?
Explanations that rely on RAM assumptions must ignore or discount two important areas
addressed by this chapter. The first is to deem the sustained political competition between
liberal and conservative policymakers as either insignificant, or as somehow part of a
broader national effort to seek out a unitary rational response to external stimuli. Second
would be the need to assume that the major proliferation “events” of the decade such as
the unexpected Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, or North Korean ballistic missile tests
of 1998, led to rational policy responses such as the signing of the National Missile
Defense Act and rejection of the CTBT in 1999. As the material in this chapter has
demonstrated, the potential of such external stimuli to change relative power positions
was both deeply contested and preceded by years of sustained political discourse
advocating divergent policy approaches.
The chapter has argued that the conceptual and policy shifts in favor of CP over NP and
deterrence were the result of sustained political discourse and institutionalization, which
due to legislative majority and highly coordinated discursive strategies, were dominated
throughout much of the 1990’s by representatives of conservative strategic culture.
Conservatives in power were highly effective at promoting their strategic culture
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preferences, forcing compromises from an Administration struggling to defend its
domestic agenda, and limiting restrictive oversight and appropriations pressures on
military CP programs in areas such as active defenses and counterforce capabilities. By
the time the proliferation events of 1998 arrived, ‘solutions’ were already in place for the
strategic problems that presented themselves in dramatic public fashion, further
weakening opposition to conservative strategic culture derived policy preferences. By the
end of 1999, the political defeats and compromises made by the Clinton Administration
left counterproliferation considerably strengthened in both material capability and policy
prominence, while nonproliferation norms and practices were significantly weakened.
This chapter has examined two major strategic cultures competing for policy dominance
in the United States, each with distinct sets of assumptions and policy prescriptions for
addressing proliferation threats. Though it would be tempting to assume that the struggles
between these two groups were simply over individual policy outcomes, it is more
accurate to say their struggles were over the broader legitimacy of their approaches. The
establishment of normative beliefs in a contested political environment is a zero-sum
game whereby legitimacy cannot be conferred upon one set of policy concepts until
another has been delegitimized. However, it is difficult to quantify issues such as
legitimization when dealing with government policies and the normative beliefs that
support them. When does one normative belief cross the threshold into broad acceptance
as legitimate? When can we say that a competing norm has been delegitimized?119
The measure of “enough” individuals supporting an emergent set of normative beliefs to
tilt the balance of capabilities towards broad legitimacy and support for those norms
depends on the context in question. In the case of those supporting the unilateral
application of offensive military force to prevent or roll back unconventional weapons
capabilities, there is no single point in the period examined where a fundamental change
in the balance of power towards those supporting the emergent norms underpinning CP
can be said to have become dominant. Rather, it is the cumulative effects of several years
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of strategic cultural competition that yields a better picture of the challenges for CP
legitimization at the expense of NP and deterrence. The clothing of these conceptions
“with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and
efficacious” was an ongoing process that gained momentum, but was by no means
completed by the end of the period in question.120 Representatives of conservative
strategic culture had made much headway in their discursive struggles to legitimize CP,
as evidenced by the broad acceptance of their politically charged discourse, the
significant policy battles won by CP, and the support given to the ongoing process of CP
institutionalization by the DOD.
The following chapter will examine how these two interdependent forces for legitimizing
new normative beliefs fundamental to CP and the institutionalization of CP capabilities
and concepts within the DOD shaped the landscape of choice for the decisionmakers of
the Bush Administration. Though this combination of emergent norms and capabilities
institutionalization had begun at the end of the Cold War, and continued without much
public notice throughout the 1990’s, it wasn’t until the policy responses to the attacks of
9/11 that the more offensively oriented CP, with its emphasis on the political identity of
proliferators rather than merely their capabilities dramatically brought to public attention
the policy changes that had been many years in the making.
                                                 
120 Alasdair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4,
(Spring, 1995), pp. 45, 54
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Chapter 6
The Path to Preemptive Counterproliferation: 1999-2002
The strategic cultural battles of the Clinton years had left U.S. nonproliferation policy in
a state of disarray, with conflicting messages sent both to the international community on
America’s support for the NP regime, and to the relevant domestic bureaucracies
concerning the prioritization of their nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs
and policies.1 Without strong civilian oversight of a DOD counterproliferation policy
oriented directly at supporting traditional nonproliferation norms and enforcement
mechanisms, the bottom-up institutionalization of CP in the regional combat commands
led to a far more militarized policy than had been originally envisioned. Regional
commanders concerned with likely adversarial capabilities now drove the development of
CP capabilities. Their utilitarian approach to the means of CP policy was not always
clearly coordinated with civilian leaders still concerned with the ends of overall policy
responses to proliferation.
Although the DOD was correct in assuming it had succeeded in providing more options
to policy makers seeking to respond to the threat posed by the proliferation of
unconventional weapons, by the end of the Clinton Administration, such options existed
within a much narrower range of overall policy orientations than had been envisioned
when the DCI was created. With years of fractious legislative battles over defense
priorities and capabilities funding creating weakened civilian oversight, the CP
orientation of the DOD more closely reflected the organizational biases and traditional
mission preferences of the military itself. Such a narrowing of the boundaries of CP
policy allowed not only a more offensive doctrine regarding proliferation threats to
emerge, but gave future decisionmakers far more opportunity to see proliferation
responses from an essentially utilitarian, technological perspective, rather than the
traditional normative political and economic perspectives of the NP regime.
                                                 
1 Such mixed messages were well summarized at the time in, Gilles Andréani, ‘The Disarray of U.S. Non-
Proliferation Policy’, Survival, (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 42-61
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The arrival of the Bush Administration in 2000 brought into office a group of
policymakers that carried with them many of the conservative strategic cultural
assumptions regarding threats posed by the coupling of illiberal regimes and WMD
capabilities.2 The group brought with it the skepticism of multilateral institutions long
held by bearers of conservative strategic culture, but conceptualized in a more activist
form.  Many accounts of this period forward explanations for the policy shift that focus
on either the personal preferences of the senior Administration leadership, or on intra-
Administration struggles representing traditional bureaucratic power plays. 3
This chapter challenges accounts that attribute major CP policy change to the decisions
and individual preferences of senior Bush Administration officials.4 It will be argued that
while the central policymakers of the Bush Administration were certainly important in
prioritizing and articulating policy, their role in ‘shaping’ CP was largely one of giving
special prominence to policy responses designed, legitimated and institutionalized by
those who had come before them, and putting those policy priorities into action. Much of
what contemporary observers attribute to the unique conceptual biases of the senior
members of the Bush Administration – a skepticism of multilateral institutions, an
extreme view of “rogue regimes” that set a high expectation for military conflict with
these states, a strong view of the utility for proactive use of U.S. military force in
addressing post-Cold War security threats – were largely pre-existing conceptions, rather
than unique cognitive products of these figures. Much of their early policy efforts and
articulations of CP policy drew together many of these earlier conceptualizations
“legitimized” by their conservative strategic cultural predecessors, and enabled by a
                                                 
2 On of the most detailed and respected accounts of the figures central to the Bush Administration is
provided by James Mann, in Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, (New York, NY:
The Viking Press, 2004); see also Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush
Revolution in Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press , 2003)
3 Most of the accounts focusing on the supposed ‘neocon’ aspect of the senior Bush Administration fall into
this category. See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the
Global Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay and
James B. Steinberg, ‘The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation’, The Brookings Institution
Policy Brief, no. 109, (October 2002); Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax
Americana (London: Routledge, 2004)
4 Examples include Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy,
Ch. 1; and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York, Palgrave, 2003) Ch. 28
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military organization advocating a utilitarian, capabilities-driven approach to defense
planning.
A supposedly revolutionary policy response that largely entailed selecting from a policy
menu prepared by their predecessors in the executive, legislature and DOD illustrates the
crucial role played by political legitimization of threat conceptions and the
institutionalization of policy responses, especially in the wake of major national crises.
Indeed, documentary evidence demonstrates that essential CP concepts embedded in the
2002 NSS were already being formulated into coherent policy before the attacks of 9/11.
The state of CP Policy at the end of the 1990’s
As discussed in the previous chapter, by the end of the 1990’s the DOD was moving
steadily towards a CP mission weighted more towards assertive, proactive military action
than NP regime support, one more focused towards preventative force options than force
protection. In many ways, the Pentagon was shifting its actual operational weight towards
the “secondary thrust of the [DCI]… to provide the Commander-In-Chief with the tools
to disarm an adversary unilaterally if necessary, before an adversary can initiate the use
of WMD.”5
Operation Desert Fox and the cruise missile attack on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant
in Sudan marked the distinct departure point for the DOD in operational terms from
earlier definitions of CP.6 No longer simply supporting multilateral NP regimes, but
effectively acting as an alternative via unilateral coercive strategies intended to rollback
NBC/M capabilities, CP represented a radical redefinition of ‘prevention’ in proliferation
terms. Both CP and NP were argued to support the norm of nonproliferation by giving
enforcement measures some bite, but enforcement emerged in practice largely as
unilateral military coercion, rather than multilateral mechanisms based upon non-
discriminatory NP norms.
                                                 
5 Barry R. Schneider, ‘Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-
Proliferation’, McNair Paper 41, (May 1995), National Defense University, p. v.
6 See Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation, pp. 154-166
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The direct normative challenge of both military strikes to the traditional approaches of
NP and deterrence were mitigated by their stated linkage to larger issues; terrorist support
in the case of Sudan, and defiance of UN sanctions and NP regime enforcement in the
case of Desert Fox. Indeed, only 11 of the nearly 100 air strikes in Iraq were targeted at
so-called WMD sites, and the majority of those were related to Iraqi ballistic missile
programs.7 However, both operations marked an important turning point for overall U.S.
policy on controlling the spread of unconventional weapons, as part of the stated rationale
for both sets of military strikes was the prevention of unconventional weapons
capabilities by the respective target states.
By the final years of the Clinton Administration, evidence of this evolutionary shift in
organizational perceptions about the role of CP in relation to NP was illustrated in the
public pronouncements of the senior DOD officials tasked with formulating,
implementing and institutionalizing CP policy. While still holding to relatively traditional
umbrella definitions of NP and CP, the use of force in addressing proliferation threats
was much more clearly identified as central to the military mission of CP, serving to
quietly shift the overall emphasis of policy away from support of NP. Attempting to
minimize this shift, senior defense officials often described the threat or use of military
force as intended to support nonproliferation through ‘coercive diplomacy’ or ‘forcible
threat reduction’. 8 Such actions and related justifications seemed to confirm the early
suspicions of critics concerned that CP would ultimately pave the way for challenging the
diplomatic and economic methods of NP policy with the use of preventative or
preemptive force.9
                                                 
7 William S. Cohen, General Hugh Shelton, and Rear Admiral Thomas Wilson, DOD News Briefing on
Operation Desert Fox, December 18, 1998,
http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/12/18/t12181998_t1218sd.html (accessed December 8, 2007)
8 Dr. James N. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Requirements, Plans and
Counterproliferation Policy, Remarks as delivered, The 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation
Conference, Washington, D.C., January 11-12, 1999
9 David Fischer, ‘Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald
Müller (ed.), International Perspective on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, 1995), pp. 11-24
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It is questionable how much the attacks achieved in the mitigation of proliferation threats.
However, the significance of the application of overt military force in departing from a
troubled and now contradictory NP mission should not be overlooked. For military
planners, whether intended by the Clinton Administration or not, both operations signaled
that preemptive CP activities would become central to their proliferation response
mission, putting into action the CP funding priorities of the past five years. Indeed, the
funding category, “NP diplomacy support” had fallen from 5th to a distant 15th out of 15
DOD funding priorities for CP policy by 1998.10 The miniscule budget for support of the
NP regime and multilateral enforcement measures had long since been quietly
redistributed and prioritized to the Department of Energy, whose resources and expertise
were suited largely to the verification of export control regulations, rather than
meaningful enforcement mechanisms.11
Senior DOD officials responsible for CP policy described a post-UNSCOM world as one
where the appeal to NP norms and traditional NP regime mechanisms did not figure as
centrally in addressing perceived proliferation threats. As a senior Pentagon official
tasked with managing the institutionalization of counterproliferation policy within the
DOD stated in 1999,
While nonproliferation should be our first objective, proliferation has occurred
and will occur despite our best efforts to prevent it. We cannot allow and we
cannot rely entirely and solely on diplomatic efforts to solve the problem.
Determined proliferators have and will continue to overcome treaties in moderate
regimes.12
Finally, a ‘new’ concept of deterrence was articulated; one not simply threatening
punishment in the case of unconventional weapons use, but threatening punishment in the
case of unconventional capabilities development by target states. 13 Crucially, senior DOD
officials still viewed CP (at least publicly) as complimentary to NP, in that giving CP
                                                 
10 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical and
Biological Defense, ‘Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress
Executive Summaries’, (May, 1998), http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/reports.html, (Accessed – 10 June, 2003)
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Mitchel Wallerstein, (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation), remarks as
prepared, 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., January 11-12, 1999
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“teeth” would ultimately serve to strengthen the NP regime and deterrence strategies. Yet
as a critical distinction from their conservative strategic cultural counterparts in the
legislature, CP was valued by military leaders because of the implicit assumption of
rationality in adversarial states. States whose leaders understood U.S. willingness to take
substantive, and potentially devastating preventative military action to stop proliferation
activities were assumed less likely to initiate such capabilities development in the first
place:
The potential economic costs and risks to national security – and, indeed, to a
government’s very political survival – may be perceived as substantially
outweighing any possibility of attaining short-term, asymmetrical, political /
military advantage. If this message can be driven home convincingly, bilateral
and multilateral political and diplomatic solutions to regional proliferation
problems may be increasingly viable and attractive to the parties at interest.14
Considering the stated objectives of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative,
announced in 1993, combined with the agreed definitions and missions for CP and NP
dictated by the NSC shortly thereafter, the question of how CP under the DOD shifted so
dramatically in orientation must be addressed. Although the previous chapter examined
some ways in which competing strategic cultures opened funding windows for DOD CP
programs, further examination of the interaction between civilian oversight and mission
identification by the DOD should be made in order to assess both the natural doctrinal
biases of the military, and the organizational assumptions particular to the militarization
of CP policy.
Organizational forces driving the further offensive militarization of CP
Some insight into how this transformation came about within the DOD can be found in a
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report commissioned by a
longtime legislative supporter of increased DOD CP funding, Representative Floyd D.
Spence (R-SC).15 The committee chaired by Spence had repeatedly increased funding for
                                                 
14 Ibid.
15 This office was, until July 2004 named the General Accounting Office. Special thanks to Arturo Holguin,
Policy Analyst, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) for his explanation of the role of
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DOD CP programs, and the GAO was requested to review the DOD’s implementation of
the DCI because, “there have been Congressional committee concerns expressed about
the direction and DOD’s management of the counterproliferation program.”16 Taking as
its starting point the assertion in the DOD’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review that a key
challenge for the Department was to institutionalize counterproliferation as an organizing
principle in every facet of military activity, the GAO report examined how successful the
Department had been in achieving that goal. Thus, taking the Department’s own
assumptions about the CP mission as a given, the GAO report provides a unique
historical perspective into the institutionalization and transformation of CP.17
The report confirms many of the steps taken towards implementation of the DCI as
described by other participants and observers.18 Prominent in the GAO analysis is a
picture of the DOD leadership responsible for CP policy as having successfully integrated
CP planning, training and capabilities into the regional combatant commands, fostering a
bottom-up implementation of the DCI.19 However, the GAO findings concluded that
more needed to be done to formulate a “comprehensive strategy for countering the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a military strategy for integrating
offensive and defensive capabilities.”20 Additionally, the report recommended that the
DOD work to coordinate overall doctrine and planning more fully across all levels of the
Department, and strive to quantify the success of the department’s stated goal of rolling
back proliferation.21
                                                                                                                                                  
the GAO and its reports. Interview with Arturo Holguin, 8 August 2007. Spence was the chair of the
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
16 What precisely those concerns may have been is unknown. United States General Accounting Office,
Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More
Integrated and Focused’, May 2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-97, p. 3
17 This report is particularly invaluable, as many of its sources are DOD policy planning documents that
remain classified as of this writing. Thus, although an imperfect guide to DOD thinking on CP throughout
the end of the 1990’s, the GAO report serves as a vital bridge for analyzing the gap between policy
implementation and policy outcomes.
18 Interviews with Rebecca Hersman, John P. Caves, and Hanry Sokolski.
19 GAO, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 6
20 Ibid. pp. 6,7
21 Ibid, p. 23
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Aside from acknowledging the existence of an offensive CP doctrine, particularly the fact
that offensive counterforce planning was already being integrated into joint doctrine
documents, the report’s definition of CP, taken from the DOD itself, serves to illustrate
how much the DOD’s understanding of the CP mission and mandate had changed in the
six years since the Poneman Memo:22
Counterproliferation is the activities of DOD to combat the spread of NBC
capabilities and the means to deliver them. The offensive component of
counterproliferation (referred to as “counterforce”) includes actions taken to
defeat NBC targets, such as mobile missile launchers, and NBC weapons
production and storage facilities. The defensive component includes “active
defense,” which are actions taken to destroy enemy NBC weapons and delivery
vehicles while en route to their targets; “passive defense,” which are measures
taken to help U.S. forces survive and operate in an NBC environment, such as
biological and chemical agent detectors and protective clothing and masks; and
“consequence management,” which refers to efforts to mitigate the consequences
resulting from the use of an NBC weapon, such as the decontamination of weapon
systems and equipment and casualty evacuation. Consequence management
measures are often included in passive defense.23
Gone from this re-definition was any emphasis on support for the NP regime, diplomacy,
arms control or export controls as earlier implied in the Poneman Memo definitions. In its
21st Century incarnation, CP had become fully militarized, reflecting the ‘success’ of CP
institutionalization by being imbedded into the central mission, force planning and
training of the services and regional commands. Such a transformation in emphasis
should not come as a surprising outcome of the bottom-up institutionalization sought by
civilian leaders. The combat commands are focused on the concrete requirements of
warfighting, not the abstract requirements for creating policy or doctrine consistent with
established normative traditions.
The GAO report reflected a military organization in which, ”forcible threat reduction”
stood as a commonly accepted tool for accomplishing military missions and reducing the
uncertainty posed by unconventional weapons. Despite whatever may have been
                                                 
22 On this point, the GAO report references the now declassified document: JCS, ‘Joint Doctrine for
Countering Air and Missile Threats’, Joint Publication 3-01, Oct. 19, 1999. Available from:
www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/jp3_01.pdf (accessed October 15, 2007)
23 GAO, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 3
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articulated at the civilian leadership level about the ends of such policy, regional
warfighting commands were concerned with the effective means of combat – means that
by their nature could serve any number of possible policy ends.
The movement of the DOD on CP policy, spurred on towards certain funding priorities
by an activist conservative legislature, served to both reinforce conservative strategic
cultural threat perceptions, and again narrowed the range of future options for decision
makers. While in purely instrumental terms it may have appeared to DOD officials that
the development of CP capabilities only served to offer more “choices to the President,”
the practical effect was to offer a wider array of individual force options within an overall
narrowed structure of approaches to the problem.24 The understandable shifting of DOD
focus to CP methods that aligned with its organizational strengths – namely the
application of military force – worked to marginalize the traditional mechanisms of the
NP regime in the long-term, absent tighter civilian control to the contrary.
Such organizational limitations would become crucial for an incoming administration
attempting to formulate and articulate a coherent policy response to support its
conceptions of proliferation threats.
Conservative Strategic Culture in Office
Aside from emboldening Republican supporters of a strengthened U.S. military, the
election of George W. Bush brought into office senior civilian officials with established
conservative strategic culture credentials as fierce critics of the nonproliferation regime
and arms-control policies. Figures such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had been active in earlier conservative
efforts aimed at promoting missile defenses as a necessary policy response to
unconventional weapons proliferation in ‘rogue regimes’.25 These key figures helped to
                                                 
24 Interview with Ronald M. Sega.
25 As discussed in the previous chapter, Rumsfeld was particularly significant in leading the commission
that had been tasked by Republican lawmakers with challenging the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate on
Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States. See Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-
threat.htm (accessed July 17, 2007)
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strengthen the growing assertion within the administration that nonproliferation had
failed, deterrence was unreliable, and that a policy of muscular counterproliferation was
needed to reverse the proliferation trend in “rogue” states such as Iraq, Iran and North
Korea. The sentiments of this group echoed the larger undercurrent of more conservative
approaches to U.S. foreign policy, pushing away from multilateral, institutional
engagement towards a strategy of unilateral protection of U.S. interests.26
Though the personalities and apparent policy biases of senior Bush Administration
officials have been well covered in a number of other sources, it is worth briefly
mentioning debates over relative ideational stances within the Administration.27 Though
conservative strategic cultural biases and preferences are argued to have been prevalent
among most major figures in the Administration, this classification should not be
considered monolithic. Particular emphasis has been placed on the division between
figures such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser
Condolezza Rice as a moderate conservatives embracing skepticism towards the casual
application of force to address strategic threats and favoring more multilateral approaches
to security issues, and others such as Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney as
generally favoring more a more unilateral, activist application of force towards a wider
range of national security interests.28
This division between ‘multilateralists’ and ‘unilateralists’, however, was never a
particularly accurate description of policy divisions within the administration, and
numerous scholars have qualified these divisions with labels ranging from ‘realists’ and
‘idealists’, to ‘democratic imperialists’ and ‘assertive nationalists’.29 Many accounts have
                                                 
26 Walker, ‘Nuclear order’, p. 713
27 Significant accounts of officials within the Bush Administration include, Mann, Rise of the Vulcans;
Halper and Clarke, America Alone, Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound; Dueck, ‘Ideas and
Alternatives in American Grand Strategy’, and Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2002)
28 It is questionable how much this division had to do with fundamental policy differences, and how much
had to do with a long history of skepticism and personal distaste between these individuals. See Mann, Rise
of the Vulcans, p. 239
29 For ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’, see Michael J. Mazarr, ‘George W. Bush, Idealist’, International Affairs,
Vol. 79, No. 3, (2003), pp. 503-522; for ‘democratic imperialists’ and ‘assertive nationalists’, see Ivo H.
Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound, pp. 15, 16
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also featured an essential grouping of neoconservatives who are argued to have played a
significant role in shaping Bush Administration policy on issues as diverse as missile
defense and the Kyoto Protocol.30 It is notable, however, that despite a strong
representation in the Administration as a whole, no principle posts were filled by
neoconservatives.31
Important issue clustering relative to CP could be indicated by those who could be
counted as holding a more identifiably neoconservative perspective on ideationally
determined threat perceptions, and those who did not hold such strong ideational biases,
but still strongly departed from the multilateralism of the Clinton Administration on
proliferation issues. If anything, figures such as Colin Powell, and National Security
Advisor Condolezza Rice represented a conservative strategic culture position with
proliferation threat perceptions closer to those that had DOD institutionalization of CP -
highly focused on potential capabilities threats, and thus complimentary to
neoconservative positions in terms of the application of military means - rather than a
genuine opposition to the more ideationally determinate positions of figures like Paul
Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, John Bolton and others. The Administration was by no means
split along a liberal – conservative divide, but featured varying degrees of conservative
strategic cultural bias. Arguably, deep divisions over policy in the early months of the
Administration were often overstated in media coverage, rather than supported by
accounts of administration insiders, perhaps as the result of reporters hoping to identify
forms of palace intrigue that had been so prominent within the Clinton Administration.32
In the area of proliferation threats, the biases and assumptions of conservative strategic
culture towards the international security environment generally prevailed, leaving no
                                                 
30 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound; Halper and Clarke, America Alone
31 Although figures such as Rumsfeld had been longtime supporters of many neoconservative causes,
particularly missile defenses and the removal of Saddam Hussein, such as articulated in the now famous
Project for the New American Century letter to President Clinton in 1998, urging him to work towards
removing Saddam Hussein from power, a letter also signed by Abrams, Armitage, Wolfowitz and Bolton.
See Project for the New American Century, ‘Letter to President Clinton’, January 26, 1998,
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm (accessed June 5, 2004)
32 A representative example of such overstatement of divisions within the Administration is Jane Perlez,
‘Bush Team’s Counsel Is Divided on Foreign Policy’, New York Times, March 27, 2001; for press coverage
of clashes within the Clinton Administration inner circle, see Halberstam, War in a time of peace, Ch. 6
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significant political or bureaucratic opposition to challenge the evolved terms of
proliferation discourse emphasizing irrational adversarial identity and the lack of
rationale for restraints on U.S. power. Unanimity from senior officials on all points of CP
policy was not required to reinforce existing conservative threat perceptions, as the
aggregate calls for policy response by the Administration were firmly in line with
conservative strategic cultural preferences as a whole. Even more significant, the overall
position of administration policymakers on proliferation issues was now strongly
complimentary to the DOD’s CP policy priorities, rather than weakly opposed or
ambiguous, as had been the case for the Clinton Administration.
In line with the shift in military thinking towards capabilities-based planning were
numerous Bush Administration officials widely recognized for their criticism of
intelligence methodologies requiring ‘validated’ assessments of unconventional weapons
development by so-called ‘rogue states’.33 These shared cultural assumptions were
particularly heightened in proliferation issues, coupled as they were with a very weak
intelligence track record on unconventional weapons, which was described by one former
Clinton Administration official as, “always wrong… usually underestimating WMD
capabilities, sometimes overestimating them, but always wrong.”34 More than simply a
casual attitude towards fact finding in support of a political agenda, these sentiments
reflected a conservative inclination towards worst-case scenario planning, similar to that
prevalent military culture.35 A military culture with offensive biases towards confronting
potential adversarial capabilities meshed well with a strategic cultural offensive bias
towards confronting adversarial identity.
Communicating Incoming Administration Policy Priorities
One of the very first foreign policy priorities announced by the incoming Administration
was deployment of a working missile defense system. Declaration of the goal of National
Missile Defense by the Bush Administration included eliminating the distinction between
                                                 
33 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 240-242
34 Interview with John P. Caves.
35 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine
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theater and national defenses, and thus implicitly threatened compliance with the ABM
Treaty.36 Unlike the Clinton Administration before them, senior Bush Administration
officials faced no significant domestic political opposition on the issue of missile
defenses, and thus could largely empower the set menu of choice on the issue that had
been prepared and legitimated by years of sustained discourse aimed at constructing
ballistic missiles as an existential threat with a ‘common sense’ solution in the form of a
comprehensive NMD.
The coordinated and highly effective machinery of policy advocacy and political
communication utilized by the Administration represented an effort to situate potential
political resistance to Administration policy positions within the issue boundaries set by
the Administration itself. Their task was significantly aided by the inheritance of
“legitimized” discourse on issues such as missile defense, WMD and rogue regimes. The
terms of legitimate security discourse had already been successfully framed, enabling the
Bush Administration to simply control the discourse in order to dedicate its time and
political resources to shaping the methods of a redefined nonproliferation /
counterproliferation mission, rather than expending energy legitimizing its policy vision.
The basic concepts of threat conception had been so clearly established by the time the
Bush Administration arrived in office, that the mere invocation of the terms already
carried deep and implicit conceptual baggage. And invoke such terms they did. In the
first months in office, these terms were constantly repeated in policy pronouncements,
press releases, press conferences and any other available public venue.37 As one former
public relations executive explained the purpose of such repetition,
If your messenger isn’t smart, but is incredibly certain, what do you do with him?
You send him out with very specific messages and the strict instructions not to
                                                 
36 For international arguments that the Clinton and later Bush Administration’s moves threatening the ABM
Treaty would inherently undermine mutual deterrence norms, see those made by then Minister of Foreign
Affairs for the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, ‘The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic
Stability and the ABM Treaty’, Foreign Affairs (September / October 2000), pp. 22-38
37 Susan D. Moeller, ‘Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, paper prepared for Advanced
Methods of Cooperative Security Program at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland
(CISSM), (March 9. 2004), pp. 25-34
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talk about anything else. It’s what we tell companies about talking to the media –
it’s not a dialogue, it’s a presentation. If you limit and repeat your main points,
then that’s what the reporter writes.  It’s the only material you’ve given them. 38
Furthermore,
The Bush Administration had very consistent messaging. Everyone ‘stayed on
message’, and the cumulative effect of such constant messaging is to create a wall
of certainty and ‘truth’ that is very difficult for critics to effectively counter. The
objective of their PR approach was to sell their policies and control the terms of
debate, because if you have the only voice in the absence of all others, it becomes
truth.39
The Administration’s political communication strategy was indeed a well-oiled machine
of repetition and reinforcement of established conservative strategic cultural conceptions.
In the case of NMD, for example, the Administration began with the implicit assumption
that there was no serious debate over the legitimacy of missile defenses, but only minor
debates over the implementation of the Missile Defense Act. Thus the task of political
communication for the Bush Administration had fundamentally moved beyond the
contentious identification of threats or even the selection of policy responses to
proliferation. The closing years of the Clinton Administration had settled the major
questions about valid responses through conservative strategic cultural political
argumentation and liberal strategic cultural capitulation. The task was now conceptual
reinforcement, institutional consolidation and policy implementation. Political
“messaging” was now oriented largely towards the implementation of policy decisions.
Assessment of executive-legislative disagreements over the formerly contentious issues
of missile defenses and arms control treaties, now directly challenged by the Bush
Administration, reveals a surprisingly lack of legislative resistance efforts to propose,
delay and shape the emerging policy.40 However, such relative legislative inactivity on
                                                 
38 Former senior vice-president of Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide, Cherie Quaintance, interviews,
August 13-15, 2007
39 Ibid.
40 A tendency notably critiqued during the Vietnam War by late Senator J. William Fullbright in his book,
The Arrogance of Power, Quoted in Bert A. Rockman, ‘The President, Executive, and Congress: The Same
Old Story?’ in Donald R. Kelley (ed.), Divided Power: The Presidency, Congress, and the Formulation of
American Foreign Policy, (Little Rock: The University of Arkansas Press, 2005), pp. 21-25; See also Philip
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the issues central to CP correlates well with Marie Henehan’s findings on the cyclical
nature of legislative activism, in that once central problem identification and alternative
specification phases have ended, legislative activity ebbs during the actual
implementation of policy.41
A major victory in the opposition to multilateral legal constraints on American power
came with the abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which had placed
strict limitations on the development and testing of anti-ballistic missile systems for 28
years. Conservative supporters viewed the ABM treaty as a relic of the Cold War, and
saw its abandonment as a critical step in protecting the U.S. interests from the threat of
unconventional weapons armed adversaries.42 Critics saw the abandonment of the ABM
treaty as raising the potential for future arms races, as the existing nuclear forces of
countries like China would eventually lose their credible deterrent value.43 A working
missile defense system would remove the mutual vulnerability that lay at the heart of
deterrence relationships. Additionally, since defensive gaps were much more
technologically difficult to bridge than offensive gaps, abandonment threatened to
destabilize the system of deterrence by once again raising the offensive value of nuclear
weapons.44
Abandonment of the ABM treaty also struck at the heart of the original nuclear bargain of
the NPT – eventual disarmament by existing nuclear powers. The vast investment in
ballistic missile defense seemed to indicate both that the United States was not interested
in eventual disarmament, and that military solutions to proliferation were preferred over
preventative political or legal solutions.45 This threatened the norm of nonproliferation
and the general nuclear order by sending the message that proliferation was inevitable,
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deterrence unreliable and disarmament undesirable. As the new under secretary of
defense for policy, Douglas J. Feith responded when questioned about the
Administration’s commitment to arms control treaties such as the ABM treaty and
Chemical Weapons Convention:
If we make agreements that we can't enforce and that we have good reason to
believe are going to be violated and are going to be open to countries that enter
them cynically and in bad faith, the overall consequence of that over time is to
cheapen the currency that we should really be preserving the value of.46
Abandonment of the ABM Treaty marked one of the first concrete steps taken by the new
Administration to actively promote into doctrine what had been developed through
institutionalization within the DOD supported by conservative strategic cultural re-
conceptualization over the past eight years. What supposedly justified a more offensive
CP doctrine were not actual systemic changes in the international system, but a threat
conception and policy response based on adversarial political identity for civilian
decisionmakers, and potential adversarial capabilities for military leaders.47 CP was
clearly moving beyond traditional NP and deterrence expectations of restraint on power,
and putting into practice a contrary approach entailing more active military pressure to
head off the potential strengthening of certain target states.
Now this chapter will briefly examine a specific example of these convergent forces, in
the articulation of a nascent national strategy to combat unconventional weapons
proliferation set forth in an early 2001 policy speech by President Bush. This speech is
significant in revealing Administration policy responses as a product of conservative
strategic culture and DOD driven CP policy evolution before the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001. In addition to clearly expressing conservative strategic cultural
biases mated to DOD capabilities, the speech was the first indication of a policy shift that
elevated an offensive military CP to the level of national policy in an open challenge to
traditional NP and deterrence norms.
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Incorporation of DOD CP approaches and conservative threat conceptions into policy
In a May 1, 2001 speech at the National Defense University, President Bush presented
the new approach to addressing the threats posed by the proliferation of unconventional
weapons in a speech largely geared towards rationalizing the desire of the Administration
to abandon the ABM Treaty. This speech contained the Administration’s most
comprehensive articulation to date of the threat from unconventional weapons
proliferation. Spelling out ideationally determined proliferation threats, the speech
represented a culmination of conservative strategic cultural reframing efforts on the
issues of WMD and missile defense. Contrasting with newspaper reports of divides
between major Administration figures on the issue of proliferation, this policy
articulation had been partly written by Secretary of State Colin Powell and National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, both of whom signed off on its final form and
attended the speech.48
The speech began by articulating a central conservative strategic cultural threat
construction concerning the issue of rationality and responsibility. Signaling a clear
Administration break from the non-discriminatory norms of the NP regime, Bush divided
the issue of proliferation between those who possessed “nuclear forces” and those who
were seeking “WMD’s”, arguing that during the Cold War, “few other nations had
nuclear weapons, and most of those who did were responsible allies…”49 (emphasis
added)
President Bush then directly linked a perception of irresponsible adversarial identity to
the threat from unconventional weapons proliferation, presenting the identity and
motivation of unconventional weapons proliferators in direct opposition to the values and
interests of the United States:
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…The list of these countries includes some of the world’s least responsible states.
Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of
ballistic missiles in Soviet hands but from a small number of missiles in the hands
of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek
weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United
States and other responsible nations from helping friends and allies… Like
Saddam Hussein, some of today’s tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of
the United States of America. They hate our friends. They hate our values. They
hate democracy and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own
people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough.50
Bush continued with a pointed rejection of traditional views on deterrence, and a call for
the U.S. to withdraw from the ABM treaty:
We must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty
does not recognize the present or point us to the future; it enshrines the past. No
treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from
pursuing technology to defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies is in our
interests or in the interests of world peace… We should leave behind the
constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and
mutual vulnerability. 51
Such a reconstruction of deterrence sidelined questions of adversarial intention. No
distinction would be made between the proliferation of unconventional weapons by
adversaries in rational pursuit of national security objectives and proliferation as the
result of expansionist or aggressive ambitions. Whereas the first implied a role for
traditional conceptions of deference, the second implicitly called for preventative action
to stop or rollback proliferation. By blurring the line between the two, the Bush
Administration embraced a threat perception heavily weighted towards ideationally
defined relationships, rather than those based upon individual estimations of intent.
Though identifying a different source of proliferation threat than the DOD, the
Administration perspective meshed seamlessly with DOD threat conceptions that sought
to shift defense planning away from particular adversarial threats, to the wider range of
all potential adversarial capabilities.
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This synergy of compatible doctrinal assumptions also facilitated the upward flow of
specific policy prescriptions from the DOD to the executive. A militarized approach to
counterproliferation resulting from capabilities based defense planning within the DOD,
now served as a template for Bush Administration officials seeking to map out a
comprehensive conservative strategic culture policy. Specific policy assumptions
articulated in the president’s speech would have looked familiar to close observers of CP
policy evolution within the DOD over the past five or six years, as they represented a
broad adoption of military CP practices, elevated to the scale of national strategy. These
policy pronouncements additionally represented an explicit rejection of liberal hopes for
the maintenance and expansion of the traditional norms of nonproliferation policy.
Establishing an ‘appropriate’ U.S. policy response to this new class of proliferation
threats, Bush concluded that, “Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of
active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses.” 52
Deterrence had no role in addressing this threat, as assumptions of ideological
determinism signaled to the Administration that adversarial states were incapable of
being deterred. Nonproliferation was still useful, but only in the form of “active
nonproliferation”, which was Administration shorthand for targeted enforcement methods
of coercive diplomacy backed by military force, a form of nonproliferation virtually
unrecognizable to those familiar with NP throughout the Cold War.53
The substance of the policy speech was essentially a reformulation of the DOD CP
priorities that offered enhanced options for coercive diplomacy backed by military force,
and a host of military force options that were suitable for offensive or preventative use.
Such a policy may have been expected as the military component for a broader policy
utilizing a broad range of foreign policy tools. However, the significant step taken by the
Bush Administration in this speech was to borrow this highly militarized approach to
counterproliferation and situate it as an effective replacement for the existing framework
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of traditional NP policy focused on non-discriminatory economic and diplomatic
methods. This speech marked an early signal that an offensive, ideationally
discriminatory CP was not a secondary, or even equivalent component of a larger
strategy, but was now for all intents and purposes the foundation of a national strategy to
address proliferation threats.
Policy Response to 9/11
The final defining event that shaped an evolving counterproliferation policy was the
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. While there is no need to
examine the September 11th attacks in detail here, it is sufficient to recognize that the
immediacy of threat to the United States posed by these attacks prompted rapid and
widespread changes in many U.S. foreign policy priorities. The attacks of 9/11 were of
monumental significance in altering the domestic political landscape of the United States
and crystallizing conservative strategic cultural conclusions about the nature of certain
security threats. While examining the full impact of 9/11 on U.S. foreign policy is outside
the scope of this study, it is important to note that the attacks constituted a foreign policy
‘crisis’ with few parallels in American history.54
Within weeks of the terrorist attacks, policy makers such as Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld were publicly arguing that the United States must be prepared to undertake
preemptive action on short notice against states that presented an imminent threat.55
Additionally, both Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz argued that Saddam Hussein
was intent on developing WMD capabilities and possibly providing such weapons to
terrorists for use against the United States. Therefore, any U.S. led “war” on terrorism
should include Iraq as a target.56 Where once terrorism and the proliferation of
unconventional weapons were seen as distinct threats, the very public and highly
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scrutinized U.S. response to September 11th had blurred the conceptual line between the
two.
In many ways, this conflation of terrorist and unconventional weapons threats was a
relatively minor conceptual step to take for a conservative strategic culture that had spent
the years since the first Gulf War delegitimizing the assumption of adversarial rationality
underpinning deterrence. In establishing a discursive space around WMD as a description
of irrational identity, it made little conceptual difference whether those adversaries were
state or non-state actors. Indeed, since the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway by an
obscure Japanese cult in 1995, senior civilian and defense officials had been bundling
terrorist and state production of WMD into the same threat construction on a regular
basis.57 WMD had quite definitively been transformed through sustained argumentative
discourse from a description of weapons to a description of actor identity.
The momentum behind the newly prominent counterproliferation policy as a response to
the September 11th attacks culminated in the United States explicitly reserving the right to
preemption and enshrining it in a new strategic doctrine. This new “doctrine of
preemption” was formally presented in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, and
given more detailed treatment in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction (NSCWMD) of 2002.58 Both of these documents feature the same conceptual
blurring of the line between “rogue states” and undeterrable terrorists, paving the way for
a combined strategy to meet both threats and the proliferation of unconventional
weapons. The argument was also made that “rogue” regimes not only shared the
irrationality of terrorists, but that they actively supported terrorists and that WMD in the
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hands of rogue regimes would invariably end up in the hands of terrorists. It was then
argued that because the United States was facing such a qualitatively new threat,
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are
able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and
our allies and friends. …Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United
States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The
inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of
weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.59
Further establishing a strategic doctrine based on unilateral interpretations of security, the
NSCWMD opened the door to further relegitimization of nuclear weapons through its
language on meeting threats posed by unconventional weapons proliferation:
U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of
operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and
terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies.
…The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to
respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to all our options –
to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and
allies.60 (emphasis added)
In making a formal break from past nonproliferation policy, the NSCWMD made no
mention of disarmament, nor any efforts to limit U.S. nuclear stockpiles.
Counterproliferation efforts in this policy document to “devalue the importance” of
unconventional weapons included the development of a new generation of nuclear
weapons designed to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets such as hidden production
facilities.61 This initiative threatened not only to close the gap between conventional and
nuclear weapons, but by declaring nuclear weapons a tactical niche in the U.S. arsenal, it
threatened to undermine the longstanding taboo on the use of nuclear weapons. 62 The
incentives that formed the original nuclear bargain at the heart of the NPT had, in a single
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sweeping articulation of intent, been replaced by the selective and unilateral threat of
punishment for proliferators.
Such discussions marked an acceleration of an inward turn towards unilateral approaches
to the security dilemmas of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Terrorism and nuclear
proliferation were now expressed as problems to be solved, not issues for diplomatic
management. Moreover, in coupling counterterrorism to counterproliferation and
equating restraint with weakness, counterproliferation as policy was now, at least
rhetorically, confirming the worst fears of its early critics - that of the United States
pursuing a unilateral vision of nuclear order.
In an important speech at West Point speech following 9/11, President Bush set the stage
for the formalization of the break with Cold War national security strategy, asserting,
Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing
against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend…
Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass
destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to
terrorist allies.63
The Administration consensus was further coordinated and bolstered by Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, publicly arguing that in the wake of 9/11, “It is not possible
to defend against every threat, in every place, at every conceivable time. Defending
against terrorism and other emerging threats requires that we take the war to the
enemy.”64
Although deterrence and containment hadn’t been the organizing principles of U.S.
national security strategy since the end of the Cold War, the formal rejection of these two
pillars was central to how the alternative security strategy would be framed. In light of
the audacity of destruction visited upon the United States by the 9/11 terrorists, the view
                                                 
63 The White House, ‘President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point’ (June 1, 2002)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (Accessed May 5, 2003)
64 Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘Transforming the Military’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002): pp.
20-32
261
of terrorist threats based on identity rather than motive seamlessly merged with a
capabilities-driven view of defense planning. Merging conservative strategic cultural
DOD framing of proliferation threats, capabilities that could be used or developed by
“rogue regimes” would be used by terrorists. This threat construction – the triple ‘T’
threat of terrorism, tyranny and technology – was fundamentally the product of
longstanding conceptual framing and political argumentation “won” by conservative
strategic culture during the Clinton years and the process of institutionalizing CP
capabilities and practices within the Department of Defense that had emerged from the
lessons of the Gulf War. 65
This policy response represented the explicit privileging of counterproliferation and
acknowledgement of the military requirements for preemption, and making a case for its
application. Again, what many commentators saw as revolutionary in the 2002 NSS was
not revolutionary in the sense of transformative doctrine, but novel for its explicit
articulation of an approach that had been steadily evolving since the Gulf War, and
indeed had been actively in practice for several years before George W. Bush took
office.66  Thus it was not the result of a particular group of new decisionmakers creating a
set of policy responses from whole cloth, as much as the product of these policymakers
pressing forward with established priorities, conceptions and organizational capabilities.
This thesis does not argue that the evolution of CP policy was a necessary precondition to
the U.S. military responses that followed the attacks of September 11th. The Bush
Administration would likely have found a rationale for strong military response even if
proliferation had not been central to their justifications, and it is for good reason that a
detailed investigation into the motivations behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003 falls
outside the scope of this thesis. This thesis is concerned with the evolution of
                                                 
65 Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay and James B. Steinberg, ‘The Bush National Security Strategy: An
Evaluation’, The Brookings Institution Policy Brief, no. 109, (October 2002), p. 2
66 It is noteworthy that the 2002 NSS was the creation of the National Security Council under Condolezza
Rice, and neither the Pentagon nor the Office of the Vice President had been closely involved in its
drafting. See Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p, 331; See also Daalder, Lindsay and Steinberg, ‘The Bush
National Security Strategy, p. 2
262
counterproliferation and how it was transformed from a limited defense initiative in
support of NP and deterrence, to one of their central challenges.
What seemed revolutionary for CP post-9/11 was in fact a very public presentation of the
direction counterproliferation had been steadily taking place for the past decade. Indeed,
much of the alarmed reaction to the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the 2002 NSS centered not
on what was explicitly stated within the document, but what was assumed to be implicitly
implied in terms of likely U.S. military action to attack the sources of proliferation in
states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea.67 The trajectory taken by U.S. national security
strategy since the end of the Cold War had indeed been hugely transformative and
revolutionary, but its these transformations had occurred over a period of years, and was
the culmination of incremental, long-term efforts at normative legitimization and
institutionalization.
This process had been obscured by the quiet workings of a military bureaucracy going
about its duties; by a previous administration that had covered its concessions and
transformative actions with appeals to the very norms it actions undermined, and by the
din of domestic politics, where the steady drum beat of heated rhetoric masked the
dramatic transformations inherent in the substance of that rhetoric. Though in no way did
these actions predetermine the policy outcome articulated by the Bush Administration, it
is difficult to see how the end result could have been more closely guided by the actions,
conceptual transformations and ideological battles that preceded it.
Conclusion
This chapter’s central critique has focused on the overly personalized explanations for CP
policy evolution popular in much of the literature on the Bush Administration. In these
accounts, central decision makers within the Administration swept into office and
transformed CP into a militarized, preventative approach to proliferation, largely by fiat.
Challenging this account entails examining how the discursive practices of conservatives
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and institutionalization of CP within the DOD had already affected policy decisions and
shaped broader conceptions of the problem of proliferation before these decisionmakers
came to high office. At this point, it will be useful to briefly summarize the central
elements of CP policy evolution that occurred before the Bush Administration came into
office, and those that occurred afterwards.
The first transformative influence was the delegitimization of the central conceptions and
practices of the NP regime and deterrence that began in earnest at the end of the Cold
War. This delegitimization originated both within civilian and military circles, as
policymakers attempted to grapple with the strategic changes brought about by the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Challenges to the norms of nonproliferation and
deterrence during this period took the form of nascent political argumentation over the
rationality of potential adversaries such as Iraq and North Korea, whose regional
ambitions were expected to draw them into eventual conflict with the United States.
Concurrent with questions about the relevance of deterrence were early attempts at
legitimization of an alternative discriminatory, ideationally defined threat construction
embedded within the earliest conceptions of counterproliferation. This initial process of
delegitimizing old conceptions and replacing them with new ones was defined by heated
political debate, and hesitant steps within the DOD to identify new military roles suited to
the reduction of significant environmental uncertainty.
It was in the wake of the Gulf War that institutionalization of offensive capabilities to
stop proliferation were first undertaken by the DOD, ostensibly in order to provide
enhanced support to NP and deterrence. Over time, this institutionalization took on a
markedly offensive orientation, leading to the development of significant offensive CP
military capabilities focused on long-range precision deep strike technologies, new CP
missions for special operations forces, and specialized unconventional weapons detection
and defeat technologies. Together, these created policy alternatives to traditional NP
enforcement mechanisms and expanded the range of military tools that could be applied
to strategies of coercive diplomacy and small-scale efforts at proliferation prevention.
Institutionalization of such capabilities and practices within the DOD embedded an
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offensively oriented CP deep into the central training and mission planning priorities of
regional warfighting commands, creating new menus of choice for future policymakers.
The Bush Administration’s contribution to CP policy was largely the formalization and
policy application of these earlier transformations. First was a U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM treaty, which formalized the rejection of deterrence as a central organizing military
doctrine. In the shock and aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, well established
cultural lenses of conservative strategic culture could both draw upon and further
legitimize the largely institutionalized CP capabilities and practices of the DOD in order
to shape and articulate a comprehensive CP policy of preemptive defense against non-
democratic regimes or terrorist groups suspected of wielding unconventional weapons.
This recursive relationship between strategic culture and the military organization in this
crucial period of post-Cold War history supports Thomas Berger’s observation that
existing normative beliefs, rather than new ideas often determine crisis response, “The
interaction between formal institutions and the beliefs and values present in a given
society becomes particularly relevant in periods where the political system is undergoing
change.”68
Neoconservatives undoubtedly played a central role in the evolution of CP policy, but the
neoconservative aspect of the Bush Administration has been generally overstated in the
reporting and literature. The significant role this group played was largely one of shaping
conservative strategic culture in the years preceding the Bush Administration, informing
conservative strategic culture with powerful biases against non-democratic identities, and
thus affecting the range of policy responses appropriate to that threat construction in the
years before the arrival of the Bush Administration. Indeed, in challenging popular
conceptions of a “neoconservative cabal” broadly shaping policy outcomes within the
Bush Administration, neoconservative thinker Joshua Muravchik has pointed out the fact
that no neoconservatives were elevated to senior policymaking positions in the aftermath
of 9/11, and indeed this period saw a net departure of neoconservatives from position
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within the Administration.69 Interviews conducted with prominent neoconservatives and
those who work closely with them in Washington DC also reveal a far more divided
group of senior policymakers in the years following 9/11, than a homogenous group
pressing in unison for unanimously accepted policy ends.70
A highly militarized, offensively oriented CP doctrine developed by the DOD served as a
template for Administration officials seeking to shape policy actively oriented towards
the rollback of proliferation. Conservative strategic cultural biases and assumptions about
the utility of force and the nature of the international security environment meshed well
with DOD means for countering proliferation and general conservative military biases.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served not to transform, but rather to accelerate this policy
shift, allowing the Bush Administration to co-opt DOD CP policy as the framework for a
national strategy to respond to proliferation threats. This explicitly establishment of CP as
the framework for national policy to control the spread of unconventional weapons
focusing national strategy on what once had served as merely the military component of a
broader strategy emphasizing diplomatic, political and economic methods.
This transformation culminated with the release of the 2002 National Security Strategy, a
document that formalized a long-budding doctrine of proliferation prevention linking
terrorism, unconventional weapons and illiberal regimes into a single category of threat
and “rational” response, placing the existing framework of CP within an explicit doctrine
of preemption.
This thesis will now conclude with a summary of its findings, some implications relevant
for policymakers, a brief discussion of the theoretical issues addressed, and discussion for
further research suggested by its findings.
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Conclusion
This thesis has argued that culturally conditioned ideas and functional organizations
fundamentally shape policy outcomes, and that their interaction must be understood if we
are to see how strategic concepts arise and are transmitted into policy implementation.
Gaining a clearer understanding of how ideas about security threats and the use of force
arise within a political culture, how they compete with existing ideas through
argumentation, gain legitimacy in political discourse, and are put into action through
organizational institutionalization is essential in moving beyond simplistic assumptions
of objective, material “national interest” prevalent in much of the analysis of foreign
policy. By ignoring the institutionalization of new conceptions in organizational
capabilities and practices, or dismissing argumentation and political communication as
“politics as usual”, policymakers (as well as analysts) risk missing the important ways in
which their policy choices may be constrained or weighted.
In the case of counterproliferation, it is tempting to see policy transformation as the result
of individual choices by Bush Administration policymakers. This thesis has argued,
however, that the choices made about CP by Bush Administration officials were not
original cognitive products, but selections from a policy menu fundamentally shaped by
years of conservative strategic cultural challenges to the normative practices of NP and
deterrence. The historical evidence examined supports the first proposition from the
theory chapter of this thesis, that successful long-term challenges to existing normative
practices will not be those simply championed by the dominant strategic culture, but
those that successfully reframe the strategic conceptions on which those practices are
based. The way threats are framed in political discourse matters. Years of coordinated
challenges to the Cold War concept of WMD as a weapons-based threat eventually
transformed WMD into an identity-based threat. These different threat conceptions yield
dramatically different policy responses, and control of the discourse surrounding
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unconventional weapons accords the power to define ‘appropriate’ responses, regardless
of who holds final decisionmaking authority.
The idea that proliferation threats do not stem primarily from the destructive potential of
weapons themselves, but from the ideologies of the states that possess them represented a
significant reversal of conventional wisdom on proliferation. However, translating this
threat conception into a meaningful response required the active participation of the
Department of Defense, whose own biases, practices and capabilities strongly shaped the
evolution of CP. The second proposition of this thesis, that successful institutionalization
of new normative practices requires penetration of guiding conceptions throughout the
functional organization tasked with policy implementation, is more ambiguously
answered by the case study. While institutionalization of CP by the DOD required the
active participation of functional units of the military, it is doubtful whether acceptance
of specific conservative strategic cultural threat conceptions was a necessary condition.
Indeed, available evidence points to a very different guiding conception of proliferation
threat within the DOD; that the proper defense orientation of the U.S. military should be
towards potential adversarial capabilities, rather than traditional calculations of
adversarial motives and intentions. This divergence in organizing threat conceptions did
not hinder the institutionalization of CP, however, as offensively oriented capabilities and
practices could address both core organizational and strategic cultural threat
constructions.
This presents an important dilemma for policymakers, as effective institutionalization of
new normative beliefs about the use of force may entail unpredictable interpretation by
military organizations. Organizational biases for the expansion of offensive CP
capabilities led to a set of capabilities and practices oriented more towards the offensive
military prevention of proliferation than the enhanced defensive measures first envisioned
by Clinton Administration officials. Paralyzing domestic political battles reduced civilian
oversight of the DOD while functional units of the organization were given greater
autonomy to determine how CP would be implemented. The resulting shift towards
preventative capabilities supports the third proposition that without strong civilian
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oversight to the contrary, capabilities driven defense initiatives will tend to become more
offensively oriented over time.
In assessing the final proposition, that normative challenges will require significant time
for successful institutionalization, often leading to mismatch between operationalized
policies and current conceptions of appropriate action, it is difficult to draw definitive
answers from the time period in question. Time horizons for successful
institutionalization of new types of action are lengthy, often exceeding the tenure of
civilian policymakers who initiate them. Yet it remains to be seen whether any lasting
mismatch between organizational capabilities and current normative consensus over
appropriate CP methods have occurred as the result of time lags rather than basic
differences between organizational and strategic cultural biases for action. As the
rejection of normative approval for preventative action would entail inaction, it may be
difficult to ever conclusively determine the validity of this proposition. A related
implication, however, is that mismatches between established practice and current
policymaker preference may be common. In the following section, this conclusion argues
that such mismatches stemming from time pervasiveness may play an important role in
constraining policy decisions.
In the end, CP as a legitimized and institutionalized policy cannot be separated from the
overall force modernization efforts of the U.S. military. The problem arises in the
inherent uncertainty attached to assessing the threat from unconventional weapons
programs in states of concern to US policymakers and military planners, and how
powerful figures framed policy responses to these dilemmas. Coupling ideologically
determinate threat conceptions to vastly improved military capabilities with strong
preventative potential was a recipe for conflict, and the CP responses that followed the
release of the 2002 NSS should come as little surprise. In an interconnected world,
conflicts rooted in revolutionary attempts to enforce a particular vision of international
order have widespread and often unintended consequences that must be carefully studied
and understood if counterproductive policy responses are to be avoided.
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Policy implications of the discoveries of this thesis
While there are many policy implications that flow from the findings on strategic cultural
and organizational interaction in this thesis, three central issues relevant to both analysts
and policymakers will be discussed in this section:
1) Problems stemming from embracing ideationally determinate threat conceptions
2) The time pervasiveness of institutionalization and conceptual legitimization
3) The political implications of attempting to conclusively “win” policy arguments
Problems stemming from embracing ideationally determinate threat conceptions
There are significant tradeoffs in conceptualizing the threat of proliferation as originating
in the identity of adversarial states. Mutual deterrence and a nonproliferation regime with
weak enforcement mechanisms may be somewhat outmoded in a multi-polar
international system featuring more liquid supplies of unconventional weapons materials
and knowledge. However, the self-restraint on power at the heart of a non-discriminatory
system of proliferation control and the underlying assumption of adversarial rationality
when faced with the threat of massive retaliation by the American military present certain
benefits over assumptions of adversarial irrationality and ideological determinism. While
it is certainly prudent to prepare US military forces to combat unconventional weapons,
and potentially prudent to take a more aggressive approach to proliferation threats in the
face of uncertainty, coupling such capability with assumptions of inherent adversarial
irrationality and ideological determinism is both unrealistic and unwise.
Assumption of adversarial irrationality often draws upon an ideological determinism not
supported by close analysis of the decisionmaking behavior of important potential
adversaries like North Korea and Iran, and thus may unnecessarily raise the risks of
escalation and general conflict. Long-term observation of the specific motives and
behaviors of states like North Korea points towards an essentially rational basis for their
270
actions.1 This does not mean the U.S. would be wise to ignore dangerous proliferation
activities within North Korea. Nor is the issue that a state such as North Korea makes
decisions that would be deemed responsible by US policy makers, but rather that their
motives provide significant clues to where flexible and specific policy responses could
prove more effective than general, non-actor specific coercive strategies.
The application of actor-general threat assumptions to adversaries with diverse cultural
conceptions, historical experiences and political motives isn’t simply a problem of
unimaginative policymaking. The experience of establishing a relatively stable strategic
relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War should serve as a powerful lesson
about the benefits of nuanced foreign policy making. Simply acknowledging that the
system of bi-polarity which gave rise to mutual deterrence has ended does not mean that
the essential insights of that strategy cannot be imaginatively applied in cases of
significant asymmetries of power such as those dominating the post-Cold War
international security environment. Providing context-rich interpretations allows more
room for the analysis of specific adversarial behaviors and intentions than a threat model
that merely assumes hostile intent. There is an important difference between
pragmatically hedging against uncertainty by adopting more assertive policy responses,
and adopting aggressive policy responses in order to conform to actor-general threat
assumptions.
While attempts to more subtly analyze the motives of potential adversaries and construct
appropriately nuanced strategic relationships carry distinct risks, the payoff for such
efforts can mean the difference between tenuous peace and catastrophic conflict.
The time pervasiveness problem of institutionalization and conceptual legitimization
As Bernard Brodie argued more than 50 years ago when first grappling with the new
strategic dilemmas posed by the introduction of nuclear weapons,
                                                 
1 An excellent example of such thoughtful analysis of the historical, cultural and political roots of North
Korean foreign policy behavior is Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating
Behavior, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999)
271
The ideas that are being implemented at any one time are likely to be those which
enjoyed an intellectual consensus some two or three years ago – at least the best
consensus then available – and which are now perhaps discredited.2
New normative beliefs should be expected to be pervasive over time, and unlikely to be
changed with the turnover of presidential administrations. This institutionalization should
serve to offer a more highly constrained set of responses to proliferation to incoming
administrations. These legitimized conceptions and institutionalized practices could be
challenged by unforeseen crisis or failure, but are unlikely to be challenged simply
because a new president arrives in office with a different set of priorities or views on the
nature of the proliferation threat. The findings of this thesis echo much of the literature on
norms and institutionalization in arguing that challenging established conceptions and
practices requires another cycle of delegitimization with a potentially significant time
horizon.
As dominant normative beliefs are overturned in stages, rather than by fiat, there is strong
reason to believe that the normative challenge of CP to NP is likely to last beyond the
Bush Administration. Both the terms of discourse and the behavioral norms embodied by
a doctrine of preemption are highly persuasive for a large group of citizens and
policymakers in the United States, and have been partially institutionalized by the
capabilities and doctrinal practices of the DOD. There are strong ideational, cultural and
organizational reasons to believe this will not change quickly. Policymakers and analysts
alike must think of policy outcomes not simply as representative of the narrow product of
bureaucratic or legislative bargaining, but as representative of emerging or established
normative beliefs.
In the case of CP policy, it’s important to note that both leading 2008 presidential
contenders adhered closely to the terms of discourse legitimized since the end of the Cold
War in articulating threat conceptions concerning rogue regimes, WMD’s and missile
defenses. While the beliefs ostensibly motivating the Iraq War have been widely
                                                 
2 Dr. Bernard Brodie, ‘Influence of Mass Destruction Weapons on Strategy’, 1956 lecture at Naval War
College, published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (February 1957)
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criticized as mistaken, many of the conceptualizations which were used to rationalize the
war – rogue regimes allied with radical terrorists, imminent WMD threats to American
national security, etc. – have shown pervasiveness beyond the policy failures of the Bush
Administration in demonstrating their legitimacy.
An associated policy implication of the findings of this thesis is that major policy changes
result largely from both a transformation of legitimate conceptions and a capacity to
implement and institutionalize those conceptions. While this may seem obvious, recent
experiences have show that policymakers often underestimate the strength of existing
norms and the requirements of normative delegitimization / legitimization cycles. A
recent relevant example is the short public life of so-called “bunker-busting” nukes –
small yield nuclear devices intended to be deployed with deep penetrating munitions in
order to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets. While the intention to develop such a
class of weapons was forwarded with much fanfare by the Bush Administration during
the rush of policy responses following 9/11, momentum for such capabilities never
gained political traction. Although promoted with the same intensity and conceptual
“certainty” as proposals such as the right of preemptive military action, the inclusion of
such weapons into American doctrinal responses to proliferation quickly faced
debilitating resistance from legislative, scientific, public and even some military circles.
The technical hurdles for developing and fielding such a class of weaponry were minor,
and the military had already dedicated significant R&D resources to computer modeling
of blast effects, collateral damage potential through lack of containment and technical
feasibility.3 However, a simple desire by the dominant strategic culture to legitimize the
development and use of those weapons was insufficient to overcome strong normative
resistance within the legislature and public opinion, founded on the norm of non-use. A
utilitarian argument proved insufficient when facing a well-established norm with broad
legitimacy.
                                                 
3 Geoff Brumfiel, ‘Experts blast US decision to back nuclear bunker busters’, Nature, Vol 423 (29 May,
2003), p. 469
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Though it was not an issue studied in depth through the research for this thesis, the
arguments about the interaction of normative legitimization and instituionalization would
predict that such resistance would be crippling. While the normative basis for traditional
approaches to nonproliferation and deterrence had eroded over a period of nearly 15
years before the unveiling of the 2002 NSS, the strong norm of nuclear non-use had never
been addressed during this time. It could be assumed that the failed efforts to legitimize
the use of a new class of nuclear weapons were due largely to a lack of required and
sustained efforts to delegitimize the existing norm, and legitimize a new norm in its
place. Such efforts seem to require significant time to evolve and become effective, even
more to become institutionalized in organizational capability and practice. It should not
be surprising that the issue of bunker-busting nukes died quickly despite the traumatic
attacks of 9/11, which added transformative momentum to policy responses and led to
very wide latitude for Executive action.
The political implications of attempting to conclusively “win” policy arguments
All presidential administrations and political parties are engaged in the continual act of
selling. The products they market are their policies and the payoff for successful
salesmanship can be immense. In their efforts to “sell” CP policy, the leading bearers of
conservative strategic culture drew many lessons from the proven insights of the public
relations industry. That such a crossover would so dramatically occur in the United
States, the Mecca of consumer capitalism, should come as no surprise. However, the
effective control of cognitive framing and messaging that is at the heart of modern
political communication can have unintended consequences. Taken to extremes, the
techniques of effective framing and messaging that successfully promote policy can also
severely limit the diversity of opinion that is the lifeblood of a functioning democracy.
Much of CP policy is undoubtedly the result of well-intentioned policymakers attempting
to most effectively promote the kinds of policy responses they felt would best protect
American lives and interests. However, in the process of attempting to “win” arguments
conclusively, rather than to gain advantage through accepting the necessity for political
274
compromise, political actors can limit the ability of the United States to foster the kind of
open, honest debate that is critical to the development of appropriate threat conceptions
and policy responses in any healthy political culture. As such, the political
communications efforts at the heart of CP policy evolution may also constitute an ironic
failure to appreciate one of the central concepts of traditional deterrence – that of the
necessity for mutual and voluntary restraints on power. Much as the Cold War realization
that “victory” in a nuclear world is likely to be Pyrrhic at best, painful compromise and
self-restraint must be viewed as critical to sustaining a healthy domestic political culture.
Additionally, publics sensitive to the lack of meaningful discussion of policy alternatives,
especially in the absence of media challenges to dominant political messaging and
framing, are left to construct their own collective stories about the important policy issues
of the day. With the penetration of new media and social networking technologies, these
stories often quickly gather momentum, if not diversity or substantive analysis. In the
modern American context, the result has largely been one of deep polarization between a
credulous acceptance of dominant political narratives on one side, and incredible
narratives of pervasive conspiracy on the other. The cumulative effect being a widespread
radicalization and enfeeblement of public discourse that only further erodes the potential
for healthy democratic forms of governance. While it should be obvious, it bears
repeating that political actors have a responsibility to promote open and honest discussion
on the issues of the day. Carefully constructed cognitive frames and highly controlled
messages promoted by the efficient machinery of political communications expertise
instead can lead to unintended social division and policy stagnation.
Finally, although the events and policy outcomes examined in the thesis were tied to an
individual case study, it should not be assumed that the transformation of CP policy over
time was a unique case of organizational and political forces that cannot be applied to
other contexts. Any state with competing strategic cultures divided over basic
assumptions about the international security environment, especially in cases that involve
debates over the ‘rationality’ of their adversaries, may be prone to similar policy
outcomes. Arguments about adversarial rationality will likely intensify and challenge the
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legitimacy of existing normative beliefs after the introduction of nuclear weapons to
strategic relationships. Delegitimization of existing normative beliefs about the use of
force would be of particular relevance in states such as Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan, as
these are states with vibrant domestic political competition and delicate strategic
relationships involving unconventional weapons.4 Increased political and military
organizational pressures favoring preventative or preemptive military strategies are likely
to feature prominently in all of these cases. Far from merely a ‘perfect storm’ of factors
occurring within the U.S. at a unique point in time, the dynamics of competing strategic
cultures and the institutionalization of preventative military practices will be an important
feature of international relations as the proliferation of unconventional weapons
continues.
Contributions of this thesis to theories of foreign policy making
As dealt with in the first chapter of this thesis, an analysis that incorporates both strategic
culture and organizational theory holds significant advantages over the more traditional
theoretical approaches often utilized in the analysis of foreign policy, namely the
Rational Actor Model (RAM), Bureaucratic Politics models and Cognitive models.
Departing from narrow assumptions of rational action, time specific cases of bureaucratic
bargaining and the uniqueness of individual biases allows foreign policy analysis that
gives critical insight into the process of policy change, rather than simply offering
explanations for individual policy decisions. Examining the power of collective ideas and
institutionalized practices through the lenses of strategic culture and organizational theory
offers many analytical advantages that should be carefully considered by future
researchers.
The legitimization strategic cultures can confer on particular strategic conceptions, and
the institutionalization of new capabilities and practices by military organizations have
significant impacts that are not explained by other theories. Together, these forces can
                                                 
4 Although apparently possessing a cohesive strategic culture, China’s relationship with Taiwan may be
subject to similar transformative pressures, especially if Chinese military leaders continue to ‘reduce’
environmental uncertainty through the development of further ballistic missile forces aimed at Taiwan.
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challenge important norms of foreign policy conduct through the delegitimization of
existing conceptions and the erosion of institutional support for existing policy
implementation. In their place, new practices and conceptions can be conferred
legitimacy within the realm of domestic political discourse by strategic cultures, and be
given staying power through the institutionalization of new capabilities and practices by
powerful functional organizations. This staying power means that not only do newly
legitimized practices and conceptions stand a better chance of actual policy
implementation, but they also face a far greater likelihood of supplanting existing norms
from which future policymakers will begin the process of framing strategic dilemmas and
selecting appropriate policy alternatives. Understanding this process matters if we are to
understand how major foreign policy positions change over time, affecting the broad
direction of a state’s national security objectives and the choices it makes about the use of
force to fulfill those objectives.
Additionally, this thesis has made arguments about the role of the U.S. Congress that
expand our current understanding of its foreign policy making influence. Traditional
analysis of congressional foreign policy making tends to focus on the formal division of
power between Congress and the President, with much discussion over the relative
weakness of Congress in deciding when military force should be used. While the
particular balance of formalized authority in this relationship is significant, such
assumptions limit congressional influence to its ability to act as institution in largely
legalistic terms. This thesis has argued that in addition to its formal authority to pass
legislation and wield budgetary power, Congress can have a significant impact on foreign
policy outcomes through the informal ability of its members to construct discursive space
about certain issues such as WMD and National Missile Defense. The role of Congress as
a locus for elite political argumentation means that Congress can wield significant
informal power in limiting or shaping ‘legitimate’ threat perceptions and policy
responses. In this case study, the challenge of CP policy to NP and deterrence
fundamentally depended on linguistic framing as the basis for contests over the
legitimacy of proliferation threat conceptions and policy responses. Therefore, the
question of how the terms of debate are shaped is not a minor issue of what words are
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used in national level discourse, but a central question of how lasting associations are
made between threat conceptions and appropriate policy responses.
Further research called for by this thesis
A compromise was made in this thesis by attempting to examine the impact of both
competing strategic cultures and organizational behavior on policy evolution. Addressing
both was important in realistically accounting for the major influences on CP policy
evolution, but certain analytic depth was sacrificed in order to examine their
interdependence. More detailed research needs to be undertaken on both approaches in
order to develop a clearer understanding of their relative importance and
interrelationship. Some specific suggested avenues for further research in each case are as
follows:
Firstly, although this thesis has not adopted a positivist methodology, future research
would be well served by more systematic testing for the presence and influence of
strategic cultural preferences and biases. Although strategic culture is a useful framework
for correlating collective preferences and policy outcomes, basic questions about the
origins, transmission and evolution of policy preferences among decisionmakers remain.
Strategic culture is a broad attempt to grapple with the dilemma of understanding
collective action on certain issues, but the theoretical perspective is still in its infancy in
many important ways.
This thesis has accepted some of the basic categories of strategic cultural differences –
questions about the inevitability of conflict, zero sum nature of the international system
and utility of military force – but are there other critical assumptions that serve to more
clearly identify and divide one major group from another? Are these differences country
specific, or can they be generally applied across strategic contexts? Some strategic
culture theorists such as Theo Farrell seem to utilize very different identifying categories,
depending on the context, but it is questionable whether this is the result of analytical
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insight or merely an analytical convenience.5 More comprehensive surveys of senior
policymakers and their staff would be helpful in tracing out such linkages and divisions.
Secondly, there is a need for a more comprehensive survey of the links between political
communication and cycles of legitimization and delegitimization of normative beliefs.
This thesis has argued that political argumentation is key to the establishment and
maintenance of legitimate normative beliefs, but significant questions remain about
linkages between discourse and the establishment of limiting discursive space around
specific threat conceptions and policy responses. This linkage is likely to assume a
constantly changing form, as strategic cultures shift in their relative positions of
dominance, as presidential administrations arrive in office and depart, and as political
communications techniques come into and go out of fashion.
To make sense of ongoing policy debates, it is essential to understand the boundaries of
legitimate discourse, and how those boundaries were established. In particular, the
weighting of decisionmaker perceptions of what constituted ‘appropriate’ action are key
to understanding which arguments are made and which discursive strategies are
employed. Further research examining these processes across different historical and
cultural contexts is important to create a better understanding of foreign policy behavior.
The literature on foreign policy analysis would be well served by establishing whether
different strategic culture share successful argumentative strategies for establishing new
legitimate normative beliefs, or delegitimizing existing ones.
Finally, this thesis has indicated that organizations and strategic cultures depend on
mutual reinforcement in the form of conceptual legitimization and institutionalization to
promote and defend policy choice, and that the time required to establish both means that
policy choice may be pervasive even in the face of obvious policy failure. However, are
there other significant shared cultural or organizational factors that lead groups or
                                                 
5 Compare for example Farrell’s ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Programme’,
International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2002), pp. 49-72, and his ‘Strategic Culture and American
Empire’, SAIS Review, vol. 25, no. 2, (Summer-Fall 2005), pp. 3-18
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organizations to defend their policy practices in non-rational circumstances, such as the
obvious mounting costs of failed policy?
One potential avenue for exploring alternative explanations would be to apply Kahneman
and Tversky’s Prospect Theory to broader classes of decision making to determine at
what point a collective decision is considered an ‘investment’ in which irrational
decisions will be made to avoid losses. Kahneman and Tversky’s general “loss
minimization behavior” insight from prospect theory has traditionally been applied to
states as unitary actors in the case of explaining motivations for preventative war.6
However, this thesis has argued that both military organizations and competing strategic
cultures possess different assumptions about what constitutes “loss” and “gain” in such
circumstances. Such research could have important implications for understanding the
role of culture as either sustaining strategic preference in ways defying the expectations
of rational action, or as a cover for political discourse that seeks to simply rationalize
policy positions that originate from other sources of strategic preference.
A final word
This thesis began with a question about ideas and their consequences for foreign policy
outcomes. The impact of culturally shared beliefs and assumptions motivate and justify
our actions in ways often poorly understood by both students and practitioners of foreign
policy. When shared ideas and socially constructed threat conceptions are transmitted to
formal organizations tasked with foreign policy implementation, an additional layer of
complexity makes definitively assessing their impact extremely challenging. It is hoped
that this study has contributed to advancing our understanding of how these forces shape
foreign policy outcomes in often subtle and unexpected ways.
Examining how the United States has responded to the proliferation of unconventional
weapons in the post-Cold War period says a great deal about how American
                                                 
6 Jack S. Levy, ‘Declining Power and the Preventative Motivation for War’, World Politics, vol. 40, no. 1
(October, 1987), pp. 86-90
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policymakers see their role in the world. American debates over the nature of the
international system, and the ideas about how U.S. power should be used to shape that
system are particularly important to understand. Students and practitioners of foreign
policy should therefore make the study of U.S. strategic cultures and formal organizations
a more central focus of attention in order to develop a better understanding of the forces
that can drive the United States towards either constructive or conflictual international
relationships.
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